LCS Mine Warfare Package Advances Despite Technical Hurdles, as Navy Plans 2025 Deployment
In the Indo-Pacific littoral region, offensive and defensive naval mine warfare is likely to be key. This was demonstrated in WW2 and the Korean Conflict. Keeping friendly harbors and choke points open has been identified by the Chinese as critical to their PLAN operations. Conversely, denying the same to the US and its allies such as Japan, Australia, and quasi allies such as Taiwan and India is part of China's offensive strategy. Using mines to quarantine the ROC islands combined with airborne blockade may allow the PRC to reclaim its "renegade province" without invading.Recent developments include a $7.7M engineering support contract to Bollinger and USS Santa Barbara completing first mine warfare training with unmanned vessels. If successful, the Navy plans to retire Avenger-class ships and MH-53E helicopters, concentrating mine countermeasure operations in the Pacific Fleet.
The shift represents a broader trend among Western navies moving toward unmanned MCM operations. While nations like Belgium, Netherlands, and Italy are building dedicated MCM vessels, the U.S. approach relies on converting Independence-class LCS ships, restricting capability to Pacific Fleet operations.
"We're first out of the gate," says Captain Scott B. Hattaway, acknowledging system limitations while emphasizing its pioneering role in unmanned mine warfare. The Navy plans to deploy the first operational MCM-equipped ships to Bahrain in 2025, testing the concept in real-world conditions.
LCS MCM Summary
- Capability:
- - Core systems:
- AN/AQS-20 sonar,
- Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS),
- MH-60S helicopter with laser detection
- - Operations: Detect-to-engage using unmanned vessels (hunt, neutralize, sweep)
- - Standoff: Designed for 10+ mile standoff from minefield
- - Limitations:
- CUSV range/communications require line-of-sight,
- heavy sea state impacts effectiveness
- Status:
- - IOC achieved March 2023
- - First operational package on USS Canberra April 2024
- - Three Independence-class ships equipped
- - First deployment scheduled 2025 (Middle East)
- - No Freedom-class integration
- - Space constraints prevent module switching
- Cost:
- - $7.7M recent engineering support contract (2024)
- - $28B spent through 2019 on LCS development/construction
- - $3.3B spent on operations/support through 2019
- - Estimated $60B total for 35-ship fleet operations/support over 25 years
Transition plan: If 2025-26 deployments succeed, Navy will retire Avenger-class ships and MH-53E helicopters.
The Independence-class LCS USS Santa Barbara (LCS 32) achieved a first last month, becoming the first ship to complete mine warfare training milestones with unmanned surface vessels, an important step forward in the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission module, on schedule for its maiden deployment in 2025.
Parts of the MCM mission package achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on March 31, 2023 after an extensive series of qualification tests aboard USS Cincinnati (LCS 20). The first operational and complete MCM mission package was brought aboard USS Canberra (LCS 30) in April 2024. The effort throughout 2024 concluded with the qualification tests of the mission package being performed by the crew of Santa Barbara.
“The United States has the privilege, and I would say the challenge, of being the first ones out of the gate and putting it into theater. I’m not saying we got it right, I’m saying we’re first out of the gate.”
Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director, SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division
Santa Barbara is the third Independence-class LCS to be fitted with the MCM mission module. USS Canberra (LCS 30) and USS Tulsa (LCS 16) were first and second respectively. No Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ships will be fitted with the MCM package, leaving the entire U.S. MCM capability within the U.S. Pacific Fleet.
The lethality milestones achieved by the crew of Santa Barbara mark a major step forward in the deployment of the MCM mission module, paving the way for its maiden deployment to the Middle East.
The first Littoral Combat Ships equipped with the MCM mission module will deploy to the Middle East in 2025 and 2026 Captain Hattaway told at the Naval Leaders’ Combined Naval Event 24 (CNE 24) conference in the UK in May 2024. He added that the next four ships equipped with the mission module will be forward deployed to the 7th Fleet Area of Responsibility.
If deployments prove successful, the U.S. Navy will begin the process of divesting legacy Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon Airborne Mine Countermeasure Mission (AMCM) helicopters in 2025.
What makes up the LCS MCM mission module?
At the core of the LCS mine warfare mission is the Independence-class LCS itself, which can provide self defense capability to mine countermeasure assets in the area. This includes missile defense provided by the 11-cell Raytheon SeaRAM launcher and general defenses against surface, air, and land targets with the BAE Systems Mark 110 57mm gun.
Embarked for the MCM mission is a MH-60S Seahawk mine warfare helicopter equipped with the AN/AES-1 Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS) which excels at locating moored mines in shallower water. The MH-60S also offers the AN/ASQ-235 Airborne Mine Neutralization System (AMNS), offering a safer method to counter-mine potential threats compared to traditional mechanical minesweeping with EOD divers.
The unmanned portion of the MCM mission module are Common Unmanned Surface Vessels (CUSVs) developed by Textron Systems, also known as the Fleet-class of USVs. These CUSVs can carry the AN/AQS-20C, a forward-look and side-scan sonar capable of locating sea mines, or the Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) which adds acoustic and influence sweep capability to the CUSVs deployed by LCS motherships.
The components of the LCS MCM mission module were not originally designed to be loaded into the 30,000 square feet of mission bay space and shortcomings have been encountered in balancing the space between 11 meter CUSVs, four or five 12-foot CONEX boxes, a lift system for the CUSVs, and an independent berthing box for the operators of the MCM suite.
Due to these space constraints, modularity of this platform is no longer offered or being pursued by the U.S. Navy to switch between mission modules, a sharp turn from the original planning of the LCS.
Current limitations of the LCS Mine Countermeasures mission package
According to Captain Scott B. Hattaway, Director of the SMWDC Mine Countermeasures Technical Division, the 11 meter CUSV is currently limited by form factor, limiting the endurance of the platform and the weight of the cable for towed sonar depth. The current form factor of the CUSV is limiting the maximum performance that can be extracted from the AN/AQS-20C sonar suite.
Another limiting factor, according to Captain Hattaway, is the range offered by the CUSV. Line of sight between the LCS mothership and the CUSV is required. In heavy sea states, effectiveness is limited. Bandwidth is taxed by the amount of information that needs to be shared back and forth to the operator and the sensor suites. The U.S. Navy is working on methods to extend the range of deployed CUSVs, including the use of Starshield, the U.S. military’s arm of the Starlink satellite internet platform.
“We’re looking at having a UAV with a towed antenna, raising the elevation to hundreds of feet in the air that will allow us to increase the range of USVs, as well as having Starlink as a backup.”
Captain Scott B. Hattaway
The maiden deployment to the Middle East will supplement forward deployed Avenger-class mine countermeasure ships currently homeported in Bahrain. The deployment will also allow for the collection of real-world data and feedback from sailors to refine the mission package and make necessary design changes ahead of a wider rollout to the LCS fleet.
Littoral Combat Ship Still Fighting to Prove Its Worth
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Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship USS Gabrielle Giffords launches a Naval Strike Missile during Exercise Pacific Griffin (Navy photo) |
The Littoral Combat Ship was meant to start the Navy’s operational renaissance. But a chorus of naysayers and critics have put service leaders on the defensive, insisting that the troubled program has turned a corner.
A recent panel discussion on the ship at the Surface Navy Association’s national symposium began by asking its audience for a show of hands.
“Raise your hand if you’ve ever said something bad about the Littoral Combat Ship,” the panel host said. “Raise your hand if you’re still saying bad things about the Littoral Combat Ship.”
Perhaps more significant than the sea of hands and knowing laughter was the fact that a panel focused on the program’s merits began by acknowledging its unpopularity.
The LCS program, now 22 years old, was fraught with controversy before it even began. Navy leaders debated the usefulness of small combatants within the naval fleet and what exactly they would do — and how.
A 2014 report authored by former Undersecretary of the Navy Robert Work titled, “The Littoral Combat Ship: How We Got Here, and Why,” said while Navy leaders remained resolute in their defense of large combatants, a Navy Global Concept of Operations that sprung from the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review created the need for small warships capable of performing “focused or special missions in inshore waters where it would be impractical or unwise to commit larger, more high-value forces,” Work wrote.
In the report’s forward, Robert Rubel, then-dean for the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, described the early vision of the Littoral Combat Ship as a program meant to bring about a naval renaissance, ushering in “a new naval operational art oriented on combined arms” and expanding the service’s focus beyond tactics and strategy.
Over the next two decades, the program would endure scheduling delays, nebulous design concepts, a ballooning budget, costly training and maintenance and failed weapons systems. The Navy has decommissioned seven ships since 2021 — some mere years into their 25-year service life — with plans to retire seven more over the next three years.
“Perhaps the most serious objection to LCS is that the Navy charged into series production without having a clear idea of how the ship would be used,” Rubel wrote.
A 2022 Government Accountability Office report titled, “Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Address Significant Operational Challenges and Implement Planned Sustainment Approach,” said the ship was intended to bring increased warfighting flexibility and close critical warfighting gaps, “but over the years, the Navy has experienced challenges in demonstrating these capabilities.”
The ship, designed to operate in shallow waters close to shore, consists of two parts: the ship itself and its mission packages. The Navy developed two variants, Freedom — a steel design built by Lockheed Martin — and Independence — an aluminum design by an industry team originally led by General Dynamics, but Austal USA now serves as the prime contractor.
The design for the LCS was to support specific mission packages, including surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.
The program has struggled to implement its planned mission packages, with failed attempts at mine countermeasures technology and eventually scrapping the anti-submarine package. However, the Navy announced in May 2023 the mine countermeasures mission package — a suite of maritime systems and sensors to counteract mines in littorals — achieved initial operational capability.
The intent of the LCS mission packages is to free up more expensive large surface combatants like cruisers and destroyers to focus on their primary missions, the GAO report said.
“However, we reported in 2017 that costs to construct the ships have more than doubled from initial expectations, and promised levels of capability have been unfulfilled,” the report continued. An originally planned fleet of 55 Littoral Combat Ships dropped to 35.
The ship’s design — or lack thereof — has been one of the program’s most scrutinized aspects, with criticism ranging from a ship built for speed at the expense of survivability to an ill-conceived design not fully thought out prior to production.
As the program swayed, so did its budget.
The GAO report found that as of fiscal year 2019 the Navy had spent more than $28 billion to develop and build 32 Littoral Combat Ships, and as of December 2019, the Navy had planned to build three more by 2025. The service had already spent “at least $3.3 billion” to operate and support 17 LCS since 2008, and in 2011 the Navy estimated a cost of $38 billion to operate and support 35 ships for their planned service lives of 25 years. By the end of 2018, the service’s estimate had nearly doubled to more than $60 billion.
The GAO report also found the Navy’s cost estimates did not account for a revised maintenance approach, and that the Navy had not demonstrated the operational or warfighting capabilities the LCS fleet needed to perform its missions.
The GAO report is one of many documenting “numerous quality problems” that persisted after the ships were delivered to the fleet and costly maintenance and training deficiencies that remain unaddressed.
Work — one of the program’s defenders — argued its critics were focused too narrowly on the ship’s design features, characteristics and concept of employment without considering its intended supporting role in a new fleet architecture or the design choices that sprung from it. The program was conceived “as an integral part of a new battle force architecture that continues to evolve,” he said.
Officers at the Surface Navy Association panel briefly acknowledged the program’s tarnished reputation but said it was ready for redemption. Moderator Rear Adm. Ted LeClair, director of Task Force Littoral Combat Ship, emphasized the “tremendous progress the Navy has made in making the LCS ship class more reliable, sustainable and lethal.”
Perhaps the most championed upgrade was the program’s approach to training and maintenance, a sore and expensive subject in the program’s history. All four panelists and LeClair highlighted a shift from an almost complete reliance on contractors for maintenance to training crews that can be both operators and maintainers.
LeClair said the task force has partnered with regional maintenance centers to establish maintenance execution teams that are fully operational on both coasts and “[continuing] to drive greater self-sufficiency” onboard ships.
The hope is that the teams will eventually take over maintenance checks that have traditionally been handled almost entirely by the original equipment manufacturers.
Capt. Marc Crawford, commodore of Littoral Combat Ship Squadron One, said as recently as 2020, 95 percent of maintenance checks were being handled by contractors, with maintenance execution teams handling 5 to 10 percent. So far in 2024, maintenance teams have taken over about 70 percent. “That in and of itself is a tremendous feat,” he added.
Capt. Sean Lewis, commodore of Destroyer Squadron Seven, said a deeper investment is still needed in the LCS sailor “and their ability to perform preventative maintenance and corrective maintenance without over-relying upon flying contractors or government employees into a theater — which I cannot rely upon, especially in the fight.”
The program is also shifting toward a concept called single crewing — an approach that combines what has previously been two separate crews trained on separate platforms into one.
Capt. Mark Haney, commodore of Littoral Combat Ship Squadron Two, said the concept is not just combining two crews into one, but re-envisioning what an LCS crew looks like. The one crew concept is a return to basics, he said — “a more standard, traditional capacity, [to] be able to do your own maintenance, having supply on board a traditional combatant, returning that to an LCS.”
Split crews took away from their opportunity to gain knowledge about how to operate their ships, he added.
Training and maintenance play into the Navy’s broader goal of improved operational availability, established by an in-depth review of the program in 2020. The review resulted in then-Commander of Naval Surface Forces retired Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener creating Task Force LCS, which focused on a key performance parameter known as materiel availability.
The metric assigns a score derived from an assumed operational availability of .85, considering both unplanned and planned maintenance downtime. It’s also a parameter by which the panel championed the LCS’s recent successes.
The latest triumph was an “unprecedented’’ 26-month deployment of the Independence-class USS Charleston to the Western Pacific, Crawford said.
Capt. James Hoey, assistant chief of staff for Littoral Combat Ship and mine countermeasures readiness for Naval Surface Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet, said the ship maintained an average materiel availability of .72 throughout the deployment, or 13 percent above the .64 threshold established by the task force.
Four other Independence-class ships currently deployed to Seventh Fleet — Gabrielle Giffords, Manchester, Oakland and Mobile — are operating at a .73 materiel availability, “which means they’re operating at a 96 percent efficiency rate, which is fantastic,” Hoey said.
The task force also focused on improving lethality, which the panel highlighted when discussing the ship’s missile capabilities.
Gabrielle Giffords, Manchester, Oakland and Mobile are all equipped with the Naval Strike Missile — a long-range, precision strike weapon that seeks and destroys enemy ships at distances greater than 100 nautical miles. Freedom-class ships are expecting installation of the missile in fiscal year 2025, Haney said.
“This is a ship killer,” he said. “That is a high-end fight weapons system.”
In October, an SM-6 multi-mission missile was launched off the back of an Independence-class ship, which Crawford called “unprecedented” and “just the tip of the iceberg.”
LeClair said more impressive than the launch itself was the time it took to install the SM-6. The missile was installed in three days and fully operational, and “we think we can get that down to a day,” he said. It was also uninstalled in 24 hours, he added. “That versatility is exactly what we designed the ships to do. We just have to be creative with what we want to put on there and how we want to do it.”
The ships are also incorporating unmanned aerial systems such as Textron Systems’ Aerosonde — a small, multi-mission drone used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance — which was installed for the first time ever on the Independence-class USS Savannah in fall 2023, with operational testing in December proving “highly successful,” Crawford said. The system is currently being installed on the USS Mobile, he added.
The Freedom class, with four delivered to Naval Station Mayport in Florida and an expected 11 total by 2025, means capacity, Haney said — “capacity to deploy ships in other theaters on a regular basis.”
The success of systems like Aerosonde shows the potential for the LCS “to be a cornerstone of naval operations,” Lewis said. “I’m a believer in LCS in the right environments. The Littoral Combat Ship is a tool for naval excellence.”
As the LCS program works to gain more believers, the Navy continues to express confidence in the ship’s relevance to the service.
“You look at the needs of the fleet commanders [and] the surface Navy, LCS provides capability across a wide range of mission areas that does free up the [guided missile destroyers] to go do that high-tier mission set,” Haney said. “In the Red Sea, you had … [Freedom-class LCS] Indianapolis holding down the Arabian Gulf where you would have had to put a DDG in there to do those same mission sets. So, there’s great value when you look across the landscape of what the Navy demand signal is today.”
Crawford called the LCS the cavalry of the Navy, “whether it’s a scouting mission that we’re doing to support maritime domain awareness … or whether it’s flanking maneuvers that we’re doing to go envelop the adversary. The LCS can bring that to the fight.”
Five or 10 years ago, LeClair said the conversation about the LCS class was “very different. But I feel strongly we have turned a corner. We still have more work to do, but I have tremendous confidence in the ships and the crews.” ND
Topics: Shipbuilding
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