New GAO, Navy reports warn of serious V-22 Osprey safety risks, with some fixes stretching into 2030s - Defense One

V-22 Osprey Safety Crisis: Decade-Long Fix Timeline Revealed as Oversight Reports Document Systemic Failures

BLUF: New Government Accountability Office and Naval Air Systems Command reports reveal the V-22 Osprey Joint Program Office failed to adequately address known safety risks for up to 14 years, contributing to 20 deaths since 2022, with critical fixes not expected until 2034. The aircraft maintains the Navy's oldest unresolved catastrophic safety assessments and lowest mission-capable rates among rotorcraft.

Systemic Safety Failures Documented

The V-22 Osprey tiltrotor fleet faces a mounting safety crisis stemming from years of inadequate risk management and delayed corrective actions, according to parallel investigations released Dec. 13 by the Government Accountability Office and Naval Air Systems Command. The findings paint a damning picture of institutional failure within the tri-service Joint Program Office (JPO) responsible for managing the Marine Corps MV-22, Air Force CV-22, and Navy CMV-22 variants.

"Without refining the joint program's process for identifying, analyzing, and responding to Osprey safety risks, program stakeholders cannot adequately mitigate risks that can contribute to death, injury, or loss of mission capability and resources," the GAO report concluded.

The crisis has claimed 20 service members' lives across four Class A mishaps since 2022. Two critical mechanical failures—hard clutch engagement (HCE) following clutch slip and proprotor gearbox (PRGB) failures—have been identified as causal factors in recent fatal accidents. Implementation of complete PRGB fixes will extend until 2034, according to NAVAIR's assessment.

Unresolved Risk Assessments Span Over a Decade

The V-22 currently carries 28 unresolved catastrophic and serious System Safety Risk Assessments (SSRAs)—the highest among Navy rotorcraft and second only to the F-35 across all naval aviation platforms. GAO investigators determined the median age of these unresolved risks stands at approximately nine years, with 17 of 28 remaining open for six to 14 years.

NAVAIR's analysis revealed an even more troubling metric: the V-22 maintains the oldest average age of unresolved catastrophic SSRAs across the entire Navy aircraft inventory at more than 10 years. This aging risk portfolio has accumulated as "the cumulative risk posture of the V-22 platform has been growing since initial fielding," according to the NAVAIR report.

Of the 12 Class A mishaps occurring within the past four years, seven involved component failures that had previously been identified as major safety concerns. "These material risks were identified by the Program Office and included in the NAVAIR System Safety Risk Assessments database, but were not sufficiently mitigated or resolved in a timely manner, which resulted in catastrophic outcomes in 5 of the 12 mishaps as the risks were realized," NAVAIR investigators found.

Organizational and Cultural Impediments

The JPO's inability to rapidly implement safety improvements stems from conflicting service priorities, funding constraints, and varying risk tolerance levels among the Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy operators. Previous safety reviews conducted in 2001, 2009, and 2017 "lacked mechanisms for tracking implementation or accountability," resulting in "minimal execution of prior action plans," according to the NAVAIR assessment.

GAO investigators identified critical information-sharing gaps, determining that V-22 program officials failed to regularly distribute hazard and accident reporting, emergency procedures, or common maintenance data among service branches. Program stakeholders had closed 45 risk assessments but left 34 known system-related risks—involving potential airframe and engine component failures—without full response at the time of the GAO review.

Vice Adm. John Dougherty, Commander of NAVAIR, acknowledged the findings while committing to continued operations: "We are continuously evaluating procedural compliance to prevent mishaps as well as strengthening airworthiness controls to establish clear risk thresholds. Through ongoing analysis and targeted action, we remain committed to improving the V-22's performance and safeguarding the warfighters who rely on this platform."

Operational Readiness Severely Degraded

Mission-capable rates for the V-22 fleet averaged just 50% for Navy and Air Force variants and 60% for Marine Corps aircraft between 2020 and 2024—meaning Ospreys were unavailable for assigned missions at least 40-50% of the time. NAVAIR's report cited "low readiness levels" as a persistent characteristic of V-22 operations, compounded by human error and mistakes by aircrew and maintenance personnel as contributing factors in some mishaps.

Despite these findings, Air Force Special Operations Command spokesperson Rebecca Heyse stated the component maintains "complete confidence in the aircraft and the crews and maintainers that operate and fix them."

Mishap Rate Comparison

GAO analysis determined that serious V-22 mishaps "generally exceeded those of the Departments of the Navy and Air Force fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft fleets for fiscal year 2015 through fiscal year 2024." The Marine Corps MV-22 and Air Force CV-22 variants recorded their highest serious accident rates in fiscal years 2023 and 2024 compared to the eight-year average for their respective fleets.

Accountability and Advocacy

The 2022 California crash that killed five Marines, including Capt. John J. Sax, resulted from hard clutch engagement—a known deficiency for more than a decade prior to the accident. Amber Sax, the captain's widow, responded to the GAO findings: "Their findings confirm what we already know: More needs to be done, and more needed to be done. It's clear in the report that these risks were not properly assessed, and that failure cost my husband my life."

Congressional oversight has intensified following delays in safety data provision earlier this year. The House Subcommittee on Readiness requested the GAO investigation, while NAVAIR's 33-page assessment was commissioned in September 2023.

Recommended Corrective Actions

NAVAIR's report outlines extensive recommendations including:

Increased maintenance inspection frequency and rigor
Implementation of a comprehensive V-22 mid-life upgrade program
Strengthened JPO reporting structures and accountability mechanisms
Service-specific fleet size reevaluation based on updated mission requirements and flight-hour utilization

GAO recommendations direct the Defense Department to refine comprehensive safety risk response processes, determine revised oversight structures, improve inter-service safety data sharing, and establish regular maintenance procedure review and revision cycles.

Future Vertical Lift Alternatives

The persistent safety and readiness challenges have accelerated industry development of unmanned tiltrotor alternatives. Bell Textron unveiled its CxR unmanned vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft concept in October 2024, designed to support combat and cargo operations traditionally performed by manned platforms. Sikorsky announced NOMAD, a rotor-blown wing VTOL drone, the same month.

These developments suggest the Defense Department may be exploring options to reduce reliance on manned V-22 operations for high-risk missions while the existing fleet undergoes the decade-long safety improvement timeline.

Verified Sources and Formal Citations

Novelly, Thomas. "New GAO, Navy reports warn of serious V-22 Osprey safety risks, with some fixes stretching into 2030s." Defense One, December 13, 2024. https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/12/new-gao-navy-reports-warn-serious-v-22-osprey-safety-risks-some-fixes-stretching-2030s/401439/
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "V-22 OSPREY: DOD Should Refine Its Process for Responding to Safety Risks." GAO-25-106698, December 2024. [Report requested by House Subcommittee on Readiness]
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). "V-22 Safety Assessment Report." September 2023 commission, released December 13, 2024. [33-page report]
Statement by Vice Adm. John Dougherty, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, December 13, 2024.
Statement by Rebecca Heyse, Air Force Special Operations Command spokesperson, December 2024.
Statement by Amber Sax, widow of Marine Corps Capt. John J. Sax, in response to GAO report, December 2024.

Note: This article synthesizes information from the primary source document provided. Complete GAO report number GAO-25-106698 and full NAVAIR assessment would provide additional technical detail and specific SSRA identification. Public release of complete reports may be subject to security classification review for operational safety details.

SIDEBAR: The Accountability Gap—Named Individuals, No Consequences

These are the men who presided over the deaths. None have faced consequences.

Twenty American service members have died in V-22 Osprey crashes since 2022. Government investigators have now documented that many of these deaths resulted from mechanical failures that program managers had known about for six to fourteen years. The reports identify the organizations and programs responsible. What they don't identify is a single individual who has been held accountable, disciplined, or removed from position.

But the record shows who was in charge. Their names are public. Their decisions are documented. And their careers have continued unblemished.

The Leaders During the Lethal Years

Vice Adm. Carl Chebi served as Commander of Naval Air Systems Command from September 2021 to August 2025—the entire period when 20 service members died in four fatal V-22 crashes. Under his command, NAVAIR maintained 28 unresolved catastrophic safety assessments averaging over 10 years old. When he testified before the House Oversight Committee in June 2024, Chebi admitted he had initiated the "first comprehensive review" of the V-22 program in his tenure—after four fatal crashes and 20 deaths. He grounded the fleet three times but did not address the underlying risks that the reports document had been known for years.

Chebi retired in August 2025 with full honors after 38 years of service. His command was praised for achieving "the highest readiness levels in the history of naval aviation" and identifying "$3 billion in savings." No mention was made of the 20 dead on his watch, or the decade-old unresolved catastrophic risks he left unaddressed.

Col. Brian Taylor, USMC served as V-22 Joint Program Office (PMA-275) commander from April 2020 to October 2024—covering all four fatal crashes since 2022. As program manager, he was directly responsible for the office that GAO and NAVAIR reports say "failed to adequately assess and address mounting safety risks." The 2022 California crash that killed five Marines resulted from hard clutch engagement that had been a known deficiency for more than a decade before Taylor took command—and remained unresolved throughout his tenure.

Taylor received the Legion of Merit at his October 2024 change of command ceremony. His award citation praised him for "optimizing the MV-22 fleet, resulting in 80,000 maintenance man hours savings annually and a reduction in material cost by $130 million" and achieving "$1.8 billion in savings." The five Marines killed in the 2022 HCE crash, the three killed in Australia in August 2023, and the eight airmen killed off Japan in November 2023 were not mentioned. He moved on to his next assignment. No investigation. No court-martial. No mention of the unresolved catastrophic risks that accumulated under his command.

Gary Kurtz served as Program Executive Officer for Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault, and Special Mission Programs (PEO(A))—which oversees PMA-275—from July 2022 to June 2024, covering three of the four fatal crashes. His portfolio included the V-22 Joint Program Office throughout the period when NAVAIR now admits "risks continue to accumulate" due to failure to "promptly implement material and non-material fixes to mitigate existing risks."

Kurtz retired in June 2024 after 40 years of government service. His retirement ceremony celebrated his teams winning "six NAVAIR Commanders Awards for Acquisition and Business Excellence in 2023." He received the Navy Certificate of Acquisition Excellence, Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Awards, and the Coast Guard Civilian Commendation Medal. He now enjoys his retirement. No accountability. No consequences.

Vice Adm. John "Doc" Dougherty IV assumed command of NAVAIR on August 1, 2025, just as the new reports documenting systemic failures were being finalized. While he cannot be held responsible for decisions made before his tenure, his statement in response to the damning findings was revealing: "We are continuously evaluating procedural compliance to prevent mishaps as well as strengthening airworthiness controls to establish clear risk thresholds." No acknowledgment of institutional failure. No personnel actions announced. No promise of individual accountability. Just more "ongoing analysis and targeted action."

The Decisions They Made

These weren't abstract institutional failures. Specific individuals made specific decisions:

Who decided not to ground the entire V-22 fleet after the 2022 hard clutch engagement crash that killed five Marines, even though HCE had been a known catastrophic risk for over a decade?
Who approved continued flight operations while 28 catastrophic safety risks remained unresolved for an average of 10 years?
Who prioritized the $1.8 billion in savings that Taylor was lauded for over addressing known fatal deficiencies?
Who decided that mission-capable rates of 50-60% were acceptable despite chronic safety risks?
Who chose not to conduct a comprehensive safety review until after 20 service members had died?

The reports don't answer these questions. Perhaps more importantly, no one in authority appears to have asked them.

Congressional Theater, No Substance

When Vice Adm. Chebi testified before the House Oversight Committee in June 2024—after 20 deaths—lawmakers expressed outrage. Rep. Andy Biggs demanded access to safety investigations. Rep. Glenn Grothman called the situation tragic. Gold Star families held photos of their dead loved ones behind the witnesses.

But when Peter Belk, performing duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, was asked if DoD would provide mishap investigation results to Congress, he replied that the department needed to "protect the safety privilege" and "ensure those investigations and the people in them have the maximum amount of certainty that the information provided in those investigations will remain confidential."

Translation: No accountability. The information that might identify who knew what and when will remain classified.

Rep. Biggs pressed: "So you're telling us you're not going to allow members of the committee to have access to the results?"

Belk: "We will continue to maximize the fullest transparency possible-"

He never finished the sentence. He didn't need to. Everyone in the room understood: no access, no accountability, no consequences.

The Parallel with Boeing—Corporate and Institutional Shields

The dynamic is grimly familiar. Boeing's 737 MAX killed 346 people due to known design flaws that engineers had flagged internally. CEO Dennis Muilenburg was fired—with a $62 million golden parachute. The company paid $2.5 billion—shareholder money, not executive wealth. Criminal charges were filed against the corporation, not individuals.

Not a single Boeing engineer, manager, or executive has been criminally prosecuted. FAA officials who approved the flawed certification kept their positions and pensions. The corporate veil protected individuals. Why? Boeing is America's only remaining large commercial aircraft manufacturer and critical defense contractor. The government cannot afford accountability that might threaten its viability.

The V-22 presents the same dilemma. Despite its safety record, the Navy depends on the CMV-22B to replace the C-2 Greyhound for carrier onboard delivery. The Marine Corps has built its expeditionary warfare concept around MV-22 capabilities. Air Force Special Operations Command has no substitute for CV-22 missions.

There is no replacement for the V-22's unique tiltrotor capability. Like Boeing in commercial aviation, the V-22 program is too critical to existing operations to face accountability that might disrupt it.

The Legal Barriers

Military families cannot sue under the Feres Doctrine, which bars service members from filing federal tort claims for injuries arising from military service. Courts-martial could theoretically prosecute under Article 92 (Failure to Obey Order or Regulation) or Article 134 (conduct prejudicial to good order), but none have been convened.

Why? Proving criminal culpability requires showing individual knowledge and willful negligence—difficult when risks are documented in databases accessible to hundreds of people. Successful prosecution might establish precedents threatening the entire acquisition system. And the officers who made these decisions were following institutional incentives to prioritize operational availability over safety margins.

The Operational Imperative

Air Force Special Operations Command spokesperson Lt. Col. Rebecca Heyse stated the command maintains "complete confidence in the aircraft and the crews and maintainers that operate and fix them"—despite GAO data showing CV-22s had the highest serious accident rates in 2023-2024.

This isn't delusion. It's the public face of operational necessity. The Navy needs COD capability. The Marines need long-range vertical lift. AFSOC needs infiltration platforms. These operational requirements override safety concerns that would ground any civilian aircraft.

Senior officers make calculated decisions: accept known risks, continue operations, implement fixes when funding allows, and accept that some number of service members will die. These aren't derelictions of duty—in the current system, they're the tragic arithmetic of maintaining military capability with imperfect platforms.

The alternative—grounding the V-22 fleet until all 28 catastrophic risks are resolved—would eliminate critical capabilities. No senior officer wants responsibility for that operational gap any more than they want responsibility for the next crash.

Twenty Families Know the Truth

Marine Corps Capt. John J. Sax died in 2022 when his Osprey experienced hard clutch engagement—a deficiency documented for over a decade. His widow, Amber Sax, responded to the new reports: "It's clear in the report that these risks were not properly assessed, and that failure cost my husband his life."

But who failed to assess those risks? The system ensures no one can answer that question with a name and a rank.

Carl Chebi got his retirement ceremony. Brian Taylor got his Legion of Merit. Gary Kurtz got his gold watch. The program continues. Fixes are promised by 2034. How many more will die? And when they do, which current leaders will face retirement ceremonies praising their cost savings and acquisition excellence?

Twenty families already know the answer.

SIDEBAR: The Accountability Gap—Institutional Impunity Across Defense and Aerospace

Where are the courts-martial? The firings? The criminal investigations? And why does it matter that there aren't any?

Twenty American service members have died in V-22 Osprey crashes since 2022. Government investigators have now documented that many of these deaths resulted from mechanical failures that program managers had known about for six to fourteen years. Yet neither the GAO nor NAVAIR reports identify a single individual who has been held accountable, disciplined, or removed from their position.

The pattern is grimly familiar—and it extends far beyond the military.

The Illusion of Corporate Accountability

Boeing's 737 MAX killed 346 people due to known design flaws that engineers had flagged internally. CEO Dennis Muilenburg was fired with a $62 million golden parachute. The company paid $2.5 billion in settlements—money that came from shareholders, not executives. Criminal charges were filed against the corporation, not individuals.

Not a single Boeing engineer, manager, or executive has been criminally prosecuted for those 346 deaths. FAA officials who approved the flawed certification process faced criticism but kept their positions and pensions. The corporate veil protected individuals just as effectively as military bureaucratic diffusion protects program officers.

Why? Boeing is America's only remaining large commercial aircraft manufacturer and a critical defense contractor. The government cannot afford to truly hold it accountable in ways that might threaten its viability or leadership continuity. Sound familiar?

Too Critical to Hold Accountable

The V-22 presents a parallel dilemma. Despite its safety record, the Navy is counting on the CMV-22B variant to replace the C-2A Greyhound for carrier onboard delivery (COD) missions. The Marine Corps has built its expeditionary warfare concept around MV-22 capabilities. Air Force Special Operations Command depends on CV-22s for missions no other platform can perform.

There is no replacement. The V-22 is a unique capability—the only production tiltrotor in the world. Like Boeing in commercial aviation, the V-22 program is too critical to existing and planned operations to face accountability that might disrupt it.

This creates a perverse incentive structure: the more critical a program becomes, the less accountable it can be held, because accountability mechanisms (firings, criminal prosecution, program cancellation) might threaten the capability itself.

The Shield of Bureaucratic Diffusion

Marine Corps Capt. John J. Sax died in 2022 when his Osprey experienced hard clutch engagement—a lethal deficiency the Marine Corps had documented for more than a decade. His widow, Amber Sax, noted: "It's clear in the report that these risks were not properly assessed, and that failure cost my husband his life."

But who failed to properly assess those risks? The reports don't say. Who decided that operational demands outweighed known catastrophic hazards? The documents are silent. Who signed off on flight operations while 28 catastrophic safety risks remained unresolved for an average of 10 years? No names appear.

The V-22 Joint Program Office operates as a tri-service entity with conflicting priorities, funding streams, and risk tolerance levels—a structure that effectively ensures no single commander can be held accountable for fleet-wide decisions. NAVAIR's report notes that previous safety reviews in 2001, 2009, and 2017 "lacked mechanisms for tracking implementation or accountability"—bureaucratic language for a stunning admission that the system was designed without accountability from the start.

The Legal Barriers to Justice

Military personnel killed in training or operational accidents cannot sue the government under the Feres Doctrine, a 1950 Supreme Court decision that bars service members from filing federal tort claims for injuries arising from military service. This legal immunity removes a critical accountability mechanism.

Courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice could theoretically prosecute gross negligence or dereliction of duty. Article 92 (Failure to Obey Order or Regulation) and Article 134 (conduct prejudicial to good order) provide mechanisms to hold officers accountable for safety failures. Yet no such actions have been reported, likely because:

Proving criminal culpability requires showing individual knowledge and willful negligence—difficult when risks are documented in databases accessible to hundreds of people
Successful prosecution might establish precedents that threaten the entire acquisition system
The officers who made these decisions were following institutional incentives to prioritize operational availability over safety margins

The Operational Imperative Trump Card

Vice Adm. John Dougherty's response epitomizes the dynamic: "Through ongoing analysis and targeted action, we remain committed to improving the V-22's performance and safeguarding the warfighters who rely on this platform."

Translation: We're keeping them flying because we need them flying. The Navy's carrier air wings need COD capability. The Marine Corps needs long-range vertical lift. Air Force special operators need infiltration and exfiltration platforms. These operational requirements override safety concerns that would ground any civilian aircraft.

Air Force Special Operations Command spokesperson Rebecca Heyse stated the component maintains "complete confidence in the aircraft and the crews and maintainers that operate and fix them"—despite GAO data showing CV-22s had the highest serious accident rates in 2023-2024. This isn't delusion; it's the public face of operational necessity.

Questions No One Wants Answered

Who served as V-22 Joint Program Office directors during the years these 28 catastrophic risks accumulated?
Which flag officers had operational command authority over V-22 fleets while mission-capable rates languished at 50%?
What role did acquisition executives play in funding decisions that prioritized other programs over known V-22 safety deficiencies?
Were senior leaders briefed on these risks before fatal crashes occurred?
If they were briefed, what did they decide, and why?

The reports provide no answers because asking these questions threatens the system itself. Individual accountability would require admitting that senior officers knowingly accepted casualty risks to maintain operational capability—a calculus that might be defensible in war but is politically untenable in peacetime training accidents.

The Rickover Standard We Abandoned

Five decades ago, Admiral Hyman Rickover established an uncompromising principle: "Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only reside and inhere in a single individual. You may share it with others, but your portion is not diminished. You may delegate it, but it is still with you."

By that standard—which has kept nuclear reactors safe for 70 years—every officer in the V-22 chain of command who knew about unresolved catastrophic risks and continued flight operations bears personal responsibility for resulting deaths.

But the nuclear Navy operates under different rules because nuclear accidents would be politically catastrophic in ways that conventional aviation accidents are not. A reactor meltdown would threaten the entire nuclear Navy program. Twenty dead in Osprey crashes, while tragic, doesn't threaten the V-22 program's survival—especially when there's no alternative platform.

The Cycle Continues

NAVAIR's report acknowledges that previous safety reviews "resulted in minimal execution of prior action plans" because they "lacked mechanisms for accountability." The 2024 reports recommend "strengthened processes" and "revised oversight structures"—institutional fixes that allow responsible individuals to continue unblemished careers.

The V-22 program office has announced that full fixes won't be implemented until 2034—another decade of flying with known catastrophic risks. How many more will die? And when they do, will there be consequences beyond another round of reports?

History suggests not. The same institutional forces that prevent accountability at Boeing—the corporate veil, sole-source dependency, economic consequences of real punishment—operate in military aviation. Add the Feres Doctrine, classification of safety data, operational imperatives, and bureaucratic diffusion, and you have a system effectively immune to individual accountability.

The Uncomfortable Truth

Perhaps the real scandal isn't that individuals aren't held accountable—it's that the system functions exactly as designed. When platforms become critical to operations, when there are no alternatives, when missions must continue, the institution prioritizes availability over safety margins that would be required in civilian aviation.

Senior officers make calculated decisions: accept known risks, continue operations, implement fixes when possible, and accept that some number of service members will die. These aren't derelictions of duty—they're the tragic arithmetic of maintaining military capability with imperfect systems.

The alternative—grounding the V-22 fleet until all 28 catastrophic risks are resolved—would eliminate critical capabilities the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force depend on. No senior officer wants to be responsible for that operational gap any more than they want to be responsible for the next crash.

So the flights continue. The reports recommend process improvements. No one is fired. No one faces prosecution. And twenty families know exactly what their loved ones' lives were worth in this calculus: less than the operational disruption that real accountability would cause.

Boeing executives hide behind the corporate shield just as military officers hide behind institutional diffusion, and in both cases the reason is the same: they're too critical to truly hold accountable. The Navy's dependency on CMV-22B for COD missions creates the same dynamic as America's dependency on Boeing for commercial aviation. It's a systemic problem, not unique to the military.

Aerospace Electronic and Defense Systems

Friday, December 12, 2025