Summary
Here's a summary of the key points from the linked stories:
1. The U.S. Navy is exploring a new concept called Mobile Defense/Depot Platform (MODEP) to convert surplus oil rigs in the Pacific Ocean into mobile missile defense and resupply bases.
2. The MODEP concept aims to address capacity issues in the Western Pacific by providing:
- Up to 512 vertical launch system (VLS) cells or 100 large missile launchers
- Logistical support for U.S. Navy surface combatants and nuclear submarines
- Air and ballistic missile defense capabilities
- At-sea reloading and refueling capabilities
3. Key features of MODEP include:
- Independent operation for up to 12 months
- Speed of 5-8 knots, covering about 200 nautical miles per day
- 150 days of endurance and a 4,000 nautical mile range without refueling
- Stability in high sea states
- Extra mission power and maintenance facilities
4. The concept is being developed by Gibbs & Cox, a Leidos company, and was unveiled at the Sea Air Space 2024 expo.
5. Advantages of MODEP:
- Estimated to cost only 10% of building a new Ballistic Missile Defense system
- Can be converted from existing surplus oil rigs within 24 months
- Provides a potential alternative to land-based defense systems
6. Challenges and concerns:
- Vulnerability to missile attacks and other threats
- Complexity of resupply and defense in combat conditions
- Questions about effectiveness compared to conventional naval assets
- Potential economic and strategic risks if captured by adversaries
7. The concept draws comparisons to previous ideas like sea basing and Japan's consideration of floating missile defense platforms.
8. The U.S. Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) provides a similar concept of operations, though with some limitations.
This MODEP concept represents an innovative approach to addressing U.S. Navy capacity issues in the Pacific, but also raises questions about feasibility, vulnerability, and strategic implications.
US Navy to explore converting oil and gas rigs into military bases | GlobalSpec
Marie Donlon | June 03, 2024
A new plan for converting oil rigs in the Pacific Ocean into mobile missile defense and resupply bases is being undertaken by the U.S. Navy.
Under the U.S. Navy’s Mobile Defense/Depot Platform (MODEP) concept, which was recently unveiled at the Sea Air Space 2024 expo, surplus oil rigs in the Pacific Ocean will be converted into mobile missile defense and resupply bases.
The concept, the developers explained, proposes transforming existing oil rigs into large, island bases capable of operating independently for up to 12 months at a time, potentially featuring either 512 vertical launch system (VLS) cells or 100 large missile launchers — thereby offering what the U.S. Navy calls a more robust U.S. air defense posture in the Pacific Ocean.
Extending beyond defense applications, the MODEP concept will also reportedly serve as Afloat Forward Staging Bases, which promise to offer logistical support for U.S. Navy surface combatants and nuclear submarines.
In addition to offering what the U.S. Navy calls “a substantial reduction in risks and costs associated with land-based defense systems,” the cost of converting these existing oil rigs is estimated to be just 10% of the cost of building an entirely brand-new Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system.
Concept Turns Oil Rigs Into Mobile Missile Defense and Supply Bases - Naval News
Gibbs & Cox aims to address the U.S. Navy’s capacity issues in armament and resupply in the Western Pacific by converting surplus oil rigs into heavily armed mobile missile and resupply bases in its Mobile Defense/Depot Platform (MODEP) Concept at Sea Air Space 2024.
“Our target here is to find a solution to help the challenging problem of having capacity issues in the Western Pacific. For not enough cells, not enough missiles, not enough of being able to keep those ships in the forward station” Dave Zook, Solutions Architect & Combat Systems Department Manager at Gibbs & Cox told Naval News.
“MODEP is a large floating island base designed to bolster the layered defense of national interest. It can linger at an ideal distance from shore and is capable of independent operation for over 12 months,” an infographic on the concept claimed.
Created as a stopgap to address ballistic missile defense and the U.S. Navy’s demand for a reloading at-sea solution, MODEP is a product of Gibbs & Cox’s internal research efforts that seeks to leverage the massive space and weight capacity of commercial offshore platforms to address these issues.
While an unconventional approach to addressing the U.S. Navy’s issues, Gibbs & Cox stress the abilities a converted offshore platform brings compared to conventional ships for air defense and sustainment at sea through two concepts shown at SAS 2024. The company claims that both the ballistic missile defense and depot variants could travel at a speed of 5-8 knots to cover around 200 nautical miles a day. “Stability in all sea states, including waves up to 60 feet tall,” was claimed by the company. Total endurance for MODEP is expected to be 150 days and a total range of 4000 nautical miles without refueling. The concept also offers 6-20 MW of extra mission power, a maintenance and repair shop for warships, a 2.3 million gallon fuel capacity, and an initial payload capacity of 8000 metric tons.
According to Gibbs & Cox, a converted platform could support air defense or strike missions at a capacity five times that of an existing U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. Concepts claim that the conversion could hold up to 512 vertical launch system cells or 100 large missile launchers, the latter of which refers to a requirement set forth by the Navy’s DDG(X) program for a more capable launching system that could support larger missiles such as hypersonics. In this air and ballistic missile defense configuration, the company highlights that the platform’s height of 45-90 meters above the waterline will provide “optimal visibility and surveillance” to the associated sensors. Leidos Gibbs & Cox also noted that its concept for ballistic missile defense at sea “reduces risks and costs associated with land-based defense systems.” It should be noted that Japan was considering an oil rig conversation similar to MODEP as an alternative to its canceled Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense system.
The concept also aims to support the sustainment of the service’s surface combatants and nuclear submarines through an Afloat Forward Staging Base configuration. Gibbs & Cox’s infographics state that MODEP “offers a stable option for VLS reloading at-sea, depot repair capability and expanded mission potential.” With the Secretary of the Navy identifying a reloading at-sea capability as a “main priority,” this concept aims to solve the complicated task by using two cranes capable of lifting 100 tons to reload VLS cells and deliver other supplies to ships and submarines. The depot configuration also looks to refuel warships at sea utilizing “existing offshore oil and gas technology.”
Another key highlight by Gibbs & Cox is the speed at which these concepts can see the light of day. The company claims that there are 4-6 commercial platforms in the United States that could be converted at low cost, stating that the acquisition of these surplus rigs represents 10% of the total cost for a ballistic missile defense version. Moreover, due to what Gibbs & Cox describe as an “oversupply in the oil market,” total conversion from civilian to military use is expected to “reach readiness within approx. 24 months.”
Gibbs & Cox Unveils Innovative MODEP Concept to Address U.S. Navy's Capacity Challenges
The EU Council has sanctioned a new set of economic and individual measures as part of its response to Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. This decision was announced on June 24 by the EU Council’s press service.
The new sanctions aim to deliver another blow to the Putin regime and its supporters for their illegal, unprovoked, and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine.
This 14th package includes restrictive measures against 116 individuals and entities responsible for actions undermining Ukraine’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.
Key Aspects of the Sanctions: Energy
The EU has banned the transshipment of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) within the EU for transport to other countries, covering both ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore transfers. This ban, however, does not affect imports, only the re-export to third countries via the EU.
Additionally, the EU has prohibited new investments and the provision of goods, technology, and services to complete ongoing LNG projects like Arctic LNG 2 and Murmansk LNG. Restrictions are also placed on imports of Russian gas through EU terminals not connected to the natural gas system.
Anti-Circumvention Controls
To combat the re-export of munitions found in Ukraine or critical to Russian military systems, EU operators selling such munitions to third countries must now implement due diligence mechanisms to identify, assess, and mitigate re-export risks to Russia.
EU companies must also ensure their subsidiaries in third countries do not circumvent sanctions against Russia. Moreover, EU operators transferring industrial know-how for martial goods production to third-country partners must include contractual provisions preventing this know-how from being used for goods destined for Russia.
Financial Sector
The EU Council has banned the use of the “Financial Messaging System” (SPFS), a service developed by the Russian Central Bank to counteract the impact of restrictive measures. EU operators are also prohibited from transacting with those on the list of SPFS users outside Russia.
Further, the Council has banned transactions with targeted credit and financial institutions and cryptoasset providers based outside the EU if these entities facilitate transactions supporting Russia’s defense industrial base by exporting, supplying, selling, transferring, or transporting dual-use goods and technologies, sensitive items, combat goods, firearms, and ammunition to Russia.
Transport Sector
For the first time, the EU has targeted specific vessels involved in Russia’s war against Ukraine, imposing a port access ban and a services provision ban.
The Council has also extended the EU flight ban to include any aircraft used for non-scheduled flights. Operators must provide requested information on irregular flights, including aircraft ownership and passenger details.
Moreover, the EU has extended the ban on the road transport of goods across the EU, including in transit.
Import and Export Controls
The Council has added 61 new entities to the list of those directly supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex. These entities face stricter export restrictions on dual-use goods and technologies, as well as items contributing to technological advancements in Russia’s defense and security sector.
The EU has imposed further export restrictions on goods enhancing Russia’s industrial capabilities, such as chemicals, manganese ores, rare earth compounds, plastics, earth-moving equipment, monitors, and electrical equipment.
Liechtenstein has been included in the list of partner countries applying restrictive measures on imports of pig iron and steel from Russia.
Other Measures
The package imposes restrictions on accepting applications for the registration of certain intellectual property rights in the EU by Russian citizens and companies.
It also prohibits buying, importing, moving, or exporting Ukrainian cultural property and other goods of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, or religious significance if there are reasons to suspect these goods were illegally exported from Ukraine.
US to convert oil rigs into floating missile defense sites
The US Navy has unveiled plans to convert surplus oil rigs into mobile missile defense and resupply facilities, a seemingly risky and costly scheme to address rising US vulnerability to rival missile threats in the Pacific.
This month, Naval News reported that Gibbs & Cox, a Leidos company, is working to convert oil rigs into heavily armed mobile missile defense and resupply bases as part of its Mobile Defense/Depot Platform (MODEP) Concept.
The scheme, designed for oil platforms in the Western Pacific where US forces face intensifying ballistic missile threats, not least from China’s DF-26 “carrier killer” projectiles, was presented at this month’s Sea Air Space 2024 expo held in Washington DC.
MODEP is configured as a large floating island base to be deployed at an ideal distance from shore and operate independently for over 12 months. The concept seeks to help fill ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability gaps and the US Navy’s demand for an at-sea reloading solution.
BMD and depot variants can travel 5-8 knots and cover around 200 nautical miles daily. MODEP’s total endurance is expected to be 150 days with a range of 4,000 nautical miles without refueling.
The converted platform is envisioned to enhance US air defense or strike missions. With a capacity five times that of an existing Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the MODEP could hold up to 512 vertical launch system (VLS) cells or 100 large missile launchers.
The platform could conceivably lead to a substantial reduction in risks and costs associated with land-based defense systems.
The MODEP concept also aims to support the sustainment of the US Navy’s surface combatants and nuclear submarines through an Afloat Forward Staging Base configuration. The acquisition of these surplus rigs is estimated at 10% of the cost of a BMD version.
A semi-permanent offshore military base is not a new idea. In a June 2018 Small Wars Journal article, Jose Delgado and Eviya Vitola note that, following political and security sensitivities encountered by the US in using Saudi bases for Operation Desert Shield, the US envisioned semi-permanent bases in international waters that could help reduce response time to global hotspot contingencies.
However, Delgado and Vitola point out that the idea was not feasible at the time due to its high cost, vulnerability to missile attack and ineffectiveness compared to conventional sealift capabilities.
However, expanding the idea of a semi-permanent offshore base from a staging and logistics area to encompass BMD and other mission areas may make it feasible.
Sam Tangredi discusses the concept of sea basing in an article published in the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) in October 2015. According to the writer, the idea is to use the sea similarly to land bases for various operations such as deterrence, power projection, cooperative security, alliance support and other forward operations.
Tangredi notes that sea bases can offer several benefits such as joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).
They can also provide rapid strike capabilities using stealth or non-stealth assets, help in special forces insertion, offer BMD regional airspace control, emergency medical facilities and space for joint task force command elements, and assist in positioning infantry, light armor and artillery offshore.
However, Tangredi queries if new sea-basing technologies can outpace evolving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats. He notes that while improving air and missile defenses can mitigate A2/AD threats, the problematic survivability of sea bases puts into question the practicality of investing in them.
Still, he suggests that BMD is an area where sea bases could prove useful as multiple land and sea-based sensors increase targeting accuracy.
Tangredi suggests that BMD-capable sea bases can also bridge the gap between sea and land-based BMD capabilities, noting that logistics operations that flow through sea bases can help to keep BMD-capable ships on station.
Those BMD advantages may be why Japan briefly considered a BMD-capable floating platform after canceling plans for the Aegis Ashore missile defense system in 2020.
Asahi Shimbun reported at the time that Japan considered deploying a floating offshore BMD using components from the canceled Aegis Ashore project.
However, there were doubts about the effectiveness of the offshore BMD system in providing continuous protection against North Korean ballistic missiles, which was one of the main advantages of the Aegis Ashore system.
The Asahi Shimbun report notes that keeping the system operational could be challenging due to weather conditions and maintenance issues when deployed at sea.
It also says that installing the missile defense system on a floating platform would be unprecedented and could result in significant expenses.
Considering the drawbacks of an offshore BMD platform, Japan may have settled on building massive Aegis Equipped Surface Vessels (ASEVs), especially against hypersonic threats emerging from North Korea.
Despite that, the US Sea-Based X-band Radar (SBX) may provide a concept of MODEP operations given their similar purpose as BMD platforms.
Missile Threat notes that the SBX is a high-resolution radar on a decommissioned North Sea oil rig that produces high-resolution images of incoming threat clouds, aiding BMD interceptors in deciphering between lethal objects and debris.
The Missile Threat report notes that the SBX has been used in 12 Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system tests and has been deployed to monitor North Korea’s missile tests and US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests.
However, the report notes that the SBX’s high resolution comes with a narrow 25-degree viewing arc, limiting its ability to track incoming missiles and leaving it dependent on other sensors for location and trajectory.
It also points out that the SBX system’s need to sail from Hawaii to the Western Pacific for optimal positioning creates a mobility drawback that requires significant notice before missile launch. At the same time, it says its deployment at sea makes it a costly and complex system.
The vulnerability of oil and gas platforms, as demonstrated in the Ukraine war, raises further questions about the military and economic sense of converting such structures into BMD-capable assets.
In a September 2023 Forbes article, David Axe recounts the Russia-Ukraine battle for the Boyko Towers in the Black Sea, noting that big, immobile oil rigs are easy targets for missiles, aircraft and drones.
Axe notes that if one of those platforms is captured by an adversary, there would be little to prevent the other side from striking back.
He also points out the difficulty of adequately resupplying such platforms under combat conditions, with personnel aboard most likely being “left out to dry” rather than adequately resupplied and defended.
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