US Approves $75 Million Taiwan Tactical Data Link Upgrade
While it is to be competed, the ATDLSU program looks like a lock for Lockheed Martin, who had the original PoSheng program which upgraded all three services of Republic of China [Taiwan] (see video below), from 2003 to 2012. I worked on an Opnet full network model of the PoSheng network under CACI.
The Lockheed Martin Po Sheng team also included key companies
throughout the United States. California-based companies include ViaSat
located in Carlsbad and CACI International, Inc., Titan, Information
Networking Systems, Inc., and Digital Wizards in the San Diego area.
Other team members include Alion Science and Technology, Annapolis,
Maryland; Veridian Engineering Group, Arlington, Virginia; and Austin,
Texas-based Advance Programming Concepts, Inc., all of whom supported
data link processing, developmental test, evaluation and network
design.
I doubt they'll be able to pull the old team together, as ViaSat has sold off their tactical data link business to L3Harris.
The US State Department has approved the possible sale of the Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade Planning and related equipment to Taiwan.
The estimated $75-million sale includes cross domain solutions, high assurance devices, GPS receivers, and communications equipment.
“The proposed sale will improve the recipient’s ability to meet current and future threats by enhancing communications and network security, and providing infrastructure to allow the secure flow of tactical information,” the Defense Security Cooperation Agency stated.
The principal contractor will be decided through a competitive process.
NATO Link-22 Upgrade
Washington last year decided to upgrade Taiwan’s Link 16 data link system to NATO’s Link-22, offering greater range and a direct connection to the US military.
Link-22 is a secure beyond-line-of-sight communications capability that interconnects “air, surface, subsurface, and ground-based tactical data systems,” Focus Taiwan wrote, citing head of Department of Strategic Planning Lee Shih-Chiang.
Chinese Sanctions US Firms
It comes as China sanctioned five US defense contractors last month in response to their arms sales to Taiwan, freezing their properties based in China.
The firms are BAE Systems Land and Armaments, AeroVironment, Viasat, Alliant Techsystems Operation, and Data Link Solutions
China 'Breathes Fire' As Taiwan Set To Acquire US-Led NATO's 'Most Advanced' Tactical Data Link System - Link 22
In a significant military development that might affect how a clash between Taiwanese-American and Chinese forces pans out, Taiwan has announced it will acquire the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Link 22 tactical data link systems.
Lee Shih-Chiang, the head of the Republic of China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) Department of Strategic Planning, made the statement at a meeting of the legislature’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee.
Data links are digital radio-based systems that interconnect multiple air and ground assets. They share each platform’s view and position and present a tactical battlefield picture. Core data regarding information and input can also be sent to multiple assets.
Coalition militaries of various countries, like NATO, find particular utility for data links, like the predominant Link 16, which is common across nearly every American and European tactical and strategic fighting platform.
Fallback When Chinese Jam Communications?
A report in Taipei Times said the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to jam Taiwanese radio communications through electronic warfare (EW).
Saying Link 22 “could prevent that” implies a scenario where Taiwanese fighters, ground command and control centers, and warships are not entirely cut off from each other.
Broadly aware of the other’s position, weapons data, fuel, and the location of nearby PLA forces, they can receive further advanced information from American surveillance assets like the E-3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning (AEW), RC-135 Rivet Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) aircraft and RQ-4B Global Hawk strategic surveillance drones.
These aircraft would fly around the South and East China Seas, keeping a watch on the battlefield during a potential Taiwan crisis.
How Advanced Is The Link 22?
The data linking and sharing are also markedly different and diverse than the Link 16 systems on some of the leading four and 4.5-generation fighters.
Link 16 merely transmits positional, fuel, and weapons payload data other fighters are carrying and some communication information in an omnidirectional fashion, spreading everywhere, with the transmission highly vulnerable to being intercepted.
But using the Link-22 boasts greater anti-jamming capabilities and improves command efficiency while providing faster communications transmissions.
Chieh Chung, an associate research fellow with the National Policy Foundation in Taipei, was quoted saying that Link 22 is a substantial advancement over Link 16. “It greatly strengthens anti-jamming capabilities and improves command efficiency while providing faster communications transmissions,” Chung said.
Taiwan’s own domestically developed data link system, built by the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CIST), is very broadly based on the American Link 16 and meets many of its military’s needs.
But Link 22 allows it to tap into US military data links directly, as the latter’s assets will surely see some level of participation in a conflict with China.
Even if it is assumed the nature of US involvement would only be complementing and secondary – logistics, arms transfers, and providing surveillance and targeting as it does for Ukraine – having access to additional surveillance and battlespace information from superior US technology gives Taiwanese commanders many options.
Su Tzu-yun, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, further differentiated between the Link 16 and Link 22 systems, saying the latter uses high-frequency and [the former wide band] ultra-high frequency bands that can operate long distances without a satellite.
Link-22 features an automatic grouping function that can fully map out the positions of enemy and friendly forces via a common operational picture (COP), Su said.
China’s XS-3 and DTS-03 data links are already superior to Link 16. Hence Taiwan receiving the Link-22 gives it a massive edge in tactical situational awareness.
The Link 22’s website describes it as “beyond the line of sight (BLOS) communications” and “gap less communication across 1000 nautical miles.” [via surface ground wave HF]
Seven specific NATO member nations are a part of the Link 22 project, including the US, UK, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Spain.
Developed as an improvement over the older Link 11 and meant to complement Link 16, the program enhanced data exchange and provided a new layered communications architecture.
China Unhappy
China’s Foreign Ministry and other defense commentators slammed the development, saying such arms sales do not deter China’s position on Taiwan and that the actions are meant to encircle and provoke Beijing strategically.
Reacting to the transfer of Link 22 and the first shipment of FIM-92 Stinger man-portable air defense (MANPAD) systems that arrived on the island, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning called it an “extremely wrong and dangerous move.”
The report in Global Times also quoted leading military expert Song Zhongping, who pointed out that the transfer of the Link 22 essentially proves the US would be commanding and directing Taiwanese operations. This implied they were less likely to take on the Chinese military frontally.
“The man-portable air-defense system like the FIM-92 Stinger missile has proved its lethality in urban warfare…and once Taiwan authorities obtain the Link-22 system, it means that the island will be brought under the US combat command structure,” Song said.
At a political level, the US agreeing to give Taiwan Link 22 means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leadership has fully consented and is on board.
This shouldn’t be a surprise as the bloc has been trying to make inroads into Asia by enhancing cooperation with Japan and adopting a hardline on China over Taiwan, calling it a future Ukraine.
- The author can be reached at satamp@gmail.com
- Follow EurAsian Times on Google News
A Study on the Future Development Trend of Air Data Links
in 國防大學空軍指揮參謀學院空權與國防學術研討會論文集 (Proceedings of the Air Power and National Defense Academic Seminar at the Air Force Command and Staff College, National Defense University), issue 2021/10, p.-60Title: III. Development and Application of CCP Data Link Systems
Since the first Gulf War in 1991, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been developing high-intensity data link systems using information technology. Drawing inspiration mainly from the U.S. military command system, which shifted from a "vertical" information acquisition and decision command to a "horizontal" level where all military units could obtain the same intelligence, the CCP recognized the importance of data link systems in the joint operations of the U.S. military. (see Note 16)(I) Overview of Development
The development of CCP data link systems began in the early 1980s with the HN-900 model as the initial system, initially used for tactical data processing on naval vessels and information exchange with external equipment. Due to the CCP's early push for digital informationization, the lack of integration in the research and development of the foundational design resulted from the varied needs and independent thinking of different military branches.From the mid-1990s, the CCP established the HN-901, HN-902, and HN-903 data link systems, implementing technological and destructive capabilities in coordinated naval, air-to-air, and naval-to-land operations. Subsequent developments, such as the TJN-905 data link, marked the maturity of data link system development. During this time, the system could execute rapid responses and feedback between command centers, issuing operational commands and receiving battlefield information, establishing a complete data link system (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: CCP Operational Concept Diagram Source: Peng Pengfei et al., "Theory and Engineering of Command Information Systems" (Electronic Industry Press, Published in Beijing, Publisher: Peng Pengfei, Published in May 2020), Page 213.
(II) Current Capabilities
In 2008, the CCP successfully developed the comprehensive data link and the H/TJN-906 broadband high-speed data link, aiming for a large capacity and high transmission rate. The success of this data link system signifies that CCP technology has officially moved towards the goals of large capacity and high transmission, with functionality and benefits comparable to the U.S. military's Link-16 data link. (see Note 17)Figure 6: DTS-03 Data Link Terminal Source: "mobile01," 解放軍新一代三軍通用數據鏈系統 - Mobile01 (Retrieved on March 1, 2021).
After 2020, the CCP widely equipped the DTS-03 data link (see Figure 6), which includes various data link terminals that can be configured on different mobile platforms according to actual needs. In recent years, the CCP has completed the "XS-3" tactical broadband high-speed data link architecture. This system, compared to the DS-03, enhances cooperative engagement capability (CEC), increases the transmission rate to 2M/Sec, and can construct an information distribution system for air and ground combat units. It is suitable for fighter jets, bombers, drones, and simultaneously supports high-capacity information transmission for multiple network units with anti-jamming capabilities (see Note 18).
Chinese Warships Struggle to Meet New Command, Control And Communications Needs
By James C. Bussert
Signal February 2009
Evolutionary introduction of assets leads to different combat capabilities.
China may be building a navy that features some world-class technologies
aboard new ships, but its large numbers and variety of naval and air
weapons still are operated in isolated methods because of the lack of
effective command, control and communications and datalinks. Of 494
Chinese navy ships, the only combatant warships with credible Level III
command, control and communications are four imported Russian
Sovremennyi guided missile destroyers, 11 new construction guided
missile destroyers, four 054A guided missile frigates, two upgraded
Luda-class destroyers and 12 submarines, including nuclear strategic
ballistic missile submarines.
Even these 33 vessels are handicapped by limited shore or space
satellite command, control and communications (C3) support and the lack
of integrated structure, organization, training and experience. The
absence of technical expertise by sailors results in some computers
being used as typewriters, which inhibits command and control (C2)
missions. As many as 90 percent of Chinese warships have an obsolete C3
capability—or none at all.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has put together a core C3
shallow-water capability by datalinking new guided missile destroyers
(DDGs) with new construction Houbei catamarans and 054A frigates (SIGNAL
Magazine, May 2007). However, severe limitations remain for strategic
or distant operations beyond coastal waters far away from nearby C3
shore support.
This is a recent problem. Traditionally, PLAN surface warships largely
conducted coastal operations and functioned without coordination and
tactical data sharing between ships or shore. Communications aboard old
Luda destroyers and legacy frigates were adequate. But new construction
missile destroyers and frigates are aimed at newer operation areas and
missions that must employ aircraft and subsurface units. PLAN ships will
be faced with new blue-water sea lines of communication protection or
carrier battle group missions.
Three phases of evolution have taken PLAN warships from basic
communications on a single platform to combined platform C3. The first
phase involved simple communications. Each weapon was stand-alone, and
each ship controlled only its internal sensors and weapons. One sensor
to one weapon is a classic stovepipe system. The PLAN includes 62 mine
warfare, 109 amphibious, 45 surveillance, 154 support and 32 auxiliary
ships. A few large new construction vessels in this group, such as the
25,000-ton LPD 071, 21,000-ton to 37,000-ton oil replenishment ships,
10,000-ton Dajiang submarine tenders or 21,000-ton Yuonwang space event
ships have respectable satellite and multiband C3, but they are not
battle group warships. The 494 warships include 29 destroyers, 47
frigates, 63 submarines and 355 patrol boats. A baseline is the vintage
Luda destroyers and early frigates that were the PLAN mainstay from 1960
to 1980. Luda and the Jianghu frigates both had seven external high
frequency (HF) antennas. Jianghu frigate antennas varied from seven-foot
to 32-foot whips. Later frigates increased to more modern sensors and
weapons, but they still entailed stand-alone systems and ships.
The first Chinese-built ship with no imported equipment at all was the
10,000-ton freighter Fenquing in 1974, but for decades imported
equipment or copies were common. Imported Decca surface search radars,
Magnavox satellite communications and Redifon marine transmitters were
on many PLAN warships from the 1980s on. In 1984, the PLAN paid $15
million for Seafox integrated communications from Marconi. A contract to
have the United Kingdom provide a complete upgrade to Luda in 1982 fell
through because of the $375 million cost. Instead, the Luda II refit
DDG 105 added a helicopter hangar and three-dimensional (3D) radar in
1987. Luda DD 132 later replaced its 3D radar with a satellite
navigation antenna, probably the Russian R-793 Pritsep GPS/GLONASS
operating at 4-6 gigahertz. Other 1980s Luda refits added radars and
weapons but no evident C3 systems.
Some impressive long-range cruises and distant operations occurred with
phase one units. Examples include the PLAN seizing the Paracel Islands
from Vietnam in the South China Sea in 1974, intercontinental ballistic
missile test observation in the South Pacific in 1980, and more than 20
warships conducting large naval exercises in 1988-1989 coinciding with
occupation of the Spratly Islands.
Phase two entailed various shipboard sensors, control and weapons being
coordinated within a single platform. The Luda III upgrades and newer
frigates typify this phase. A metric of increased C3 capability in the
Jianghu upgrades is indicated with five antennas on Jianghu I, eight on
the Jianghu II helicopter deck upgrade and 11 whip antennas on Jianghu
III gun/surface-to-surface missile (SSM) fire control and electronic
countermeasures upgrade. The last two Ludas launched in 1990-1992—DDGs
165 and 166—had the Luda III upgrades that included the Tavitac combat
direction system (CDS) computer and Vega II weapon control computer from
France. The CDS included the French Link W—a copy of Link 11—and
imported communications. The new generation Luhu DDG 112 and 113 also
had Tavitac CDS installed, although the Chinese designation ZKJ-4 was
used.
Though not reported in Western open sources, China’s 716 Institute is
believed to have developed a first-generation C2 system of unknown
designation. The Chinese claim of “wide fleet distribution” hints that
this system could predate the new post-1990 051 and 052 DDGs and was on
newer 053H frigates and possibly updated Luda ships. The system had two
computers and a display console. It featured a Pentium central
processing unit with a Compact PCI bus and an FDDI high-speed local area
network with a 100-megabyte Ethernet.
This technology somewhat dates the system. A crude Chinese-developed
digital fire control system—designated Type 88—was displayed publicly in
1991, the year the first Type 88 was installed on a 542-ton Houjian
fast attack craft. It interfaces with gun, radar, electro-optic sensors,
PL-9 surface-to-air missile and electronic warfare systems. The Houjian
has no sonar or antisubmarine warfare weapons onboard. The Type 88
consists primarily of buttons and toggle-switch technology with four
plug-in cards on the lower chassis.
The first of four new 1,700-ton Jiangwei frigates also was launched in
1991, and they were credited with the first computerized weapon control
system, designated CCS-3 in references. It was more complex than the
Type 88 because it had a datalink compared to the Type 88 point-to-point
architecture. The datalink probably was the Chinese ISBC-900 series
bus. Another metric to identify level II vessels is if they have a
combat information center (CIC) in the architecture. The first PLAN
warship claiming a CIC was the Luhai.
China’s military is backfitting low frequency (LF), very high frequency
(VHF) and ultrahigh frequency (UHF) communications and upgrading
existing systems to digital technology. This is achieved through the use
of Western imports and indigenous radio production plants. Existing
South Fleet 053H frigates are adding HN-900 two-way datalinks similar to
Link 11. FF 563 and 553 added satellite communications and HN-900 for
C3 but retained old HY-2 SSMs and guns. The Eastern Fleet FF 513
received the less-capable one-way HN-900 datalink.
PLAN ships and modern J-10A and J-11 aircraft use the 1553B databus for
their datalinks. The PCI bus card is manufactured by Chengdu Enpht
Technology Company under the name EP-H6273. Protocol chips run from 512
kilobits up to 64 megabits. The 1553B chassis and slots, named ACE 1553,
are manufactured by Beijing Shenzhou Feihang Company. The first Type
Houbei catamaran missile boat was launched in 2004, and 20 had appeared
by 2008 (SIGNAL Magazine, December 2007). They may be replacements for
the aged Hegu (Osa) and Huangfeng (Komar) boats, but that may not be
true. They all have Marine Corps paint, which indicates an amphibious
support role such as fire support for landings. A high automation level
is hinted at by a crew of only 12, compared to a crew of 26 on earlier,
similar-size Huangfeng missile boats. With only five- and seven-foot HF
whips on the bridge and no satellite communications radomes, it is
surprising to see an HN-900 datalink to the DDG between the four SSM
cells.
Examples of shore commands controlling tactical units include the 2001
J-8 interception of the U.S. Navy EP-3 off of Hainan and the 1994 Han
SSN and 1996 Song diesel boat interception of the Kitty Hawk carrier
battle groups in the Sea of Japan. The use of Chinese satellites for
reconnaissance, navigation and communications is likely in coastal
waters, but GPS and GLONASS would be required for distant operations.
Phase three of the evolution is for major PLAN warships to have C3 with
other platforms, including aircraft and other surface ships. The PLAN
warships with obvious phase three capabilities are the four modern new
construction DDG classes. The Sovremenny 956EM DDGs certainly are the
best C3 warships in the PLAN. The next indigenous nominees are the 052C
Aegis DDGs 170 and 171, and the newest 051C DDGs 115 and 116 with the
S-300 air defense 30N6E1 phased array radar and SA-N-6 vertical launch
surface-to-air missiles. All of these types of ships were launched in
2006.
The 956EM warships imported in 1999 had the Russian Sapfir-U combat
systems and associated datalinks and communications—Bell Crown datalink
and two Light Bulb video datalinks for SSMs. Fore and aft mast yardarms
mount four 200-1300-megahertz UHF dipole antennas. Twelve HF whips and a
45-foot-tall MF antenna were on the aft helicopter deck. LF wire
bundles extend from the forward to the aft yardarm and then down to the
O-2 deck.
In 1998, Neptune exported upgraded Buran-5ke automated communication
complexes to Russian customers, and this would have been on the 956EM.
In 2001, Russia exported the first four Band Stand radar/datalink
systems to Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai for the new 052B DDGs. The
Mineral-3 datalink and radar operates in the I band with a 30-kilometer
range. The Mineral-3 can detect up to 200 contacts and designate nine as
targets for SS-N-9 or SS-N-22 SSMs. China developed the HN-900 tactical
datalink transmitter that has appeared on all modern 051 and 052 DDGs,
053H guided missile frigates (FFGs) and 022 catamarans, and it has been
backfitted to a few Luda DDGs.
The two 052C DDGs reportedly are the initial ships for the
second-generation JY10G Chinese multimission information processing
system. The JY10G uses land-ship and air radar inputs to integrate with
other sensor sources and weapon systems. Reports that this system also
is on the Houbei SWATH missile boats probably are not credible because
the boats do not even have satellite communication radomes.
China’s Beijing Readsoft Technology Corporation has copied the MIL-STD
1553B databus under the designation GJB289A. It first appeared on
People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) J-8 and J-11 aircraft and
later on the naval J-10A and on the weapon system aboard the 052C. The
051 and 052 DDGs, as well as other warships, probably will follow suit.
The most valuable Russian imports—956EM DDGs, Su-30 long-range fighters
and Kilo 636 diesel submarines—provide proven interplatform datalinks
that China can copy or try to emulate on its own indigenous platforms.
Additionally, that will enable joint Russian-China naval operations with
common datalinks.
Russian/Chinese cooperation includes military geopositioning satellites.
The new generation-2 of the Chinese Beidou satellite navigation system
will be compatible with the Russian GLONASS. The modern PLAN shipboard
Dong Zhong Dong satellite communication system is designated AKD3000 and
operates at 14 gigahertz in the Ku band frequency, and it consists of
0.6-meter, 0.8-meter and 1.2-meter diameter antenna variants. Lack of
high-definition digital reconnaissance satellites hampers command,
control, communications and intelligence mission accomplishment, and a
lack of military navigation satellites inhibits many datalinks for
target position information. It is known that PLAAF Su-27s must rely on
voice communications, and Su-30 MKKs have the TSK-2 datalink, but it is
not on PLAN units. The newest Su-30 MK2 naval fighter aircraft exported
to China have a digital TSIMSS-1 communication system. The 052B and 052C
destroyers and the J-10A fighters will have datalinks similar to the
Russian AT-2M, which itself is a copy of the U.S. Navy Link 16.
Submarines are the most challenging command link platforms. Strategic or
tactical communications with submerged submarines primarily come from
shore very low frequency (VLF) stations. Russia built LF stations at
three fleet headquarters by 1976. China’s first VLF site was Lushun in
1965, and its most recent was an extremely high power site at Yulin
submarine base on Hainan in 1982. The twelve Kilo diesel submarines’
digital CDS MVU-110EM and communications suite of R-625 UHF, R-680
VHF/HF to R-683 LF receiver covered all bands. Target designation for
submarine-launched 3M-54E anti-surface-ship missiles can be possible by
datalinks on 956EM, Su-30 fighters, helicopters and naval command
aircraft. Russian Mi-24 helicopters, which are PLAN assets on warships,
have Landaish analog mission computers to provide targeting data via a
PK-025 datalink. Russian-provided naval air units had RSIU-5 VHF radios,
which are on PLAN surface warships.
Some auxiliaries (AGI) and non-SSM ships now carry a Light Bulb antenna,
indicating a functional change from a missile datalink to a
high-capacity communication link similar to a Link 16. The main PLAN
shore C3 commands are located at the North Fleet (Qingdao), East Fleet
(Ningbo) and South Fleet (Guangzhou) headquarters with main control from
the PLA Central Command in Beijing. Information integration for large
DDG and naval shore commands use PIII ruggedized computers with VxWorks
or Windows NT operating systems, 100-megabyte Ethernet and large,
multipurpose video monitors.
James C. Bussert is employed at the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
Dahlgren, Virginia, where he works on surface-ship antisubmarine fire
control systems.
U.S. Releases Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade
23 February 2024 (Friday)
By Wendell Minnick (Whiskey Mike) 顏文德
TAIPEI - The below is a press release with edification in brackets:
(Arlington, Virginia, February 22, 2024)
The US-Taiwan Business Council today welcomed the announcement of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Taiwan of Advanced Tactical Data Link System Upgrade Planning and related equipment at an estimated total cost of US$75 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the proposed Taiwan arms sale on February 21, 2024.
The published Congressional Notification (transmittal number 24-09) is for FMS Cross Domain Solutions (CDS) [The FMS CDS is a means of information assurance that provide the ability to manually or automatically access or transfer information between two or more differing security domains. FMS CDS devices are integrated systems of hardware and software that enable the transfer of information among otherwise incompatible security domains or levels of classification. They also enable filtering of unauthorized messages and malicious files and, in order to protect both U.S Classified Military Intelligence (CMI) and FMS customer systems, networks and data], High Assurance devices; Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, communications equipment, requirements analysis, engineering, technical services, and other related elements of logistics and program support.
Council President Rupert Hammond-Chambers commented, “We welcome this ongoing normalized and regularized arms sales process. But we again see a focus on sustainment, with little or no consideration of the broader challenges that Taiwan is facing - including blockade and interdiction scenarios, along with grey zone activities. We echo incoming Indo-Pacific Commander Samuel J. Paparo’s recent U.S. Senate testimony, where he said that ‘If we’re just planning for an invasion, we’re leaving a wide range of military options unplanned for.’ ”
“The asymmetric approach is one piece of the puzzle, not the whole puzzle, and the Administration needs to broaden its approach. Our security assistance should include capabilities allowing Taiwan to respond to all its challenges, not just the threat of an invasion. In May 2022, we commented on security assistance focused solely on a D-Day-style attack by PLA forces, citing its shortcomings. We have consistently noted this point in previous comments on recent arms sales, which have focused almost exclusively on munitions and sustainment.”
Hammond-Chambers added, “The ongoing issues surrounding Kinmen call for a robust Taiwan coast guard that can patrol its territorial waters. Training and interoperability should be the primary goals, along with accelerating the expansion and modernization of the Taiwan Coast Guard fleet. Transferring existing Sentinel Class U.S. Coast Guard boats to Taiwan - while replacing the U.S. inventory with newer boats - could be one way to accomplish that. There is precedent for this sort of ship transfer, and ongoing allocation of U.S. financial resources could absorb costs.
Blockade scenarios require anti-submarine vessels and helicopters, with larger ships required to patrol Taiwan's territorial waters. Taiwan could build such ships in domestic yards, while sourcing subsystems internationally. In the face of China's relentless grey zone pressure, Taiwan's burgeoning fighter fleet - which will top 200 advanced F-16s by the end of 2026 – also requires support aircraft.”
Hammond-Chamber concluded by saying “The U.S. appears to be dismissing these other challenges for now, potentially creating current and future vulnerabilities for Taiwan.”
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China opens fire on Lockheed for arming up Taiwan
China has vowed to sanction Lockheed Martin, the world’s and America’s largest defense contractor, for a fifth time after Washington approved on December 16 a US$300 million arms deal that will link Taiwan’s tactical information system with that of NATO allies.
The new system will help improve Taiwan’s command, control, communications and computer (C4) capabilities and enhance operational readiness to meet current and future threats, according to the Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
The arms sale was the 12th to Taiwan since US President Joe Biden took office in January 2021.
Beijing has fired four rounds of countermeasures against Lockheed since July 2020, including placing it on an “unreliable entities list,” ordering the defense firm to pay fines equivalent to twice the amount of its arms sales to Taiwan in recent years, and banning the company’s executives and staff from entering China.
After the US government approved Lockheed and Northrop Grumman’s arms sale to Taiwan on August 24 this year, both companies were sanctioned by Beijing on September 15, though the Chinese government did not specify the terms of the curbs at the time.
“It is true that both Lockheed and Northrop Grumman do not have a lot of direct businesses in China. But it does not mean that our sanctions against them are meaningless,” a Shaanxi-based writer using the pen name “Qiaofeng” says in an article. “Their affiliated companies are involved in many fields such as aircraft, energy and electronics in China.”
The writer says the curbs send a message to the international community that China opposes all forms of foreign interference and has the determination to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
He says that by sanctioning the US defense contractors, China can set an example for upholding international fairness and justice amid the United States’ blatant violation of international rules.
Military operations
Two Chinese weather balloons were seen crossing the sensitive median line of the Taiwan Strait on December 17, the days after the arms sale announcement, according to the Defense Ministry in Taipei.
“The Chinese communists’ frequent military operations around Taiwan present a serious threat to us,” said the island’s Ministry of National Defense.
The ministry said the new tactical information system will help Taiwan improve its battlefield awareness. It said it expects the sale to “take effect” in one month.
A source told Reuters that Taiwan’s existing Syun A system, which has been in service for more than a decade, cannot easily interface with non-US equipment such as locally made fighter jets. The source said the joint warfare capabilities of Taiwan’s C4 system are inadequate.
The Syun An system is reportedly unable to integrate data from the long-range early-warning radar system situated in the island’s northern mountains.
The system’s downgraded Link 16 tactical data network is also incompatible with non-US equipment, including Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Fighters, French-made La Fayette-class frigates and Mirage 2000 fighters. Link 16 is a standardized military tactical data link network used by the US and NATO allies.
“China will take resolute and strong measures to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity and take countermeasures against relevant companies involved in arms sales to Taiwan,” said Wang Wenbin, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson.
“The Taiwan question is entirely China’s internal affair that should not be affected by any foreign interference,” he said. “No matter how many weapons the US provides to the Taiwan region, it will neither change the historic course of China’s reunification, nor weaken the Chinese people’s firm will in safeguarding our national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
He said the recent US arms sale to Taiwan seriously undermines China’s sovereignty and security interests, harms peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and sends a wrong message to separatist forces seeking “Taiwan independence.”
“China deplores and strongly opposes this and has made solemn démarches to the US side,” Wang said.
‘Dangerous’ fighter jet intercepts
The Taiwan Strait balloon incidents come about a month after Chinese President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden met in San Francisco on November 15 and agreed to increase communications.
The two leaders had an in-depth exchange of views on strategic and overarching issues critical to the direction of China-US relations and on major issues affecting world peace and development. But the leaders reached no new agreements on Taiwan-related issues, according to reports.
Biden reiterated that Washington’s “one-China” policy has not changed and that the US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side of the Taiwan Strait.
Xi reportedly told the US to stop supporting Taiwanese independence and halt arms sales to the self-governing island, which Beijing considers a renegade province that must be “reunified” with the mainland. The US side said it will continue to support Taiwan’s defense.
Admiral John Aquilino, head of US Indo-Pacific Command, told the media on December 18 that China’s “dangerous” fighter jet intercepts against US aircraft seem to have stopped since the Xi-Biden summit, which he characterized as an “incredibly positive outcome” if sustained.
However, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to launch warplanes across the median line of the Taiwan Strait on a daily basis.
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China spies on Taiwan's US-Made Defenses
A Taiwan Air Force Captain is the fourth confirmed person to be caught spying for China within the last two years, reported the Associated Press.
The espionage from within Taiwanese ranks focused on the nation's missile defense and communications systems built with sensitive U.S. technology.
Capt. Chiang was based in the north of Taiwan where the military houses their Lockheed Martin and Raytheon-supplied Patriot missiles along with the island's early warning radar system.
In addition, local media reports translated by the AFP in Taipei said that a retired Taiwanese agent from the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau is in police custody for allegedly luring his colleagues to China under the pretext of traveling or doing business. They were then forcibly detained and interrogated on sensitive information, said the Chinese-language United Daily News.
Inside information on Taiwan serves China's long-standing resolve to take back the nation by military force if necessary. The successfully modern island off the southeast coast of China remains independent and resistant to reunification with the mainland since a civil war 63 years ago.
Last year, the Taiwanese army's head of communications and information was also arrested on the charge of spying for China. Taiwanese news reported that Maj. Gen. Lo Hsieh-che was recruited by a Chinese female spy in Bangkok while he was stationed in Thailand. He gave strategic secrets to Beijing and has now been sentenced to life in prison.
The Taiwan defense ministry said at the time that the Maj. Gen. was unlikely to have had access to U.S.-related intelligence. However, as a high-ranking officer he had documents regarding the purchase of the Po Sheng command and control system from American defense contractor Lockheed Martin.
The Po Sheng provides branches of the Taiwanese forces with a shared communication network that is crucial for coordinating military action.
In the event that China launches an attack on Taiwan for not ceding its independence, which China views as rebellious, the Chinese would want to know how to make their target as vulnerable as possible.
Having access to data on Taiwan's radar-enabled missile defenses and communications system would give China a crippling upper hand, as gaining control of the electromagnetic spectrum is a major asset in modern warfare.
