Hypersonic Weapons are Next Level. The Design Process for them Should be Too. - YouTube

Hypersonic Weapons are Next Level. The Design Process for them Should be Too. - YouTube

Offensive hypersonic weapons move at least five times the speed of sound and have unpredictable flight paths. DOD has begun multiple efforts to develop offensive hypersonic weapons that can be launched on the ground, in the air, and at sea. High costs and failed tests are a concern for some of these efforts. GAO looked into six hypersonic efforts being developed by the Army, Air Force, and Navy. 

 After gathering and reviewing significant information the GAO is making 10 recommendations to DOD to improve these efforts. Related GAO Works: HYPERSONIC WEAPONS: Following Leading Practices Could Address Affordability Concerns and Reduce Risk GAO-24-106792. Check out the report: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-1...

Report Summary

Here's a summary of the key points from the GAO report on hypersonic weapons:

1. The Department of Defense (DOD) is developing six offensive hypersonic weapon efforts, emphasizing rapid development and delivery of capabilities.

2. These efforts are not fully implementing leading practices for product development:
   - Some are not soliciting and incorporating user feedback throughout development.
   - Several have not fully adopted digital engineering tools like digital twinning.

3. DOD faces challenges in accurately estimating costs for hypersonic weapons due to limited experience. The Conventional Prompt Strike program's cost estimate could be improved.

4. DOD has identified and is addressing enterprise-level risks in four areas:
   - Technology (e.g., thermal protection systems, navigation)
   - Industrial base (e.g., limited suppliers, long production lead times)
   - Test and evaluation (e.g., insufficient facilities, high demand)
   - Workforce (e.g., limited talent pool, competition for skilled workers)

5. While DOD is managing these risks internally, it is not comprehensively reporting progress on managing these risks to Congress.

6. The GAO made 10 recommendations, including:
   - Soliciting user feedback for specific programs
   - Assessing the implementation of digital engineering tools
   - Improving cost estimation practices
   - Providing periodic updates to Congress on enterprise-level risk management

7. DOD concurred with all recommendations.

This report highlights the complex challenges DOD faces in developing hypersonic weapons and suggests areas for improvement in program management, cost estimation, and congressional oversight.

Leading Practices for Product Development 

Based on the GAO report, several leading practices for product development are not being fully implemented by DOD's hypersonic weapon efforts. Here are the key practices that are not being consistently used:

1. Soliciting and incorporating user feedback:

The report emphasizes that direct and timely collaboration with users is essential for determining the most critical capabilities to include in a minimum viable product. However, four of the six efforts reviewed (SM-6 Block IB, HACM, HALO, and ARRW) are not currently soliciting or incorporating direct and timely user feedback, or have no plans to do so in the future.

User feedback in this context refers to input from individuals who directly interact with the system, such as operators and maintainers, not high-level officials who determine requirements. The report notes that while some efforts are collecting feedback from various stakeholders, these stakeholders often do not constitute "users" as defined by the GAO's leading practices.

2. Utilizing digital engineering tools, including digital twinning:

The report highlights that leading companies benefit from developing various models using digital engineering tools, such as digital twinning, during the design modeling and simulation phase. A digital twin is a virtual model that simulates the configuration, performance, and behavior of a system within a computer and can be updated when new features are added.

However, four of the six efforts (LRHW, SM-6 Block IB, ARRW, and HACM) are either not using digital engineering or are using it only to a limited degree and lack plans to further implement these tools in the future. The report notes that while some efforts use 3D models or simulations, these fall short of the advanced digital engineering tools identified in the GAO's leading practices.

3. Iterative development approach:

While all six efforts have taken steps consistent with an iterative development approach or plan to do so, the report suggests that the lack of user feedback and limited use of digital engineering tools may hinder the effectiveness of this approach. Iterative development involves continuously refining and improving the product based on user feedback and rapid prototyping, which is challenging without proper user input or advanced digital modeling capabilities.

4. Prioritizing schedule by off-ramping capabilities:

The report indicates that while efforts are generally following this practice, the lack of user feedback may impact their ability to effectively determine which capabilities are most essential for the minimum viable product.

These gaps in implementing leading practices could potentially slow down development, increase costs, and result in products that don't fully meet user needs. The GAO's recommendations focus on addressing these gaps to improve the overall development process for hypersonic weapons.

How Could CPS Cost Estimation be Improved

According to the GAO report, the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program's cost estimate could be improved in several ways to better align with the "accurate" characteristic described in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. Here are the key areas for improvement:

1. Methodology:
- The estimate relies heavily on subject matter expert opinions without fully accounting for potential bias in these inputs. The GAO suggests that expert opinion should be used sparingly and the estimate should account for the possibility of bias influencing the results.
- The estimate uses analogies to other programs that may not be sufficiently similar. For example, using the Trident II D-5 program as a comparison point, despite significant weight differences between the missiles.
- Cross-checks using alternative estimating methodologies were not documented or provided during the review. These cross-checks are important for ensuring greater credibility in the resulting estimate.

2. Updating the estimate to reflect program changes and actual costs:
- The estimate accounted for schedule delays by adding a new element rather than updating the entire estimate's assumptions. This approach risks invalidating estimates for other elements of the overall effort.
- Due to data quality issues and the unique nature of initial build efforts, actual cost data from contractors and subcontractors were used to cross-check the existing estimate rather than being directly input into the estimate. These crosschecks were not documented in the cost model.

3. Documentation of variances:
- While the estimate substantially met criteria for documenting, explaining, and reviewing variances between planned and actual costs, the report suggests that costs within the estimate could be updated at more detailed levels as actual cost data become available.

4. Use of historical records:
- While the estimate substantially met criteria for using historical records from analogous programs, the methodology did not completely account for the disparity between the specifications and requirements of the CPS system and the chosen analogous programs.

5. Inflation adjustments:
- The estimate substantially met criteria for properly adjusting for inflation, but there may be room for improvement in this area as well.

How to Improve

To improve the cost estimate, the GAO recommends that the Navy ensure the CPS program office:

1. Uses the best methodology from the data collected to estimate each element of the cost.
2. Updates the estimate to reflect program changes and actual costs more comprehensively.
3. Considers implementing cross-checks using alternative estimating methodologies.
4. Improves documentation of the rationale behind expert opinions and analogies used.
5. Updates the entire model when accounting for schedule changes, rather than adding new elements.

These improvements would provide Navy decision-makers with a more accurate cost estimate and could serve as a model for cost estimators working on future offensive hypersonic weapons programs.

Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Could Reduce Cost and Schedule Risks by Following Leading Practices

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Fast Facts

The Department of Defense is working to quickly develop hypersonic weapons, which are capable of moving at least 5 times the speed of sound and have unpredictable flight paths that could give the military a tactical advantage.

Most of DOD's efforts to develop hypersonic weapons aren't using modern digital engineering tools, such as virtual representations of physical products. By not following this leading practice, they won't benefit from the tools' advantages, such as speeding up the schedules for prototypes and making it easier to incorporate changes based on user feedback.

We recommended addressing this and applying other leading practices.

A Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon

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Highlights

What GAO Found

The Department of Defense (DOD) is increasingly investing in the development of hypersonic weapons. These weapons' unique characteristics—such as the ability to maneuver at very high speeds—could allow the U.S. to strike heavily defended targets from a distance.

Comparison of Ballistic and Hypersonic Missile Trajectories

All six offensive hypersonic weapon efforts GAO identified have placed a high priority on delivering quickly, with all intending to deliver a “minimum viable product”—one with the initial capabilities needed for users to recognize value. Four of the efforts, however, are not soliciting user feedback to determine what capabilities to include in their minimum viable product, a leading practice for product development identified by GAO in July 2023.

In addition, four efforts have not adopted leading practices for using digital engineering tools, another leading practice for product development. These tools include virtual representations of physical products. Employing modern digital engineering tools and directly soliciting user feedback both have the potential to speed up the design process, reduce costs, and develop a more usable product.

While DOD has identified and analyzed cost risks, the cost of these weapons is difficult to estimate. This is in part due to DOD's limited experience developing and fielding hypersonic weapons. For example, the Navy's estimate for Conventional Prompt Strike—among the most mature cost estimates available—compensates for the lack of quality historical data by relying heavily on the views of subject matter experts. Expert views are best used sparingly, as they can be prone to bias, unless estimators analyze and account for that bias. Addressing this and other issues in accordance with GAO leading practices for cost estimates could provide Navy decision-makers a more accurate estimate.

DOD implemented most elements of an effective risk management framework, which allows agencies to assess and monitor threats to achieving their goals. DOD is not, however, comprehensively reporting to Congress about progress against DOD-wide risks to fielding hypersonic systems. Reporting this information at an enterprise level provides a more complete picture of DOD's efforts and progress, while promoting transparency.

Why GAO Did This Study

Offensive hypersonic weapons move at least five times the speed of sound and have unpredictable flight paths. DOD has begun multiple efforts to develop offensive hypersonic weapons that can be launched on the ground, in the air, and at sea. High costs and failed tests are a concern for some of these efforts.

A joint explanatory statement includes a provision for GAO to review DOD's efforts to develop offensive hypersonic weapons. This report addresses the extent to which DOD's hypersonic efforts are: (1) employing leading practices for product development, (2) identifying and analyzing cost risks, and (3) implementing effective enterprise risk management, among other objectives.

GAO reviewed documentation for the six hypersonic efforts currently being developed by the Army, Air Force and Navy, and interviewed DOD officials.

GAO assessed these efforts using its leading practices for product development, cost estimating, and risk management, as appropriate.

Recommendations

GAO is making 10 recommendations to DOD, including increasing the incorporation of feedback from users into system designs, expanding the use of modern digital engineering tools, improving the Conventional Prompt Strike cost estimate, and expanding enterprise-level reporting activities. DOD concurred with these recommendations.

Recommendations for Executive Action

Agency Affected	Recommendation	Status
Department of the Navy	The Secretary of the Navy should ensure the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block IB effort solicits and incorporates relevant user feedback throughout development. (Recommendation 1)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force	The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile effort solicits and incorporates relevant user feedback throughout development. (Recommendation 2)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy	The Secretary of the Navy should ensure the Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive anti-surface warfare effort solicits and incorporates relevant user feedback throughout development. (Recommendation 3)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force	The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon effort, if further development and production is planned, solicits and incorporates relevant user feedback throughout development. (Recommendation 4)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Army	The Secretary of the Army should ensure the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon effort assesses the practicality, benefits, and affordability of implementing digital engineering, including digital twinning, and whether to incorporate these tools into the effort. (Recommendation 5)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy	The Secretary of the Navy should ensure that the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block IB effort assess the practicality, benefits, and affordability of implementing digital engineering, including digital twinning, and whether to incorporate these tools into the effort. (Recommendation 6)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force	The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon effort, if further development and production is planned, assesses the practicality, benefits, and affordability of implementing digital engineering, including digital twinning, and whether to incorporate these tools into the effort. (Recommendation 7)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Air Force	The Secretary of the Air Force should ensure the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile effort assesses the practicality, benefits, and affordability of implementing digital engineering, including digital twinning, and whether to incorporate these tools into the effort. (Recommendation 8)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of the Navy	The Secretary of the Navy should ensure the Conventional Prompt Strike program office improves its cost model in accordance with the "accurate" characteristic described in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, including by estimating each element using the best methodology from the data collected and updating the estimate to reflect program changes and actual costs. (Recommendation 9)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.
Department of Defense	The Secretary of Defense should ensure that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering periodically provides information on DOD's progress in managing enterprise-level risks to congressional decision-makers. (Recommendation 10)	Open When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

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