Writing about aerospace and electronic systems, particularly with defense applications. Areas of interest include radar, sonar, space, satellites, unmanned plaforms, hypersonic platforms, and artificial intelligence.
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Foundational Measures
All organizations should take certain foundational measures to implement a strong cybersecurity program:
Fix the known security flaws in software. Check the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog
for software used by your organization and, if listed, update the
software to the latest version according to the vendor’s instructions. Note: CISA continually updates the KEV catalog with known exploited vulnerabilities.
Implement multifactor authentication (MFA). Use multifactor authentication
where possible. MFA is a layered approach to securing your online
accounts and the data they contain. When you enable MFA in your online
services (like email), you must provide a combination of two or more
authenticators to verify your identity before the service grants
you access. Using MFA protects your account more than just using a
username and password. Why? Because even if one factor (like your
password) becomes compromised, unauthorized users will be unable to meet
the second authentication requirement, ultimately stopping them from
gaining access to your accounts.
Halt bad practices. Take
immediate steps to: (1) replace end-of-life software products that no
longer receive software updates; (2) replace any system or products that
rely on known/default/unchangeable passwords; and (3) adopt MFA (see
above) for remote or administrative access to important systems,
resources, or databases.
Sign up for CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning. Register for this service by emailing vulnerability@cisa.dhs.gov
.
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reports within two weeks. Note: vulnerability scanning
helps secure internet-facing systems from weak configurations and known
vulnerabilities and encourages the adoption of best practices.
Get your Stuff Off Search (S.O.S.). While zero-day
attacks draw the most attention, frequently, less complex exposures to
both cyber and physical security are missed. Get your Stuff Off Search–S.O.S.–and reduce internet attack surfaces that are visible to anyone on web-based search platforms.
UNDERWATER AUTONOMY | ADBR: Regional advances in underwater autonomous devices Back in 1957, Britain’s Defence White Paper saw a future in which the supremacy of guided missile systems meant the era of the manned…
Regional advances in underwater autonomous devices
Back in 1957, Britain’s Defence White Paper saw a future in
which the supremacy of guided missile systems meant the era of the
manned fighter aircraft was effectively over. That turned out to be
somewhat premature – as we well know, human-piloted combat aircraft are
still around.
Some analysts are saying much the same about crewed submarines, that
emerging sensors will make the sea “transparent,” eliminating the
fundamental submarine stealth advantage, and that uncrewed surface and
underwater hunter-killer systems will be so effective that traditional
submarines won’t stand a chance in the conflict of the future.
Uncrewed aerial system (UAS) perform many useful functions, including
surveillance and strike. Air combat of the future will feature crewed
aircraft such as F-35 and Super Hornet operating in conjunction with UAS
such as Boeing’s Loyal Wingman.
The war under the sea will likely be much the same, with a growing role for Unmanned (uncrewed) Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).
The Royal Australian Navy already operates UUVs performing underwater
survey and mine clearance. Collins class submarines – now destined for
many more years of service – will likely soon go to sea with an onboard
UUV in a Loyal Wingman-type role, as will their nuclear-powered
successors.
The roles of UUVs will likely soon expand – from surveying, sensing
for surface and submarine threats and, if need be, serving as a decoy,
to ultimately go to war in their own right, fighting autonomously
against adversary crewed and uncrewed platforms.
With Australia now embarking on the long journey to acquire nuclear
subs, a number of commentators have suggested we should also acquire a
large UUV such as the Boeing Orca (title pic), now in trials with the US
Navy.
Orca is a development of the Echo Voyager, a fully autonomous 15.5
metre 45 tonne UUV, able to dive to depths of 3,000 metres and cover
6,500 nautical miles. Power is diesel-electric with lithium-ion
batteries.
With no requirement to accommodate humans, uncrewed submarines can be
simple and compact. The US Navy has big ideas for Orcas which could
perform surveillance and intelligence gathering, mine countermeasures,
anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare, and
strike missions.
So far it has ordered five at a price of US$274.4m (A$366.5m) – much cheaper than any crewed platform.
“The RAN, working in early, close partnership with the US Navy and US
and Australian industrial partners to develop and field the Orca, and
make a range of different payloads for it, is the path that is likely to
bring the most undersea combat power most quickly to Australia’s
military,” wrote Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) senior
analyst Michael Shoebridge in March.
That was before the government announced Australia would acquire
nuclear submarines (see article on page 26), when it seemed the new
conventionally-powered Attack class boats were unlikely to enter service
before the mid-2030s. But the new nuclear subs are likely to be even
further away. Meanwhile Australia’s submarine capabilities will be
delivered by upgraded but increasingly ageing Collins boats (see article
on page 30).
Bluefin 12 UUV
CHINA Shoebridge said it was unfortunately
obvious that even the most sophisticated crewed submarine would need to
work with a range of sensors and other systems including UUVs if it was
to operate safely and effectively against adversary systems like China
was already fielding. “That’s probably true right now in a place like
the South China Sea, and it’ll only get more manifestly obvious between
now and 2035,” he said.
Unsurprisingly, China says little about its own UUV capabilities,
manifested through occasional display of vessels on the back of trucks
during various military parades, or through Indonesian fishermen netting
glider-like surveillance UUVs as far south as the Java Sea.
China is developing a range of UUVs for different applications. The
largest seems to be the Haishen 6000, a 3.5-tonne eight-metre prototype
reportedly capable of diving to 6,000 metres.
How good are Chinese UUVs? We just don’t know. It does appear that
China’s most mature capabilities are in marine surveying and
reconnaissance, but growing competencies in artificial intelligence (AI)
would appear to have significant implications for its future UUV
capabilities. That’s because any UUV, unless tethered to a mother
vessel, is effectively on its own.
That’s fine for conducting defined brief missions such as mine
clearance, but for extended operations as will be performed by Orca, the
vessel needs to make its own decisions without regular input from an
operator.
UUVs face the same communication constraints as regular submarines.
Radio works fine on the surface but only transmissions at Very Low and
Extremely Low Frequencies (VLF/ELF) can reach subs at operational
depths. And those transmissions are one way – the sub can’t respond
until it surfaces – are slow, have low bandwidth, and require vast
onshore infrastructure, such as the Harold E. Holt Naval Communications
Station in Western Australia.
A Royal Australian Navy Bluefin 9. (ADF)
AUSTRALIAN UUVs It may not be particularly
visible or widely known, but the Royal Australian Navy has a strong
interest in UUV technology, and has maintained a close watch on
developments and already fields a number of systems.
Late last year, the Navy released its Robotics, Autonomous Systems,
and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) Strategy. While the strategy
doesn’t single-out specific technologies, it does identify common
enablers required to make the Navy RAS-AI ready.
It says some technology is available now, able to conduct simple
well-defined missions, with human oversight. But by 2030, technologies
will be maturing, able to perform missions independently, automatically
adapting to changing situations. And by 2040, systems will feature
advanced understanding of scenes from their sensors, an ability to
perform ideas-based reasoning, and able to navigate in dense and dynamic
environments.
In the near term, UUVs will be able to track submarines in support of
ASW operations, conduct long-endurance ISR, navigation and networking,
and attack surface vessels. Further out, UUVs will be able to perform
time-critical strikes from a submerged platform against land targets.
With a vast area of interest and limited platforms and personnel, the
Navy is looking to autonomous systems to generate mass and tempo on a
scale it otherwise could not achieve.
The Navy first used remotely operated systems more than three decades
ago with a surface system to tow targets. Minehunters – the old Bay
class and the Huon class – both used tethered UUVs to hunt sea mines.
Next generation mine-hunting systems – which are on the way through
Project SEA 1905 – will use more sophisticated UUVs to ensure humans and
valuable vessels go nowhere near minefields.
For deployable mine countermeasures, the RAN currently operates the
70kg General Dynamics Bluefin 9 and the 213kg Bluefin 12, while actual
mine disposal is performed by the Sonartech Atlas Seafox, an expendable
UUV which destroys itself and the mine. For rapid environmental
assessment of a harbour or landing beach, the Navy will use a pair of
37kg REMUS 100 UUVs.
Submarines of the future – ours, those of allies, and adversaries –
will be equipped with onboard UUVs, now an emerging capability.
Long before they retire, Australia’s Collins boats will go to sea
with embarked UUVs, possibly the in-service Bluefin 12 or its larger
sibling, the Bluefin 21, a 750kg long-endurance UUV able to reach depths
of 4,500 metres.
Launching such UUVs is not a problem – Bluefin 21 is 21 inches in
diameter, the same as a standard torpedo tube. Smaller UUVs can swim
right out, although the US Navy is investigating sabot systems. But
recovery is more problematic, as UUVs can’t easily swim back down the
torpedo tube, though that may come.
Various underwater recovery systems have been proposed, among them
using divers to manually retrieve the UUV or a remotely operated
deck-mounted capture arm. Under the US Navy’s Snakehead program, the dry
deck shelter which is used for deploying SEALs and their swimmer
vehicles, will be modified for launch and recovery of large UUVs.
Australia has good understanding of allied capabilities thanks to the
Autonomous Warrior exercise series which Navy describes as its flagship
program to demonstrate, evaluate, and trial emerging systems at various
technical readiness levels.
Autonomous Warrior 2018, which followed Unmanned Warrior 2016 in
Scotland, was held in Jervis Bay and involved realistic trials of 77
air, surface, and underwater platforms and systems from various nations
and Australian and overseas companies.
The most recent AW activity was a virtual conference held in June and hosted by Warfare Innovation Navy..
Atlas Seafox. (SONARTECH)
This article appeared in the Sep-Dec 2021 issue of ADBR.
“#Undersea warfare is a lot more than just #submarine
versus submarine. My job is to make sure our undersea forces—and that
includes our ballistic missile submarines, our attack submarines, our
carrier strike group ASW [anti-submarine warfare] forces, maritime
patrol aircraft, fixed systems, #unmanned and #autonomous systems, all of that—are able to integrate as part of an undersea battle force,” explains Rear Adm. Richard Seif, USN, https://lnkd.in/ggG3CRd3 commander, Undersea Warfighting Development Center (UWDC), Groton, Connecticut https://lnkd.in/g4PAqt4Y.
“Given
constraints on the number of submarines we may be able to afford as a
country, frankly, the ability to deploy unmanned systems as a
system-of-systems approach is going to be critical. And then #artificialintelligence and #machinelearning for that decision superiority and data-driven decision making, I think all fits together,” he asserts.
The
UWDC is exploring a variety of unmanned systems for the undersea
mission. “We’re making tremendous progress on a whole family of systems,
everything from small, unmanned vehicles to fully autonomous vehicles,
able to carry a variety of payloads. We certainly see that as not just a
need but a real value to the force to be able to integrate unmanned
systems for everything from wide area search to surveys to delivering
effects if we need to,” he says.
Here's What to Remember: Chinese strategists seem
to be increasingly practiced (at least in a domestic context) at selling
the argument that more and new types of weapons enhance deterrence and
thus strategic stability.
When one reads enough Chinese naval literature, diagrams of
multi-axial cruise missile saturation attacks against aircraft carrier
groups may begin to seem normal. However, one particular graphic from
the October 2015 issue (p. 32) of the naval journal Naval & Merchant Ships [舰船知识]
stands out as both unusual and singularly disturbing. It purports to
map the impact of a Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
strike by twenty nuclear-armed rockets against the United States.
Targets include the biggest cities on the East and West Coasts, as
well as in the Midwest, as one would expect. Giant radiation plumes
cover much of the country and the estimate in the caption holds that the
strike “would yield perhaps 50 million people killed” [可能造成5000 万死亡].
The map below that graphic on the same page illustrates the optimal aim
point for a hit on New York City with a “blast wave” [火风量] that
vaporizes all of Manhattan and well beyond.
That makes the North Korean “threat” look fairly insignificant by
comparison, doesn’t it? But what’s really disturbing is that the
scenario described above envisions a strike by China’s largely
antiquated DF-5 first generation ICBM. In other words, the illustration
is perhaps a decade or more out of date. As China has deployed first the
road-mobile DF-31, then DF-31A, and now JL-2 (a submarine-launched
nuclear weapon), China’s nuclear strategy has moved from “assured retaliation” to what one may term “completely assured retaliation.”
Indeed, the actual theme of the article featuring those graphics
concerns recent reports regarding testing of the DF-41 mobile ICBM. The
author of that article, who is careful to note that his views do not
represent those of the publication, observes that when a Chinese Defense
Ministry spokesperson was queried about the test on August 6, 2015, the
spokesperson “did not deny that the DF-41 exists” [并没有否认‘东风’41 的存在].
The author also cites U.S. intelligence reports, concluding that four
tests have now been conducted, including one that demonstrates
multiple-reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology. The author estimates that
DF-41 will finally provide China with the capability to launch missiles
from north central China and hit all targets in the U.S. (except
Florida). With the goal of better understanding the rapidly evolving
strategic nuclear balance between China and the U.S. and its
significance, this Dragon Eye surveys some recent Mandarin-language writings on the subject of Chinese nuclear forces.
To be sure, a flurry of Chinese writings on the nuclear balance did
follow after the September parade in Beijing that highlighted Chinese
missile forces. Perhaps the most remarkable revelation from the parade
was the unveiling of the DF-26, a new, longer-range anti-ship ballistic
missile (ASBM), based on the revolutionary shorter-ranged cousin, the
DF-21D ASBM. In fact, the November 2015 issue of the aforementioned journal ran
a series of articles on the DF-26. In those articles, the weapon is
described multiple times as a “nuclear conventional dual-purpose” [核常兼备]
weapon. The major thrust of the article in that issue on the impact of
the DF-26 on nuclear strategy seems to be to try to debunk the argument
that China’s deployment of this new type of missile is “destabilizing.”
Like their American counterparts, Chinese strategists seem to be
increasingly practiced (at least in a domestic context) at selling the
argument that more and new types of weapons enhance deterrence and thus
strategic stability.
Despite the developments related above, the balance of opinion in
Beijing seems impressively moderate on the prospects for a major
nuclear buildup by China. In the allegedly nationalist forum of Global Times [环球时报],
one commentator from the China Institute for International Studies
(associated with the Foreign Ministry), for example, offered a few
illuminating comments about a year ago in an expert forum entitled “How Many Nuclear Warheads Are Enough for China?”
He is evidently concerned that “We have heard some new voices calling
to ‘build a nuclear force appropriate for a great power.’” Instead, he
argues that China must continue to focus on building a “small, elite and
effective nuclear forces” [精干有效的核力量]. Likewise, a former vice-director
of the Chinese Navy Nuclear Security Bureau offers that China is a
medium-sized nuclear power, which should learn from the experience of
Britain and France and deploy no fewer than four submarines carrying
nuclear weapons (SSBNs)—far fewer than operated by either Russia or the
United States.
Yet one can still find in that same analysis ample concern among
Chinese specialists regarding new directions in U.S. military
capabilities that could threaten China’s deterrent. Another concern
amply evident in Chinese writings concerns tactical nuclear weaponry.
Most of this reporting of late concerns a recent upgrade to the American B-61 nuclear bomb.
A full-page graphic in the same issue that discusses the DF-41 missile
tests offers many specifics on the B-61, including its “dial-a-yield”
[威力可调技术] feature that enables the operator to choose destruction on a
scale ranging from fifty to 0.3 kilotons. That same month, in the
magazine Aerospace Knowledge [航空知识], a “centerfold” featured the SS-26 Iskander, a Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapon. Elsewhere, I have, moreover, documented Chinese discussions of tactical nuclear weapons for
anti-submarine warfare, as well as the importance of nuclear-tipped
submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCMs) for strategy in the late Cold
War. Let’s hope that these are just academic discussions in the Chinese
context and do not reflect actual weapons under development.
As one can see from this discussion, there is ample reason for
anxiety with many new Chinese nuclear systems now coming online, as well
as substantial reason for optimism. As an author who frequently rides
China’s high-speed rail [高铁], I am acutely aware that astronomical sums
of money spent on that system could just as easily have been spent
building an enormous arsenal of nuclear weaponry. That was not done and
it’s certainly good that Chinese leaders have their priorities straight.
American strategists need to keep this Chinese restraint in mind,
especially as they weigh both new, expensive weapons systems (missile
defense augmentation, the new strategic bomber, SSBN-X, and also prompt
global strike) and a set of measures to counter Beijing within the
maritime disputes on its flanks.
This first appeared several years ago and is being reposted due to reader interest.
