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Sir Julian Corbett (right) believed that interdiction of maritime commerce was a
powerful strategy of war, but his theories show he lacked an
understanding of how trade interdiction would have multiple-order
consequences.
Alfred Thayer Mahan (left) had a keen understanding of the
globalized economy and how interdicting maritime commerce could paralyze
economies ashore. |
US Navy's Modernization: Balancing Mahan and Corbett's Influence
The US Navy is at a critical juncture, facing a challenging rivalry with China's expanding naval power primarily in the Indo-Pacific, as well as problems at major maritime choke points such as the Red Sea and Panama Canal. This should lead to Revisiting Corbett and Mahan.
With only 290 vessels compared to China's 370 and an expected increase to 475 by 2035, and a significant shortfall in shipbuilding industrial infrastructure, the US Navy seeks to modernize and address its mission and resource allocation. The theories of naval historians and strategists Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, who influenced naval policies for over a hundred years, come into play as the US Navy debates the correct number, type, and mission for its warships.
Alfred Thayer Mahan
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) was a renowned American naval officer, historian, and strategist whose ideas profoundly influenced naval strategy and international relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. His major works and theories include:
"The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783" (1890): This seminal work is Mahan's most famous contribution to strategic thought. In it, he argues that naval power was the crucial factor in shaping the course of history during the 17th and 18th centuries. Mahan emphasizes the importance of maritime commerce, naval strength, and the control of key sea routes in determining the rise and fall of nations. He contends that nations with strong navies could control vital trade routes, project power globally, and secure their economic and military interests
"The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire" (1892): This work extends Mahan's analysis of naval power into the Napoleonic era, exploring how sea power shaped the rise and fall of Napoleon Bonaparte's empire. Mahan emphasizes the British Royal Navy's blockade of France and its impact on Napoleon's ability to conduct maritime trade, project power overseas, and sustain his continental ambitions.
Naval Strategy and Sea Power Doctrine: Mahan's theories
on naval strategy emphasized the significance of sea power for national
security and prosperity. He advocated for the construction of powerful,
modern navies capable of asserting control over strategic maritime
regions. Mahan's ideas influenced the naval arms race among major powers
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, particularly the United
States, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, and Germany. The Washington Naval Treaties, between the wars, tried to rein in the arms race, but may in some ways have brought on World War II sooner. The US and European globalization of commerce, at the same time offshoring most of their maritime ship construction and merchant marine to a few global shipping companies under flags of convenience has resulted in a very fragile global economy.
Strategic Geography: Mahan stressed the importance of geographic factors, such as the control of key chokepoints, harbors, and naval bases, in shaping maritime strategy. He emphasized the strategic significance of regions like the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, and the Pacific Ocean in global geopolitics. Choke points continue to be critical in modern seapower, e.g., Suez Canal/Red Sea; Panama Canal; Straits of Gibraltar; Straits of Mallaca; Bering Straits.
Influence on Naval Policy: Mahan's ideas had a profound influence on naval policies and strategies adopted by major powers, including the United States, Britain, Germany, and Japan. His emphasis on the importance of naval supremacy and the control of strategic sea lanes contributed to the expansion of naval capabilities and the development of naval doctrines worldwide.
China seems to have finally taken Mahan's theories to heart. Under the Ming emperor, between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He led seven major expeditions, commanding the largest armada the world would see for the next five centuries.
Not until World War I did the West mount anything comparable. After victory in the Chinese Civil War, Mao tried to pursue his enemies onto Taiwan, but was stopped by the US having a Navy, and China not having a Navy. The current Chinese Communist Party (CCP) People's Liberation Army Navy seems determined to rectify that deficiency, and go beyond with the "Belt and Road initiative" to control trade world wide.
Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories continue to be studied and debated by scholars of naval history, strategic studies, and international relations, shaping contemporary discussions on maritime strategy and geopolitical competition.
Sir Julian Stafford Corbett
Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854–1922) was a British naval historian and strategist whose works significantly influenced naval thought and military strategy. His major works and theories include:
"Some Principles of Maritime Strategy" (1911): This seminal work is considered one of the most important contributions to naval strategy and theory. In it, Corbett outlines his principles of maritime strategy, emphasizing the importance of understanding the political context of naval operations and the need for a flexible, balanced approach to sea power. Corbett's ideas contrasted with those of Alfred Thayer Mahan, as he focused more on the strategic use of naval forces in support of broader political objectives rather than emphasizing the decisive battle.
Nature and Scope of Maritime Strategy: Corbett begins by defining maritime strategy as the art of devising plans and actions to control the sea for the benefit of one's own country. He emphasizes the importance of understanding the broader political context within which naval operations occur.
Objective of Naval Warfare: Rather than focusing solely on achieving naval supremacy or winning decisive battles, Corbett argues that the primary objective of naval warfare should be to influence events on land and compel the enemy to accept one's own terms. Naval power is a means to achieve political ends.
Principles of Sea Control: Corbett identifies two main principles for achieving control of the sea: command of the sea and denial of the sea to the enemy. Command of the sea involves establishing superiority over the enemy's naval forces, while denial involves preventing the enemy from using the sea for their purposes.
Importance of Economic Warfare: Corbett stresses the significance of economic warfare, including blockade and commerce raiding, as effective means of exerting pressure on the enemy and undermining their ability to sustain their war effort.
Flexibility and Adaptability: Corbett emphasizes the need for flexibility and adaptability in naval strategy. He argues against rigid plans and advocates for strategies that can respond to changing circumstances and exploit opportunities as they arise.
Cooperation with Other Forces: Corbett highlights the importance of coordination and cooperation between naval forces and other military services, as well as diplomatic and political agencies. Joint operations and a comprehensive approach to strategy are essential for success.
Preparation and Training: Corbett stresses the importance of preparation and training in maintaining a capable and effective naval force. He emphasizes the need for continuous learning and improvement to stay ahead in the ever-changing strategic environment.
England in the Mediterranean (1904): This book examined British naval policy and strategy in the Mediterranean region, highlighting the complexities of maintaining maritime dominance in key strategic areas.
Naval Operations (1913): This work delved into historical naval campaigns, analyzing the strategies and tactics employed by various naval commanders throughout history. Corbett's analysis provided valuable insights into the principles of naval warfare.
Corbett's views on naval strategy can be summarized as follows:
- Importance of Control of the Sea: Corbett believed that control of the sea was essential for a nation's security and prosperity. He argued that naval power could secure vital trade routes, protect overseas territories, and project influence globally. In the age of globalization this seems even more true.
- Flexibility and Adaptability: Unlike some contemporaries who emphasized decisive battles, Corbett stressed the importance of flexibility and adaptability in naval strategy. He advocated for a strategy that could respond to changing circumstances and achieve political objectives rather than seeking purely military victories. In the Nuclear age, where final victory may never be achieved without world destruction, flexibility is more important than ever.
- Economic Warfare: Corbett recognized the significance of economic warfare, including blockade and commerce raiding, in naval strategy. He understood that disrupting an enemy's trade could be as effective as direct military confrontation in achieving strategic goals. The current situation in the Red Sea and the Panama Canal show this to be true.
- Importance of Political Ends: Corbett stressed
the connection between naval strategy and political objectives. He
argued that naval operations should serve the broader goals of national
policy and diplomacy, rather than pursuing naval supremacy for its own
sake. Corbett's emphasis on the political context of maritime strategy
influenced subsequent generations of strategists and policymakers. Clausewitz goes to sea.
- Limited Naval Warfare:
Unlike Mahan, who advocated for decisive battles and the annihilation
of the enemy fleet, Corbett emphasized the importance of limited naval
warfare and the use of naval forces to achieve specific political
objectives. He argued that naval power could be used to control sea
lanes, support amphibious operations, and blockade enemy commerce,
without necessarily seeking a decisive engagement. This means many smaller ships, not a few large.
- Historical Analysis:
Corbett's works were deeply grounded in historical analysis, drawing
lessons from naval history to inform contemporary strategy and practice.
He examined historical examples of naval campaigns and operations to
illustrate principles of maritime strategy and highlight the importance
of adaptation and innovation in naval warfare. History never repeats, but it is always the same.
- Influence on British Naval Policy:
Corbett's ideas had a significant impact on British naval policy and
strategic thinking in the years leading up to World War I. His emphasis
on the political context of naval operations and the importance of a
balanced fleet structure influenced debates within the Royal Navy about
fleet composition, force deployment, and strategic priorities. In many ways, the current world situation seems to have devolved back to this era.
- Cooperation with Other Services: Corbett emphasized the importance of cooperation between naval and other military services, as well as diplomatic and political agencies. He believed in a holistic approach to strategy that integrated naval power with other instruments of national power. Jointness before it was a thing.
Legacy:
Corbett's theories continue to be studied and debated by scholars of
naval history and strategy, and his emphasis on the political dimension
of maritime strategy remains relevant in contemporary discussions of
naval affairs and international security. His works continue to be
influential in shaping strategic thinking and policy development in
maritime nations around the world. Overall, Corbett's works laid the foundation for modern naval strategic thought, emphasizing the importance of flexibility, adaptation, and the pursuit of political objectives in maritime affairs.
Global Context
In a global context, the US Navy's mission extends beyond its adversaries, trying to meet 44% of combatant commanders' requests worldwide in 2015, with an additional 150 ships needed. Despite the ongoing debate, the Navy has released a force structure goal to increase the fleet to 355 ships by 2042, starting with 285 ships by 2026 and gradually growing thereafter.
The Navy's modernization, however, is a long-term and resource-intensive process, and building and designing the force structure to protect national interests or achieve specific diplomatic goals remains a priority. In response to China's anti-ship missile capabilities, the US Navy is considering a more distributed approach to naval firepower, with new missiles across more platforms and the return of the frigate class.
US Navy's Shipbuilding Challenges and Plans for the Future
‘It’s not about numbers’ in shipbuilding race with China: Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti said
“it’s not about numbers” when asked about China’s shipbuilding capacity
relative to the United States, a preview of the service’s likely
talking points later this year when the newly installed CNO faces tough
budget questions on Capitol Hill. She doesn't seem to think Mahan and Corbett still apply.
The Navy’s shipbuilding capacity, and more pointedly, the number of
ships in the fleet, has become a political football in recent years with
Congress during the Trump administration setting 355 as a minimum
number of ships that the Navy is required to maintain. The current fleet
hovers between 295 and 305 vessels depending on the timing of
retirements and commissionings during a given year.
The US Navy faces a significant issue with its shipbuilding capability, primarily due to a shortage of skilled labor. This labor shortage has led to delays, cost overruns, and accidents in shipbuilding, maintenance, upgrades, and decommissioning projects.
Currently, there are only seven operational shipyards in the country, owned by four prime contractors, while China operates 20 shipyards for military modernization. To address this challenge, the Navy has initiated a $21 billion modernization program for the four major public shipyards. Additionally, there are plans to package production contracts with Workforce Development funding to train the next generation of shipbuilders.
The Navy has presented three alternative approaches to expanding the Battle Force by 2045, focusing on large Next Generation surface combatants, undersea vessels, or a mix of both. The Navy is also counting on unmanned platforms, such as drones and uncrewed vessels, to augment its battle fleet by 2045.
Despite the systemic challenges, the US Navy aims to maintain its strong presence and capabilities, relying on firepower, tactics, and alliances to counter the numerical advantage of the People's Republic of China. The Navy's history shows that underestimating its capabilities can be perilous for other nations. While critics argue that the US Navy should have acted sooner to address the production gap, there is confidence that the Navy will remain a formidable force.
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