Marines Chart New Course with Maritime Reconnaissance Companies and Unmanned Launchers

U.S. Marines with 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, operate a multi-mission reconnaissance craft during a sensing capability test as part of Pacific Inferno off the coast of Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, May 6, 2025. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Andrew Whistler)

U.S. Marines to Deploy Maritime Recon Unit, Unmanned Launchers - Naval News

—But Can the Navy Deliver Them to the Fight?

Strategic Pivot Accelerates Littoral Warfare Capabilities Across Indo-Pacific Theater While Amphibious Fleet Crisis Threatens Operational Viability

By Staff

The U.S. Marine Corps' latest Force Design update signals a decisive commitment to distributed maritime operations, with plans to establish Maritime Reconnaissance Companies and field unmanned rocket launchers—capabilities that reflect the service's transformation into a naval expeditionary force optimized for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. Yet as these new formations take shape, the Corps confronts fundamental challenges in sustainment logistics, an adversary rapidly developing countermeasures specifically designed to defeat distributed littoral operations, and a sobering amphibious shipping crisis that threatens to strand Marines ashore when they are needed most at sea.

Return to Pacific Roots

The parallels to World War II are unmistakable. Once again, Marines envision maneuvering across island chains, establishing temporary positions, engaging enemy forces, and repositioning rapidly. The 3rd and 12th Marine Littoral Regiments represent a deliberate return to the Corps' amphibious raiding heritage—small, lethal units operating from austere bases rather than the large, sustained ground forces that characterized operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Yet today's operational environment differs fundamentally from 1942. Where American forces once faced coastal defense guns and air attack, modern Marines must contend with precision-guided anti-ship ballistic missiles, layered air defense networks, drone swarms, cyber warfare, and an adversary possessing comprehensive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities across multiple domains.

Sensors in the Littorals

The new Maritime Reconnaissance Company represents a fundamental enhancement to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force's ability to operate in contested littoral environments. According to Lieutenant Colonel Brian Lusczynski, a capabilities integration officer at Headquarters Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration, each company will field 18 multi-mission reconnaissance craft and 18 unmanned surface vessels, creating a distributed sensor network capable of penetrating gaps in maritime domain awareness.

These units are designed to "maneuver sensors and personnel in support of Marine forces operating in the littorals," providing the persistent surveillance and targeting data essential for long-range precision fires. The multi-mission reconnaissance craft are capable of transporting eight Marines and a rubber craft, offering both intelligence collection and littoral maneuver capabilities, addressing a critical shortfall in the service's ability to operate across archipelagic terrain.

Experimentation with the small boats has been conducted by formations including 1st Light Armor Regiment and 4th Amphibian Assault Battalion, with the latter redesignating two companies as littoral craft companies, pioneering tactics and procedures now being codified across the force.

Unmanned Fires Architecture

Complementing the reconnaissance capability, the Marine Corps will procure Remotely Operated Ground Units for Expeditionary Fires (ROGUE-Fires) equipped with launchers compatible with the Multiple Launch Rocket System Family of Munitions. Wisconsin-based Oshkosh Defense has secured contracts totaling approximately $70 million to integrate autonomous driving technology into the ROGUE-Fires platform and deliver the initial production vehicles, marking a significant evolution in unmanned fires capabilities.

This unmanned platform evolution follows the service's successful fielding of the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), which delivers Naval Strike Missiles from remotely operated vehicles. The first six NMESIS systems were fielded to the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment in November, with additional systems planned for the 12th MLR starting in March 2026. The service has also activated its first Tomahawk cruise missile battery based on the ROGUE-FIRES platform, extending the reach of Marine fires beyond 1,000 nautical miles.

Oshkosh's AutoDrive system will enhance the platform's self-drive and maneuverability for off-road missions in nearly any environment, moving beyond simple leader-follower autonomous capabilities to true independent navigation. The service plans to field 261 NMESIS launchers across 14 batteries by 2030, providing Marine Littoral Regiments with organic anti-ship warfare capabilities that can operate from dispersed island positions.

The Marine Corps' force design update indicates these launchers will enable batteries to fire the same munitions developed for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), including the Precision Strike Missile—a weapon with proven anti-ship applications that extends the Marines' engagement envelope against surface threats while maintaining interoperability with Army fires.

The Logistics Conundrum

Colonel Peter Eltringham, commander of the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment, identified logistics as a key challenge Marines must overcome, given the proliferation of drones, missiles, and China's reach. The traditional Marine Corps sustainment model—dependent on large-scale prepositioned stocks and regular resupply convoys—directly conflicts with stand-in forces' requirements for signature management and operational endurance.

Eltringham noted that logistics teams will have to work supply missions from airfields, expeditionary airfields, landing sites, beach zones, ports, and various other locations as units disperse across the Pacific. This distributed approach demands fundamentally different sustainment concepts than the concentrated logistics hubs that have characterized Marine operations for generations.

The delays in fielding the Medium Landing Ship have exacerbated mobility issues, with limitations in intratheater mobility threatening to render stand-in forces combat ineffective within days of hostilities commencing. The Improved Navy Lighterage System and legacy connectors lack the speed, range, and payload capacity to service dispersed expeditionary advanced bases under fire.

To address these gaps, the 12th Littoral Logistics Battalion is conducting operational testing with the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel, a semi-submersible unmanned logistics delivery system capable of delivering supplies through contested maritime terrain. The ALPV completed its first transit around Japan's southwestern Ryukyu Islands in September, demonstrating the viability of unmanned resupply for forces operating across the First Island Chain.

Marines are also deploying platoon water purification systems capable of producing up to 15 gallons of water per hour from environmental sources, reducing dependence on vulnerable supply lines. Yet even with these innovations, logistics remains the Achilles' heel of modern littoral warfare strategies, as distributed forces require solutions for fuel resupply, ammunition distribution, and casualty evacuation that avoid creating detectable patterns.

The Marine Corps has turned to commercial spot charters for pier-to-pier movement in the Western Pacific, but these contracts are temporary and lapse without follow-on funding. The service faces funding cliffs on experimental platforms including Stern Landing Vessels, with approximately $30 million annually required to sustain these capabilities beyond 2028.

Digital Backbone for Contested Environments

Recognizing that advanced fires capabilities require resilient command and control, the service plans to upgrade existing HIMARS and NMESIS launchers with improved digital fire control systems and software designed to function in denied, degraded, and disrupted space operating environments. This enhancement addresses a critical vulnerability as adversaries develop counter-space capabilities designed to blind U.S. forces.

The Block I version of NMESIS eliminates "swivel chair fires," in which Marines relay data by hand, instead implementing digital fires for faster and more accurate strikes. This automation proves essential when operating under electromagnetic attack or with degraded satellite communications—conditions likely to characterize any high-intensity conflict in the Western Pacific.

Adversary Countermeasures: The Growing Threat

As Marine Corps capabilities mature, the People's Liberation Army is developing sophisticated countermeasures specifically designed to defeat distributed littoral operations. China's anti-access/area denial strategy concentrates advanced ballistic and cruise missiles in conjunction with air and maritime defense systems around Taiwan and the South China Sea, putting U.S. military forces and installations within range of precision-guided weapons.

For anti-access, China relies on advanced land-attack ballistic and cruise missiles to threaten U.S. military facilities on Okinawa and Guam, while employing anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile variants capable of striking with precision. The DF-21D "carrier killer" and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles represent direct threats to surface vessels operating in littoral environments, including the amphibious platforms Marines depend upon for mobility.

China also employs fighter aircraft and an intricate network of air and missile defense platforms for area denial, including indigenously produced systems as well as Russian-built S-300 and reportedly S-400 air defense systems. These layered defenses complicate aviation support for distributed Marine forces, potentially isolating expeditionary advanced bases from air cover during critical phases of operations.

The Drone Swarm Challenge

Perhaps most concerning for littoral operations, the PLA has tested and apparently fielded advanced drone swarm technology for UAVs and uncrewed surface vessels, with June 2025 flight tests of the Jiu Tian SS-UAV aerial mothership capable of releasing 100 to 150 smaller loitering munition drones. PLA researchers are developing autonomous drone swarm technology specifically for potential Taiwan invasion scenarios, examining both amphibious assault and blockade applications.

The PLA is exercising with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance drone swarms for amphibious landing exercises, testing drone formations for "island-blocking scenarios" against targets resembling Taiwan. These capabilities directly threaten the small, dispersed Marine formations operating from island positions, potentially overwhelming defenses through saturation attacks.

Chinese military commentators advocate for layered defense combining robust detection networks with kinetic and non-kinetic countermeasures, blending radars, electro-optical sensors, electronic warfare, and artificial intelligence for real-time threat analysis. This integrated approach enables rapid engagement against swarming drones—the same technologies Marines depend upon for reconnaissance and fires missions.

Field tests of the Hurricane-3000 high-power microwave weapon demonstrate China's capability to disable drones within a 3-kilometer radius, with the system operating at near-light speed to neutralize individual drones or inflict large-scale damage on drone swarms. The system functions like a "hemispherical mosquito net" with a 3-kilometer radius, offering protection against saturation drone attacks.

Space and Cyber Dimensions

China has conducted multiple test-launches of anti-satellite missiles and operates the Third Department (technical reconnaissance bureau) and Fourth Department (electronic countermeasures and radar department) in the PLA's General Staff, conducting cyber-attacks and espionage on a daily basis. These capabilities directly target the command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems upon which distributed Marine operations depend.

The PLA's counter-intervention strategy extends beyond traditional kinetic weapons to encompass what Chinese military theorists call "informatized" warfare—operations designed to paralyze adversary decision-making through attacks on networks, satellites, and data links. For Marine formations operating across vast oceanic distances, loss of satellite communications or GPS navigation could prove catastrophic, isolating units and rendering precision weapons ineffective.

The Amphibious Shipping Crisis: A Force Without Mobility

Yet even as Marines develop innovative concepts and acquire cutting-edge systems, a more fundamental problem threatens the entire enterprise: the Navy lacks sufficient amphibious shipping to deliver these forces into contested areas. Currently, only about 50 percent of the Navy's 32 operational amphibious ships are ready to deploy at any given time—far below the 80 percent readiness goal the Navy set in 2024.

Marine Corps Commandant General Eric Smith has called this a "crisis," noting that the readiness rate needs to be at 80 percent for the mandated minimum of 31 amphibious ships to be sufficient for Marine Corps missions. More troubling still, as of August 2025, amphibious ship readiness had declined to just 41 percent, creating a more than five-month gap in Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments.

One amphibious ship, USS Tortuga, hasn't sailed in more than a decade, and 15 additional ships are not on track to make it to the end of their expected 40-year service lives. A Government Accountability Office report revealed that as of March 2024, half of the amphibious fleet is in poor condition.

The maintenance crisis has cascading operational effects. USS Boxer was forced to delay deployment by 10 months due to maintenance issues across all three ships in its Amphibious Ready Group, and when Boxer finally deployed, it had to return to port within two weeks due to a faulty starboard rudder. From 2011 to 2020, amphibious ships were only available for operations 46 percent of the time.

Smith told Congress bluntly: "I have the Marines, and I have the squadrons, and I have the battalions and the batteries… I just don't have the amphibs". The commandant noted the problem will take at least a decade to fix—a timeline that could prove catastrophic should conflict with China erupt sooner.

The Medium Landing Ship: Promise and Peril

To address mobility gaps, the Navy is pursuing the Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program, formerly called the Light Amphibious Warship. The program envisions procuring 18 to 35 new amphibious ships specifically to support Marine Littoral Regiments implementing Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations.

The Navy requested $268.1 million in FY2025 to procure the first ship, with the Fiscal Year 2026 budget calling for $1.96 billion for nine LSM ships. These vessels would be much smaller and less expensive than traditional amphibious ships—designed to transport approximately 75 Marines and 600 tons of equipment with an 8,000 square foot cargo area.

However, the program faces significant challenges. In December 2024, the Navy canceled its original Request for Proposals for the LSM program due to higher-than-expected bids. The Congressional Budget Office estimates each LSM could cost between $340-430 million—far higher than the Navy's projection of approximately $150 million per ship.

The Navy has now shifted to pursuing commercial/non-developmental item designs, acquiring technical data packages from Bollinger Shipyards for the Israeli Logistics Support Vessel and from Damen Naval for the LST-100 design. Each LSM vessel is expected to take 32-36 months to build, with contracts for up to eight vessels and delivery to be completed within six years of contractor selection.

Even under optimistic timelines, the first LSM delivery is projected for 2028 or 2029—years after the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment achieved initial operational capability in September 2025. This creates a critical gap during which Marine Littoral Regiments will lack their primary intra-theater mobility platform.

Strategic Mismatch

The Navy's shipbuilding plan to maintain 31 ships relies on operating six LHD-class ships and two LSD-class ships beyond their expected service lives, including vessels already in poor material condition. GAO assessment indicates the Navy is likely to face difficulties meeting the statutory requirement to maintain at least 31 operational amphibious warfare ships between 2032 and 2040.

Meanwhile, combatant commanders are requesting the combat power of more than five Marine Expeditionary Units throughout the year—far exceeding what current amphib availability can support. Smith noted that the Corps faces three-, four-, or even six-month gaps in ARG/MEU presence globally.

The Navy and Marine Corps have yet to agree on ship availability requirements. Acting Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jim Kilby stated that the Marine Corps' requirement for 3.0 MEU presence "is not a Navy requirement," adding "I do not have a plan to get 3.0. I have a plan to maintain 31 ships per law in our shipbuilding plan".

This bureaucratic disconnect reveals a deeper problem: the two sea services have yet to achieve true alignment on what Force Design 2030 requires from the amphibious fleet. The Marine Corps has reimagined its force structure, divested major capabilities, and reoriented around distributed maritime operations—but the Navy has not matched this transformation with corresponding investments in the platforms needed to make it operationally viable.

Contested Delivery: The Greater Challenge

Even if the amphibious ship crisis were resolved, delivering Marines into contested areas poses exponentially greater challenges than World War II island-hopping. Traditional amphibious assault ships—large, expensive, and relatively slow—present lucrative targets in an environment dominated by precision weapons and persistent surveillance. Even smaller LSMs operating in littoral waters face detection risks when concentrating forces for landing operations.

This explains the Marine Corps' emphasis on distributed operations, small unit sizes, and rapid repositioning—concepts that depend entirely on having sufficient shipping to execute. The reconnaissance companies provide maritime domain awareness. The NMESIS batteries provide anti-ship fires. But without the means to move these capabilities around the battlespace, they risk becoming fixed targets rather than mobile threats.

The PLA is rapidly attaining all-domain control capabilities in the South China Sea through three decades of modernization bearing fruit in both quantity and quality of hardware. American forces cannot assume freedom of maneuver in contested littorals. Every movement becomes a calculated risk, every concentration a potential target.

Implications and the Path Forward

The Maritime Reconnaissance Company and ROGUE-Fires capabilities represent tangible outputs of Force Design 2030, demonstrating how the service is translating strategic concepts into operational capabilities. Investments in purpose-built surface vessels operating with minimal signatures while providing combat support should be complemented by greater collaboration with allied forces, drawing on their expertise in littoral operations.

Japan's geography particularly enables Marine operations, with Okinawa placing units within immediate range of key straits and island chains for rapid response and layered deterrence. The 12th Marine Littoral Regiment's positioning in Okinawa positions it at the decisive point—but only if it can maneuver across the operational area.

Yet sustainment remains the critical vulnerability. Without solving the logistics challenge, even the most capable sensor-shooter networks risk becoming combat ineffective within days of sustained operations. All critical near-term mobility decisions combined cost less than the refit of a single destroyer, yet funding remains uncertain for platforms essential to littoral operations.

The amphibious shipping crisis compounds these challenges. The Marine Corps has boldly reimagined itself for great power competition, shedding legacy capabilities to become a lighter, more distributed force optimized for the Indo-Pacific. Yet this transformation risks becoming a force without mobility—Marines trained and equipped for littoral operations but unable to reach contested areas due to insufficient shipping.

General Smith's assessment that fixing the amphibious crisis will take at least a decade represents a sobering timeline. The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment achieved initial operational capability in September 2025. The 12th MLR is building capability in Okinawa. Yet these forces may spend years operating without the mobility platforms their concepts require—creating a dangerous window of vulnerability should deterrence fail.

The question isn't whether the Marine Corps concept is sound—the shift toward distributed littoral operations makes strategic sense against a peer adversary. The question is whether the defense establishment can deliver the enabling capabilities to make it operationally viable before Marines are called upon to execute these missions in combat.

Success requires sustained investment from Congress, commitment from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, alignment between the Navy and Marine Corps on requirements and priorities, and industrial base capacity to deliver platforms on accelerated timelines. The reconnaissance companies and unmanned launchers represent important steps forward. But without resolving the amphibious shipping crisis and logistics challenges, the Marine Corps' return to its island-hopping roots may be more aspiration than reality.

The question remains whether these capabilities can mature faster than adversary countermeasures—and whether the logistics and mobility architecture can sustain them in the most challenging operational environment on earth. The Marines aren't waiting for perfect solutions but fielding what works. Yet the gap between operational concept and enabling capability grows wider even as China's counter-intervention capabilities accelerate. Time, as General Smith noted, is not on our side.

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