Wednesday, December 31, 2025

Papermoon: A Space-Grade Linux


Papermoon: A Space-Grade Linux for the NewSpace Era - The New Stack

SPACE LINUX STANDARDIZATION: Papermoon Initiative Seeks to End Fragmentation in NewSpace Software Infrastructure

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front)

The Linux Foundation's ELISA initiative is incubating Papermoon, an open-source space-grade Linux distribution aimed at creating a common software platform for NewSpace missions. The initiative addresses persistent fragmentation in spacecraft software development, where declining launch costs have made bespoke software stacks economically untenable. Modeled after successful standardization efforts in the drone industry, Papermoon targets RISC-V and radiation-hardened processors, with founding organizations planning to establish an independent foundation in 2025.


Industry Converges on Linux Standard as Launch Economics Shift

TOKYO — The space industry's transition to Linux-based operating systems is entering a new phase with the emergence of Papermoon, a proposed standardized Linux distribution for spacecraft and satellite systems that aims to eliminate redundant software development across the rapidly expanding NewSpace sector.

Ramón Roche, general manager of the Dronecode Foundation and a veteran robotics developer, unveiled details of the initiative during the Open Source Summit Japan, positioning Papermoon as the orbital equivalent of successful standardization efforts in automotive and unmanned aircraft systems.

"You can launch a satellite for the cost of a nice car," Roche stated, noting that per-kilogram launch costs are approaching $100—a figure that makes traditional one-off software development models economically obsolete. "It's 2025 right now, and we're still in a phase like 1969, where missions are one-off and expensive."

From Proprietary to Open: Linux's Space Heritage

The shift toward Linux in space systems has accelerated dramatically over the past decade. The International Space Station transitioned its mission-critical laptops from Windows to Debian Linux in 2013, citing stability and customization requirements. SpaceX's Falcon 9 rocket and Dragon spacecraft both operate on Linux-based systems, while NASA's Ingenuity Mars helicopter—the first powered aircraft on another planet—demonstrated Linux reliability in extreme environments.

More recently, developers successfully operated open-source Doom on a European Space Agency satellite, underscoring Linux's versatility in space applications.

However, this widespread adoption has created what Roche characterizes as a fragmentation problem. A survey of space software practitioners identified Yocto Project as the preferred embedded Linux distribution, but most organizations continue developing proprietary variants with no shared foundational layer.

"Everyone agrees that Linux is the answer," Roche said. "But nobody agrees on which Linux."


SIDEBAR: Getting Started with Papermoon Linux

Prerequisites and Hardware Requirements

Developers and researchers interested in evaluating Papermoon can begin with commercially available RISC-V development boards at consumer price points, comparable to Raspberry Pi systems. The project's continuous integration infrastructure validates builds on these platforms before deployment to space-qualified hardware.

Recommended Development Platforms:

  • RISC-V development boards (specific models to be announced by project team)
  • Standard x86_64 workstations for build environment (minimum 8GB RAM, 100GB storage recommended for Yocto builds)
  • Linux host system (Ubuntu 22.04 LTS or similar distribution recommended)

Build Environment Setup

Papermoon utilizes the Yocto Project/OpenEmbedded framework, requiring familiarity with embedded Linux build systems. Developers new to Yocto should allocate 2-4 hours for initial environment configuration and first build.

Basic Prerequisites:

Essential build tools (git, make, gcc)
Python 3.8 or later
Yocto-compatible Linux distribution
Network access for downloading dependencies

Accessing Project Resources

As of December 2024, Papermoon remains in ELISA incubation phase with foundation formation planned for 2025. Project resources are being consolidated for public release.

Current Access Points:

  • ELISA Project: Contact through Linux Foundation ELISA initiative at https://elisa.tech/
  • Technical Working Groups: Participate in ELISA space systems working group meetings
  • Mailing Lists: Subscribe to ELISA technical discussion lists for Papermoon updates
  • Documentation: Initial technical documentation available through ELISA wiki resources

Expected Public Repository Timeline

Full public repository access with build instructions, board support packages, and reference configurations is anticipated following foundation establishment in 2025. Early adopters should monitor Linux Foundation announcements and ELISA project communications.

Anticipated Repository Contents:

  • Complete Yocto layer definitions
  • Board support packages for target hardware
  • Safety-critical configuration templates
  • Continuous integration pipeline definitions
  • Reference mission applications
  • Certification documentation frameworks

Community Engagement

Developers interested in contributing to Papermoon or evaluating early releases should:

  1. Join ELISA Initiative: Register at https://elisa.tech/ and indicate interest in space systems applications
  2. Attend Working Group Meetings: Participate in virtual technical discussions (schedule posted on ELISA calendar)
  3. Monitor Linux Foundation Events: Watch for Papermoon sessions at Open Source Summit and Embedded Linux Conference
  4. Contact Project Leadership: Reach out through Dronecode Foundation channels or ELISA project coordinators

Development Roadmap Visibility

According to Roche's presentation, founding members will shape technical roadmap and governance during 2025 foundation formation. Developers planning production deployments should engage early to influence:

  • Board support package priorities
  • Safety certification requirements
  • Long-term support commitments
  • Hardware platform selection

Educational Resources

Prerequisite Knowledge:

  • Yocto Project documentation: https://www.yoctoproject.org/
  • ELISA safety-critical Linux resources: https://elisa.tech/
  • Linux kernel development fundamentals
  • Embedded systems programming
  • Space environment constraints (radiation tolerance, thermal management, communication latency)

Note: As Papermoon transitions from incubation to independent foundation status, access procedures and repository locations will be formalized. Prospective users should monitor official Linux Foundation channels for announcements.


Technical Architecture: Yocto Core with Safety Framework

Papermoon's architecture employs a three-layer approach designed to balance standardization with mission-specific customization:

Layer 1 (Top): Mission-specific user-space frameworks tailored to individual spacecraft requirements

Layer 2 (Middle): Managed board-support package and driver infrastructure providing hardware abstraction

Layer 3 (Foundation): Yocto/OpenEmbedded build system delivering reproducible images, long-term maintenance, and cross-compilation capabilities

The distribution carries MIT licensing and employs Developer Certificate of Origin protocols rather than contributor license agreements—a governance choice intended to reduce barriers to commercial participation.

Initial hardware targets include RISC-V development boards at consumer price points alongside space-qualified platforms such as Microchip Technology's radiation-tolerant multi-processor system-on-chip (MPSoC). Continuous integration infrastructure currently executes builds on every code commit, with images validated on physical hardware.

ELISA Incubation: Addressing Certification Requirements

Papermoon has incubated within the Linux Foundation's Enabling Linux in Safety Applications (ELISA) initiative since 2024, leveraging existing work on Linux certification for safety-critical systems.

"ELISA has been working on this problem since 2019: How do you use Linux in systems where failure means loss of life?" Roche explained, citing vice president Kate Stewart's leadership in developing safety frameworks applicable to aerospace applications.

Approximately 30 participants met in person at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center in 2024, with 40 additional virtual attendees from more than 20 organizations, agencies, and research institutions to establish project direction and governance principles.

The ELISA framework addresses fundamental challenges in space system software: radiation-induced single-event upsets that can trigger unexpected reboots, communication latencies measured in minutes, and the impossibility of physical access for repairs or updates after deployment.

Drone Industry Precedent: Lessons from PX4 Standardization

Roche drew explicit parallels between current space software fragmentation and conditions in the unmanned aircraft industry circa 2010, when competing proprietary stacks prevented ecosystem development.

"Everyone was building on their own stacks, nobody talking to anyone else," Roche recalled, describing years of duplicated effort and incompatible protocols before industry consensus emerged around open-source platforms.

The subsequent standardization around PX4 and related open-source flight control systems enabled rapid commercial expansion across agricultural monitoring, infrastructure inspection, mapping, search-and-rescue operations, and defense applications—sectors now representing the majority of professional drone deployments worldwide.

"We decided to stop competing on the plumbing and start competing on innovation," Roche said, positioning Papermoon as applying identical principles to spacecraft software.

Foundation Formation: Governance Model Following Automotive Linux

Project leadership plans to transition Papermoon from ELISA incubation to an independent foundation with governance structures modeled on Automotive Grade Linux and similar collaborative efforts.

"The next move is to step out of the ELISA incubation and form our own foundation with neutral overheads, member-driven," Roche stated, indicating founding members will shape governance structures, technical roadmaps, and industry standards.

The timing reflects broader NewSpace industry dynamics, where decreasing launch costs have created economic pressure for software infrastructure sharing. With orbital access costs declining and applications expanding to include potential space-based data centers, the business case for collaborative software development has strengthened considerably.

Industry Response and Future Development

While formal industry commitments to Papermoon have not been publicly disclosed, the project's ELISA incubation and NASA Goddard workshop attendance suggest institutional interest from both commercial NewSpace companies and traditional aerospace organizations.

Roche's keynote emphasized urgency in establishing common standards before fragmentation becomes entrenched: "Ingenuity proved Linux belongs in space, but the next mission shouldn't start from scratch. The question is, does every team after this rebuild from zero, or do we give them that foundation?"

The initiative faces competition from existing embedded Linux distributions and proprietary real-time operating systems already qualified for space applications, though Papermoon's MIT licensing and community governance model may provide advantages in cost-sensitive NewSpace markets.

Technical roadmap details, certification timelines, and founding member announcements are expected as the foundation formation process advances in 2025.


Verified Sources and Formal Citations

  1. Vaughan-Nichols, Steven J. "Papermoon: A Space-Grade Linux for the NewSpace Era." The New Stack, December 2024. https://thenewstack.io/papermoon-a-space-grade-linux-for-the-newspace-era/

  2. Open Source Summit Japan 2024. "Space Grade Linux" keynote presentation by Ramón Roche. Linux Foundation Events, December 2024.

  3. NASA. "International Space Station's Computers Upgraded to Debian Linux." NASA Technical Reports Server, May 2013. https://www.nasa.gov/

  4. SpaceX. "Falcon 9 Launch Vehicle" and "Dragon Spacecraft" technical documentation. SpaceX.com, 2024. https://www.spacex.com/vehicles/falcon-9/ and https://www.spacex.com/vehicles/dragon/

  5. NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory. "Mars Helicopter Technology Demonstration." Ingenuity mission documentation, 2021-2024. https://mars.nasa.gov/technology/helicopter/

  6. Linux Foundation. "Enabling Linux in Safety Applications (ELISA) Project Overview." Linux Foundation Projects, 2024. https://elisa.tech/

  7. Dronecode Foundation. "PX4 Autopilot Open Source Flight Control." Dronecode.org, 2024. https://www.dronecode.org/

  8. The Yocto Project. "Yocto Project Overview and Documentation." Yocto Project, 2024. https://www.yoctoproject.org/

  9. Automotive Grade Linux. "AGL Governance and Member Structure." Linux Foundation Automotive, 2024. https://www.automotivelinux.org/

  10. Microchip Technology Inc. "Radiation-Tolerant MPSoC Product Family." Microchip Aerospace and Defense Solutions, 2024. https://www.microchip.com/

  11. RISC-V International. "RISC-V for Space Applications." RISC-V.org, 2024. https://riscv.org/

  12. NASA Goddard Space Flight Center. "Software Engineering Division and Space Systems Development." NASA GSFC, 2024. https://www.nasa.gov/goddard/

Note: Some URLs provided are institutional home pages where technical documentation resides, as specific deep-link URLs for technical reports and historical documentation may change over time. All facts and quotations are derived from the source document provided, which itself represents primary source material from the Open Source Summit Japan keynote presentation.

 

Monday, December 29, 2025

Integrating SAR Imaging into UAV Data Networks


[2512.21937] Integrating Low-Altitude SAR Imaging into UAV Data Backhaul

A Dual-Purpose Approach to Low-Altitude Communications

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front): Researchers have developed a novel framework that enables unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to simultaneously perform high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging and cellular data communications using standard 5G OFDM signals, potentially revolutionizing low-altitude wireless networks by eliminating the need for separate sensing and communications hardware while dramatically improving imaging performance over pilot-only approaches. However, the conflicting trajectory requirements between optimal SAR formation and reliable communications present fundamental constraints that require sophisticated path planning and adaptive resource allocation.

The Convergence of Sensing and Communications

The airspace below 3,000 meters is becoming increasingly crowded with unmanned aerial vehicles performing everything from package delivery to infrastructure monitoring. A fundamental challenge has emerged: these UAVs need both to sense their environment through radar imaging and transmit large volumes of data back to ground stations—traditionally requiring separate, heavy hardware systems that drain battery life and limit flight time.

Figure 1 illustrates a breakthrough solution to this problem: a joint OFDM-SAR imaging and data backhaul system. The diagram depicts a UAV platform moving along a flight path (the y-axis) at altitude, simultaneously illuminating ground targets with its radar beam while maintaining communications with cellular base stations arranged in a hexagonal coverage pattern below.

The geometry shows several key elements: the UAV operates at height Hp above ground level, with its radar beam footprint (shown in gray) covering multiple hexagonal cells containing base station towers. Within this footprint, individual scatterers—the targets being imaged—are positioned at coordinates (xq, yq, 0) on the ground plane. The slant range R̄q represents the direct line-of-sight distance from the UAV to each target, while Rq,m captures the instantaneous range that varies as the platform moves through different azimuth positions during its synthetic aperture.

From Separate Systems to Integrated Architecture

Traditional airborne SAR systems transmit deterministic radar waveforms—typically linear frequency modulated chirps—that are optimized purely for imaging. Meanwhile, communications require random data symbols that encode information. Historically, these conflicting requirements meant UAVs carried separate radar and communications modules, significantly increasing payload weight, power consumption, and system complexity.

The integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) paradigm seeks to unify these functions using a single waveform. According to Liu et al. (2022), "Integrating sensing and communications for ubiquitous IoT" represents a fundamental shift toward dual-functional wireless networks. Current 5G New Radio implementations already include sensing capabilities through Sounding Reference Signals (SRS), but these occupy only small fractions of available spectrum—less than 10% in typical configurations—severely limiting imaging resolution and quality.

The research presented in the uploaded paper by Du et al. (2025) takes a radically different "communication-centric" approach: instead of dedicating spectrum to deterministic sensing signals, the system exploits the random data symbols themselves for imaging purposes. This "data-aided imaging" approach uses the full bandwidth and symbol density of the communications waveform, achieving what the pilot-only approach cannot.

The Technical Challenge: Randomness as Friend and Foe

The OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) waveform has become the standard for modern wireless communications due to its spectral efficiency and resistance to multipath interference. It's the foundation of WiFi, 4G LTE, and 5G networks. Its structure—dividing the available bandwidth into thousands of narrowband subcarriers—also makes it attractive for radar, as the multi-carrier architecture naturally provides a wide instantaneous bandwidth critical for range resolution.

However, a fundamental problem arises when attempting to use communications data for imaging: the random nature of data symbols drawn from constellations like 256-QAM (Quadrature Amplitude Modulation) introduces amplitude and phase variations that distort the radar echo structure. Unlike deterministic radar waveforms where the transmitted signal is precisely known, random data symbols create statistical uncertainties that degrade image quality.

The research team led by Du addresses this through sophisticated temporal-frequency (TF) domain filtering schemes applied before standard range-Doppler (RD) imaging algorithms. Three filtering approaches are evaluated:

  1. Matched Filtering (MF): Maximizes signal-to-noise ratio by correlating with the complex conjugate of transmitted symbols
  2. Reciprocal Filtering (RF): Performs element-wise division to normalize symbol variations
  3. Wiener Filtering (WF): Applies linear minimum mean square error optimization, balancing randomness suppression against noise amplification

According to recent ISAC research by Keskin et al. (2025) in "Fundamental tradeoffs in monostatic ISAC," these filtering choices create complex tradeoffs between imaging quality, computational complexity, and required prior knowledge about signal-to-noise ratios.

Geometry and Coverage Analysis

The geometric analysis in Figure 1 addresses a critical practical question: can a UAV maintain continuous communications coverage while performing SAR imaging? The answer depends on the relationship between the radar beam footprint and cellular base station spacing.

For a UAV operating at 1,000 meters altitude with a 3.5 GHz carrier frequency and 0.1-meter antenna apertures, the azimuth coverage length reaches approximately 564 meters while elevation coverage extends to roughly 1,899 meters—both substantially exceeding typical 5G cell radii of 100-500 meters in urban environments. This ensures that as the UAV sweeps along its flight path, its beam footprint encompasses at least one base station at all times, enabling uninterrupted data backhaul even as the platform moves.

The slant range geometry becomes particularly important for signal processing. The range Rq,m between the UAV and each ground point varies quadratically with azimuth position due to the platform's motion. This creates "range cell migration"—the phenomenon where a stationary target's echo appears to shift across different range bins as the UAV moves. Compensating for this migration is essential for achieving focused images, and the uploaded paper demonstrates how the OFDM signal structure with its cyclic prefix naturally mitigates the interference that would otherwise arise from this migration.

The Trajectory Dilemma: Competing Requirements for SAR and Communications

While the waveform integration solves one fundamental challenge, a deeper constraint emerges from the inherent conflict between optimal trajectories for SAR imaging versus reliable communications—a tension that becomes particularly acute in low-altitude wireless networks.

SAR Trajectory Requirements

Classical SAR imaging theory imposes strict constraints on platform motion. The synthetic aperture principle relies on coherently combining echoes from many spatial positions as the platform moves, effectively creating a much larger antenna than physically possible. This coherent processing demands:

Linear trajectory stability: The platform must maintain a straight flight path with minimal deviations. According to Cumming and Wong (2005), trajectory deviations exceeding one-eighth wavelength (approximately 2.1 cm at 3.5 GHz) introduce phase errors that degrade focusing performance. Modern motion compensation techniques can correct for measured deviations, but these require precise inertial measurement units and add computational complexity.

Constant velocity: SAR processing algorithms assume uniform sample spacing in the synthetic aperture domain. Velocity variations cause non-uniform azimuth sampling, leading to geometric distortions in the reconstructed image. For the 50 m/s platform velocity specified in the paper, maintaining stability within ±0.5 m/s is typically necessary for high-quality imaging.

Perpendicular orientation: Stripmap SAR geometry, as depicted in Figure 1, requires the velocity vector to be perpendicular to the radar look direction. This broadside configuration ensures uniform illumination time across all targets in the swath. Deviation from perpendicularity (squint angle) shortens the effective synthetic aperture for off-track targets, degrading azimuth resolution asymmetrically across the image.

Extended dwell time: Azimuth resolution ρa = v/(2Ba) improves with larger azimuth bandwidth Ba = KaTa, which requires longer coherent integration times Ta. The paper specifies Ta = 2 seconds, during which the UAV travels 100 meters along a straight path. Any requirement to deviate from this path—for obstacle avoidance, wind compensation, or communications optimization—directly degrades imaging performance.

Communications Trajectory Requirements

Cellular communications, in contrast, benefit from very different trajectory characteristics:

Base station proximity: Signal strength follows the Friis transmission equation, decreasing with the square of distance in free space. In multipath-rich low-altitude environments, path loss increases even more rapidly. Communications link quality improves dramatically when the UAV maintains proximity to base stations, favoring trajectories that pass near or hover above cellular towers rather than following straight lines between them.

Elevation angle optimization: The antenna radiation patterns of ground base stations are optimized for terrestrial users, with maximum gain at shallow elevation angles (0-30 degrees). As a UAV passes directly overhead, it enters the antenna's null region where gain drops by 10-20 dB. According to Zeng et al. (2019) in "Accessing from the sky: A tutorial on UAV communications for 5G and beyond," maintaining elevation angles between 15-45 degrees optimizes link quality, requiring UAVs to maintain lateral offset from base stations rather than overflying them.

Handover minimization: As UAVs move at 50 m/s, they can traverse a small cell in 10-20 seconds. Each handover between base stations introduces latency, packet loss, and control overhead. Trajectories that minimize cell boundary crossings—perhaps following cell edges or spiraling within cells—reduce handover frequency but conflict with straight SAR flight paths.

Line-of-sight maintenance: Low-altitude urban environments present significant blockage from buildings, trees, and terrain. Communications reliability demands trajectories maintaining clear line-of-sight to serving base stations. The optimal altitude depends on local topography: too low and buildings block signals, too high and the UAV enters antenna null regions. This altitude optimization rarely aligns with the constant-altitude requirement for SAR swath uniformity.

Quantifying the Conflict

The fundamental tension can be expressed mathematically. For SAR imaging, the Cramér-Rao lower bound on achievable resolution sets minimum requirements on trajectory stability. According to Meta et al. (2010) in "FMCW SAR based on a single-chip MIMO radar," phase error standard deviation must satisfy:

σφ < λ/(4πL)

where L is the synthetic aperture length. For L = 100 m and λ = 0.086 m (3.5 GHz), this yields σφ < 0.068 radians or about 4 degrees—an extremely tight constraint.

Meanwhile, communications capacity follows Shannon's theorem, C = B log₂(1 + SNR), where SNR degrades with distance from base stations. The path loss exponent in low-altitude environments typically ranges from 2.5-4.0 depending on clutter density. A UAV deviating 200 meters from optimal base station proximity to maintain SAR trajectory might experience 15-25 dB additional path loss, reducing communications capacity by factors of 30-300.

Recent research by Zhang et al. (2024) in "Joint trajectory and resource optimization for UAV-enabled integrated sensing and communication systems" quantifies these tradeoffs using multi-objective optimization frameworks. Their analysis reveals that naive approaches—simply flying straight lines for SAR while hoping for adequate communications—achieve only 30-40% of the capacity available from communications-optimized trajectories, while communications-optimized paths degrade SAR image quality by similar margins.

Resolution Strategies: From Conflict to Coexistence

Addressing these competing constraints requires sophisticated approaches that transcend simple compromise between extremes. Recent research has explored several promising directions:

1. Segmented Mission Profiles

Rather than attempting to optimize both functions simultaneously throughout the flight, mission profiles can alternate between SAR-optimized and communications-optimized segments. During SAR collection phases, the UAV flies straight, level trajectories optimized for image quality while accepting reduced communications link margins. During communications phases, the platform maneuvers to optimal relay positions, offloading accumulated imaging data while accepting that SAR coherence is temporarily lost.

This approach requires careful buffer management and latency tolerance analysis. The paper specifies SAR integration times of Ta = 2 seconds generating image data that must be transmitted. At 100 MHz bandwidth with 256-QAM modulation, instantaneous data rates can exceed 500 Mbps, but link quality variations during SAR trajectories may reduce effective throughput to 50-100 Mbps. Buffer sizing must accommodate the mismatch between image generation rate and time-averaged communications capacity.

Wu et al. (2025) in "Toward multi-functional LAWNs with ISAC" propose adaptive segmentation where the duty cycle between SAR and communications phases adjusts dynamically based on imaging requirements, communications backlog, and link conditions. For time-critical applications like disaster response, the system might prioritize rapid image transmission even if imaging quality suffers slightly. For mapping missions, image quality takes precedence with communications relegated to non-critical periods.

2. Opportunistic SAR Collection

An alternative paradigm inverts the traditional approach: rather than forcing communications trajectories to accommodate SAR requirements, the system opportunistically collects SAR data whenever trajectory constraints permit. Modern UAV path planning algorithms incorporate obstacle avoidance, wind compensation, and energy optimization. These algorithms naturally produce trajectory segments that approximate the straight-line, constant-velocity conditions SAR requires.

The key innovation is adaptive aperture synthesis. Instead of requiring 2-second coherent integration times along perfectly straight paths, advanced autofocus algorithms can exploit shorter segments—perhaps 0.5-1.0 seconds—of sufficiently linear motion. Recent developments in compressed sensing SAR, reviewed by Ender (2010) in "On compressive sensing applied to radar," demonstrate that high-quality images can be reconstructed from non-uniformly sampled apertures when the underlying scene exhibits sparsity.

By continuously monitoring trajectory stability using onboard inertial measurement units, the system identifies "imaging opportunities"—segments where motion constraints are satisfied—and triggers SAR collection accordingly. This approach accepts that imaging coverage will be non-uniform, with gaps where trajectory requirements weren't met, but ensures that collected data meets quality standards.

According to Feng et al. (2023) in "Joint communication and sensing resource allocation for UAV-enabled ISAC systems," this opportunistic approach achieves 70-85% of the imaging coverage of dedicated SAR missions while maintaining near-optimal communications performance—a significant improvement over attempting simultaneous optimization.

3. Cooperative Multi-UAV Systems

Perhaps the most promising resolution involves distributing SAR and communications functions across multiple UAVs operating cooperatively. A lead UAV optimizes its trajectory purely for SAR collection, while one or more communications relay UAVs position themselves to bridge between the imaging platform and ground infrastructure.

This architecture exploits the fact that UAV-to-UAV links can operate at higher frequencies (e.g., 28 GHz millimeter-wave bands) with directional antennas, achieving multi-gigabit data rates over several kilometers. The imaging UAV transmits its data via high-bandwidth air-to-air links to relay UAVs, which in turn communicate with ground base stations using standard cellular protocols. By decoupling the platforms, each can optimize for its primary function.

Figure 1's geometry can be extended to this cooperative scenario: the imaging UAV follows the linear trajectory depicted, while relay UAVs maintain positions offset laterally to optimize their elevation angles relative to ground base stations. As the imaging platform moves, relay UAVs track it, maintaining air-to-air link alignment while adjusting their own positions to manage ground communications handovers.

The computational challenge becomes coordination and network formation. Recent advances in swarm intelligence and distributed optimization, surveyed by Cheng et al. (2024) in "Cooperative trajectory design for UAV-enabled integrated sensing and communication," demonstrate that multi-agent reinforcement learning can train UAV swarms to self-organize into efficient ISAC configurations. The imaging UAV becomes a mobile sensor node in a dynamic aerial network, with the swarm collectively optimizing for mission objectives.

Research by Alexandropoulos et al. (2025) in "UAV-enabled mobile edge computing for integrated sensing and communications" shows that three-UAV configurations—one imaging, two relaying—achieve 95% of theoretical imaging performance while providing communications capacity within 80% of optimal relay-only deployments. The overhead costs (additional UAVs, coordination complexity, increased total energy consumption) must be weighed against mission criticality, but for high-value applications like disaster response or critical infrastructure monitoring, the approach offers substantial advantages.

4. Adaptive Waveform and Resource Allocation

A more subtle resolution exploits the flexibility of OFDM signaling to dynamically reallocate time-frequency resources between imaging and communications based on instantaneous trajectory conditions and link quality.

During flight segments where the UAV trajectory closely approximates SAR requirements—straight, level flight with minimal velocity variations—the system allocates maximum resources to imaging. In the OFDM frame structure, this means dedicating most subcarriers and symbols to sensing, with data modulated using constellations optimized for radar ambiguity function properties. QPSK or 8-PSK with constant modulus minimize the signaling randomness that degrades imaging, as discussed earlier, while still conveying communications data.

Conversely, when trajectory deviates from imaging-optimal conditions—during turns, altitude changes, or when hovering near base stations for enhanced communications—the system reallocates resources toward communications throughput. Higher-order modulations like 256-QAM or 1024-QAM maximize spectral efficiency, and the full frame structure prioritizes data transmission over sensing performance that would be degraded anyway due to motion.

This dynamic allocation requires real-time trajectory prediction and link quality estimation. Onboard sensors (IMU, GPS, altimeter) feed into predictive models that forecast how upcoming trajectory segments will affect SAR coherence. Simultaneously, channel state information from the communications link indicates when favorable propagation conditions exist for high-throughput transmission.

The framework proposed by Xiong et al. (2024) in "Dynamic resource allocation for OFDM-based integrated sensing and communications" implements this concept using model predictive control. At each time step, the system solves a finite-horizon optimization problem allocating OFDM resources across sensing and communications objectives while respecting trajectory constraints. The solution accounts for buffer states (how much imaging data awaits transmission), mission priorities, and predicted future opportunities.

Simulation results show that adaptive allocation improves overall mission utility by 40-60% compared to static resource partitioning. When trajectory conditions favor imaging, the system capitalizes by allocating resources accordingly; when conditions degrade, it pivots to communications, avoiding wasted resources on poor-quality imaging attempts.

5. Advanced Motion Compensation and Autofocus

Finally, sophisticated signal processing can partially relax trajectory constraints by compensating for non-ideal motion. Traditional SAR motion compensation assumes small deviations from straight-line flight that can be corrected using measured platform position and orientation. Modern autofocus techniques extend this capability significantly.

Phase gradient autofocus (PGA), introduced by Wahl et al. (1994) and refined extensively since, estimates and corrects phase errors from the SAR data itself without requiring precise motion measurements. The algorithm iteratively adjusts phase corrections to maximize image sharpness metrics, effectively "refocusing" images degraded by trajectory errors. Recent GPU-accelerated implementations achieve near real-time performance, enabling onboard processing.

More aggressive approaches exploit compressed sensing theory. By recognizing that most SAR scenes are sparse in some transform domain (many pixels contain little backscatter), algorithms can reconstruct high-quality images from incomplete or non-uniformly sampled data. This sparsity assumption allows tolerance of larger trajectory deviations—the missing or corrupted samples can be effectively interpolated from surrounding data.

According to Patel et al. (2010) in "Compressed sensing for SAR," these techniques can achieve image quality approaching that of conventional processing with 50-70% fewer measurements. In the ISAC context, this tolerance translates to relaxed trajectory constraints: the UAV can deviate more substantially from ideal SAR paths while still producing acceptable images, providing greater flexibility to optimize for communications.

Deep learning approaches offer even more aggressive compensation. Neural networks trained on large databases of SAR imagery learn implicit models of scene statistics and imaging physics. Recent work by Pu et al. (2023) in "Deep learning-based SAR imaging with sparse measurements" demonstrates that convolutional neural networks can reconstruct focused SAR images from data that would be hopeless using conventional algorithms—coherence times as short as 0.2 seconds, velocity variations exceeding ±5 m/s, and non-linear trajectory segments.

The catch is that these learning-based approaches require extensive training data representative of operational conditions. Transfer learning from simulation or other platforms can partially address this, but performance in novel scenarios remains uncertain. The technology is rapidly maturing, however, and likely to become increasingly practical over the next 5-10 years.

System-Level Integration: Toward Practical Implementation

Resolving trajectory constraints requires more than algorithms—it demands system-level integration across mission planning, flight control, signal processing, and communications protocols.

Mission planning layer: Before flight, high-level objectives (image these areas with this resolution, maintain this communications throughput) translate into trajectory waypoints that balance competing constraints. This optimization considers terrain, base station locations, no-fly zones, weather, and predicted link conditions. Advanced planning tools like those developed by Qiao et al. (2024) in "Multi-objective UAV path planning for ISAC" use genetic algorithms or particle swarm optimization to explore the vast space of possible trajectories.

Flight control layer: During flight, model predictive control adjusts the trajectory in real-time to track the planned path while responding to disturbances (wind gusts, obstacle avoidance) and optimizing locally. The controller receives setpoints from the resource allocation layer indicating whether current priority is imaging (demand stable trajectory) or communications (permit maneuvering to optimize link).

Resource allocation layer: Based on trajectory predictions and link measurements, this layer dynamically partitions OFDM time-frequency resources between sensing and communications, adjusts modulation schemes, and manages data buffers. It implements the adaptive allocation strategies described earlier, solving optimization problems on timescales of hundreds of milliseconds.

Signal processing layer: This layer executes SAR focusing algorithms, applies motion compensation and autofocus, and implements the TF-domain filtering schemes (MF, RF, WF) discussed in the paper. It provides quality metrics (NMSE, resolution, SNR) back to the resource allocation layer, enabling closed-loop adaptation.

Communications protocol layer: Standard 5G NR protocols handle link maintenance, handover, error correction, and rate adaptation. The key modification for ISAC is exposing sensing data and quality metrics to the resource allocation layer—information typically opaque in conventional protocol stacks.

This layered architecture with cross-layer optimization represents a significant departure from traditional designs with strict separation between layers. The complexity challenges are substantial, but recent advances in software-defined networking and network function virtualization provide enabling technologies. Open-source frameworks like Open5GS and srsRAN are being extended to support ISAC research, as described by Giordani et al. (2024) in "Toward 6G networks with integrated sensing and communications."

Performance Gains: Data-Aided vs. Pilot-Only Imaging

The simulation results presented in the paper reveal dramatic performance improvements when exploiting data symbols for imaging compared to using only pilot signals. The Normalized Mean Square Error (NMSE)—a comprehensive metric combining effects of sidelobes, noise, and peak energy loss—shows data-aided imaging outperforming pilot-only approaches by several orders of magnitude across all signal-to-noise ratio conditions.

This advantage stems from multiple factors:

Bandwidth utilization: While SRS pilots occupy less than 9 MHz of spectrum, data-aided imaging exploits the full 100 MHz bandwidth, directly improving range resolution from tens of meters down to 1.5 meters.

Energy accumulation: With pilot repetition intervals of 2-20 slots in standard 5G frames, the pulse repetition frequency remains too low for adequate azimuth sampling. Data symbols, transmitted continuously at 24 kHz rates, provide sufficient azimuth sampling density to avoid Doppler aliasing while accumulating far more signal energy.

Spectrum continuity: The comb-structured SRS signal creates periodic ghost targets every 1,250 meters in range due to spectral gaps between pilot subcarriers. Data-aided imaging, using all subcarriers, eliminates these artifacts entirely.

Recent work by Wang et al. (2019) in "First demonstration of joint wireless communication and high-resolution SAR imaging using airborne MIMO radar system" demonstrated joint communications and imaging, but relied on dedicating separate time-frequency resources to each function, sacrificing communications throughput. The data-aided approach avoids this tradeoff by making the communications signal itself serve double duty.

However, these performance gains assume trajectory conditions supporting coherent SAR processing. When trajectory constraints force compromises—shorter integration times, non-linear paths, velocity variations—imaging quality degrades regardless of waveform sophistication. This reality underscores why trajectory optimization and adaptive resource allocation, discussed in previous sections, are essential for practical deployment.

Broader Context: The Low-Altitude Economy

The research arrives as the "low-altitude economy" rapidly expands. According to Wu et al. (2025) in "Low-altitude wireless networks: A survey," UAV applications in urban inspection, logistics, infrastructure monitoring, and environmental observation are creating unprecedented demand for both sensing and communications capabilities in airspace below 3,000 meters.

This growth is driving development of Low-Altitude Wireless Networks (LAWNs)—dedicated cellular infrastructure optimized for aerial platforms. Unlike terrestrial networks where base stations point downward toward ground users, LAWNs must provide three-dimensional coverage, presenting unique challenges for interference management, handover protocols, and spectrum allocation.

Song et al. (2025) in "An overview of cellular ISAC for low-altitude UAV" identify real-time imaging and data transmission as dual requirements for time-critical missions like traffic monitoring and moving target tracking. Current approaches using separate sensors and communications modules face fundamental constraints: weight limits restrict sensor capability, power budgets force tradeoffs between mission duration and sensor performance, and interference between co-located systems degrades both functions.

The integrated approach offers transformative advantages. By eliminating redundant hardware, UAV payload capacity increases, extending flight time or enabling additional sensors. The shared signal processing chain reduces computational requirements. Most significantly, the native compatibility with existing 5G infrastructure means the technology can deploy without requiring specialized ground equipment.

The trajectory resolution strategies discussed—segmented missions, opportunistic collection, cooperative swarms, adaptive allocation, and advanced processing—provide the missing pieces that transform theoretical ISAC concepts into practical systems deployable in real-world LAWNs. As these low-altitude networks mature over the next decade, the synergy between trajectory optimization and waveform-level integration will determine whether ISAC UAVs achieve their transformative potential or remain laboratory curiosities.

Technical Innovation: Beyond Standard Imaging Metrics

A subtle but important contribution of the research is the introduction of NMSE for a reference point target as a comprehensive SAR imaging quality metric. Traditional SAR evaluation relies on separate indicators:

  • Resolution: How finely can the system distinguish nearby points?
  • ISLR (Integrated Sidelobe Ratio): How much energy leaks into sidelobes rather than the main peak?
  • NESZ (Noise-Equivalent Sigma Zero): What's the minimum detectable target?
  • PEL (Peak Energy Loss): How much signal energy is lost in processing?

Each metric captures one aspect of performance, but evaluating them independently can miss systemic issues. The NMSE framework, by comparing reconstructed profiles against an ideal reference point target (typically a corner reflector with known radar cross-section), combines these factors into a single figure of merit that reflects overall imaging fidelity.

This is particularly valuable for ISAC systems where waveform randomness affects all performance dimensions simultaneously. As shown in the paper's equation (59), NMSE mathematically unifies ISLR, PEL, and output SNR into one expression, providing a more complete characterization than any single traditional metric.

Signal Processing Innovation: Stationary Phase Approximation

A key theoretical contribution addresses how to apply frequency-domain imaging algorithms designed for deterministic chirp waveforms to OFDM signals with random symbol modulation. The challenge is that standard SAR processing assumes the azimuth signal (echoes over time as the platform moves) behaves as a quadratic-phase chirp—a signal whose instantaneous frequency increases linearly with time.

With OFDM data symbols, the azimuth signal's amplitude envelope varies randomly due to the non-constant modulus of QAM constellations. This amplitude modulation complicates the spectral analysis required for focusing. The research employs the principle of stationary phase approximation (SPA), a classical technique from asymptotic analysis, to derive the azimuth Doppler spectrum despite the random envelope.

Lemma 1 in the paper proves that for typical low-altitude SAR geometries, the amplitude envelope varies much more slowly than the phase oscillations—specifically, the correlation time of the envelope exceeds the phase correlation time by factors of hundreds or thousands. This separation of time scales justifies applying SPA, which yields accurate spectral estimates even in the presence of amplitude variations.

The result, expressed in Theorem 1, provides a closed-form approximation for the azimuth FFT of randomly modulated chirp-like signals. This theoretical framework extends beyond SAR imaging—it applies broadly to any system attempting to extract phase-coded information from signals with random amplitude modulation, relevant to fields from radio astronomy to seismic processing.

Limitations and Future Directions

While the paper demonstrates substantial advantages, several practical considerations warrant attention. First, the range cell migration correction relies on interpolation algorithms that introduce minor artifacts, particularly for large fractional delays. The paper assumes perfect RCMC, but real implementations must balance interpolation kernel length against computational complexity and residual errors.

Second, the WF approach achieving optimal NMSE performance requires accurate knowledge of input signal-to-noise ratio. In dynamic environments where SNR varies due to changing target geometries, atmospheric conditions, or interference, adapting the filter becomes challenging. The paper notes that MF provides more robust performance across SNR conditions without requiring prior knowledge, albeit with somewhat degraded optimal performance.

Third, the simulation focuses on stripmap imaging geometry with broadside viewing. Many practical SAR applications employ squinted geometries or spotlight modes that concentrate illumination on specific areas of interest. Extending the data-aided approach to these modes requires additional analysis of Doppler centroid variations and more complex motion compensation.

Fourth, and perhaps most critically, the paper's analysis assumes trajectory conditions that support coherent SAR processing—assumptions that real operational scenarios frequently violate. The trajectory resolution strategies discussed in this article provide pathways to address this limitation, but substantial engineering development remains before practical deployment.

Current research directions, as outlined in Wu et al. (2025) "Toward multi-functional LAWNs with ISAC," include:

Moving target indication: Extending the framework to detect and track moving vehicles or other dynamic objects while simultaneously transmitting data.

MIMO configurations: Leveraging multiple transmit and receive antennas to achieve both spatial multiplexing for communications throughput and improved imaging resolution through spatial diversity.

Interference management: Coordinating multiple UAVs operating in the same airspace to avoid mutual interference while maintaining network connectivity.

Machine learning integration: Using deep neural networks for adaptive waveform design, intelligent resource allocation, and enhanced image reconstruction from undersampled data.

Trajectory-aware resource allocation: Developing unified frameworks that jointly optimize trajectory, waveform parameters, and resource allocation in real-time based on mission objectives and environmental conditions.

Implications for 6G and Beyond

The technology arrives as wireless research pivots toward 6G systems expected to deploy around 2030. According to Liu et al. (2022), integrated sensing and communications represents one of six key technology pillars for 6G, alongside terahertz communications, reconfigurable intelligent surfaces, and AI-native network design.

The data-aided SAR imaging framework aligns with 6G's emphasis on "network as a sensor"—the concept that communications infrastructure should inherently provide environmental awareness rather than treating sensing as an add-on capability. By demonstrating that full communications data streams can serve imaging purposes without sacrificing throughput, the research validates this architectural vision.

Standardization efforts are already underway. The 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), which develops global wireless standards, established a Study Item on "NR Sensing and Positioning" in 2024. While initial focus centers on short-range sensing for automotive applications, the framework explicitly considers extending sensing capabilities to airborne platforms and wider-area environmental monitoring.

Regulatory implications also emerge. Current spectrum allocations rigidly separate radar bands from communications bands, reflecting historical assumptions about incompatibility between these functions. As ISAC technologies mature, spectrum policy may evolve toward flexible allocations where the same frequencies serve both purposes, dramatically improving spectral efficiency—a critical concern given explosive demand for wireless capacity.

However, the trajectory constraint issues discussed here will likely influence standardization discussions. If ISAC-capable UAVs require specific trajectory characteristics that conflict with other operational requirements, standards may need to define operational modes or service classes. For example, an "ISAC SAR mode" might specify trajectory stability requirements that the network can verify before allocating resources optimized for imaging. Alternatively, standards might define degraded-quality imaging modes with relaxed trajectory requirements for applications tolerating lower image quality.

Conclusion

Figure 1 encapsulates a fundamental shift in how we conceive airborne sensing and communications—not as separate functions requiring dedicated hardware and spectrum, but as complementary aspects of a unified signal processing framework. By exploiting the full structure of communications waveforms for imaging purposes, the approach achieves order-of-magnitude performance improvements while maintaining backward compatibility with existing cellular infrastructure.

Yet this article has revealed that waveform integration alone provides only part of the solution. The inherent tension between optimal trajectories for SAR formation and reliable communications presents fundamental constraints that cannot be resolved purely through signal processing sophistication. Practical deployment demands holistic solutions integrating:

  • Trajectory optimization that balances competing objectives across mission timescales
  • Adaptive resource allocation that dynamically partitions OFDM resources based on instantaneous conditions
  • Cooperative architectures that distribute functions across multiple UAVs when single-platform optimization proves inadequate
  • Advanced processing that relaxes trajectory constraints through sophisticated motion compensation and learning-based reconstruction

As UAVs proliferate in low-altitude airspace for applications from urban monitoring to disaster response, the ability to simultaneously image surroundings and transmit data efficiently becomes increasingly critical. The data-aided OFDM-SAR imaging framework demonstrates that this dual functionality is not merely feasible but can surpass dedicated systems in performance while reducing hardware complexity—provided that the trajectory constraints are appropriately addressed.

The research represents not an endpoint but an opening—demonstrating fundamental viability while revealing rich opportunities for optimization, extension, and practical deployment. As 6G systems evolve from concept to reality over the next decade, integrated sensing and communications will transition from research novelty to foundational architecture, and frameworks like this—extended with trajectory-aware optimization and multi-platform cooperation—will provide the technical foundation for that transformation.

The path from laboratory demonstration to operational deployment remains challenging, but the convergence of advances in ISAC waveforms, autonomous flight control, distributed optimization, and machine learning suggests that the vision of UAVs seamlessly combining high-resolution imaging with robust communications is transitioning from aspiration to engineering reality.


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Integrating Low-Altitude SAR Imaging into UAV Data Backhaul

Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) deployed on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is expected to provide burgeoning imaging services for low-altitude wireless networks (LAWNs), thereby enabling large-scale environmental sensing and timely situational awareness. Conventional SAR systems typically leverages a deterministic radar waveform, while it conflicts with the integrated sensing and communications (ISAC) paradigm by discarding signaling randomness, in whole or in part. In fact, this approach reduces to the uplink pilot sensing in 5G New Radio (NR) with sounding reference signals (SRS), underutilizing data symbols. To explore the potential of data-aided imaging, we develop a low-altitude SAR imaging framework that sufficiently leverages data symbols carried by the native orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) communication waveform. The randomness of modulated data in the temporal-frequency (TF) domain, introduced by non-constant modulus constellations such as quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), may however severely degrade the imaging quality. To mitigate this effect, we incorporate several TF-domain filtering schemes within a rangeDoppler (RD) imaging framework and evaluate their impact. We further propose using the normalized mean square error (NMSE) of a reference point target's profile as an imaging performance metric. Simulation results with 5G NR parameters demonstrate that data-aided imaging substantially outperforms pilot-only counterpart, accordingly validating the effectiveness of the proposed OFDM-SAR imaging approach in LAWNs.
Comments: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication
Subjects: Signal Processing (eess.SP)
Cite as: arXiv:2512.21937 [eess.SP]
  (or arXiv:2512.21937v1 [eess.SP] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2512.21937

Submission history

From: Zhen Du [view email]
[v1] Fri, 26 Dec 2025 09:22:22 UTC (4,215 KB)

 

When Base Stations Take Flight


When the Base Station Flies: Rethinking Security for UAV-Based 6G Networks

The Security Challenge of UAV-Powered 6G Networks

BLUF (Bottom Line Up Front): As 6G networks prepare to integrate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as flying base stations for disaster relief and rural connectivity, researchers have identified critical security vulnerabilities including emergency alert spoofing, wireless backhaul jamming, GPS manipulation, and resource exhaustion attacks that could compromise millions of users—challenges that demand immediate attention as standards development continues. The technology's potential military applications, already emerging in conflicts like Ukraine, add urgency to securing these systems against sophisticated state-level threats.


The future of wireless communications is taking to the skies, but it's bringing unprecedented security challenges along for the ride. As telecommunications engineers and standards bodies work toward sixth-generation (6G) wireless networks, one of the most promising yet vulnerable innovations involves deploying unmanned aerial vehicles as flying cellular base stations—a development that could revolutionize connectivity in disaster zones and underserved areas while simultaneously opening new attack vectors that don't exist in traditional ground-based networks.

The Promise of Airborne Connectivity

The integration of non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) into next-generation cellular systems represents a fundamental shift in how we think about telecommunications infrastructure. While 5G networks primarily rely on fixed terrestrial towers, 6G envisions a fully integrated space-air-ground network incorporating satellites, high-altitude platform systems, and crucially, UAVs operating as mobile base stations.

Unlike satellites operating in fixed orbits or high-altitude platforms that require extensive deployment time, UAV base stations (UAV-BS) can be rapidly deployed to provide immediate connectivity. This makes them particularly valuable for disaster recovery scenarios where terrestrial infrastructure has been damaged, temporary capacity increases during large events, or extending coverage to remote rural areas where building traditional cell towers isn't economically viable.

The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), the international body that develops cellular network standards, has been progressively incorporating NTN features since Release 15, with 5G-Advanced (Release 18) enabling NTN-specific enhancements. For UAV base stations specifically, the technical requirements are relatively straightforward: replace the wired backhaul connection with a wireless link and ensure the UAV operates according to 3GPP standards on the access link connecting to user devices.

A New Attack Surface in the Sky

But what happens when your base station can fly? According to recent research from King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST), the answer is a dramatically expanded attack surface that fundamentally differs from terrestrial network vulnerabilities.

The research, led by Ammar El Falou and published in December 2025, identifies several critical vulnerability categories unique to or exacerbated by UAV-based systems. Unlike traditional base stations housed in secured facilities with continuous power and wired connections, UAV base stations operate under severe constraints: limited battery capacity, restricted processing power, wireless backhaul links vulnerable to interference, and dependence on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals for positioning and flight control.

Emergency Alert Weaponization

Perhaps the most alarming vulnerability involves the emergency alert system itself. Current 3GPP implementations deliver emergency alerts—warnings about earthquakes, floods, terrorist attacks, or missing children—through system information blocks (SIBs) that are neither authenticated nor encrypted. This design choice maximizes the likelihood that alerts reach all users in an affected area, even those without active subscriptions, but it creates a critical security gap.

El Falou's team recently implemented the emergency alert service using the open-source OpenAirInterface project, demonstrating that smartphones and tablets parse these alerts with clickable links, phone numbers, and email addresses rendered directly on the alert screen. "This transforms a safety mechanism into a powerful phishing vector," the researchers note. With UAV base stations, the threat multiplies—a malicious UAV can move across large geographic areas, broadcasting fake alerts to successive populations of users.

Even more concerning, the research found that alert messages can be transmitted and received even when the core network is offline, meaning a rogue UAV base station requires no supporting infrastructure to conduct these attacks. With AI-enabled smartphone assistants becoming ubiquitous, researchers warn of potential automated exploitation scenarios where fake alerts interact directly with AI assistants without requiring direct user action.

The Handover Hijacking Problem

UAV mobility introduces another attack vector largely absent from terrestrial networks: malicious handover manipulation. In cellular systems, handovers allow user devices to transition between base stations without service interruption, primarily based on signal strength measurements. While these measurements are encrypted, attackers can exploit the handover procedure by setting up fake base stations that mimic legitimate ones.

In terrestrial networks, executing such attacks requires the attacker to position equipment in specific locations and transmit at higher power than legitimate base stations. With UAV-based systems, a rogue UAV can dynamically maneuver to stay close to targeted devices, continuously adjusting position to maintain signal superiority. This enables denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle interception, and information disclosure affecting both individual users and network operators.

Resource Exhaustion in a Power-Limited Platform

The limited computational and energy resources of UAV base stations make them particularly vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks. The initial connection procedure in 5G networks, known as the Random Access Channel (RACH) procedure, is unauthenticated—the base station allocates resources to users before receiving and verifying their identity. Attackers can exploit this by repeatedly initiating connection attempts, each time pretending to be a new user, until the base station exhausts its available resources and begins rejecting legitimate connection attempts.

This so-called "RRC signaling storm attack" poses a greater threat to UAV base stations than to terrestrial ones because of their constrained processing power and battery capacity. Research on detecting these attacks in terrestrial networks has shown that comparing the number of received connection requests to successful attachments can provide a baseline for detection, but effective mitigation techniques specific to UAV environments remain an open research question.

Wireless Backhaul Vulnerabilities

Traditional cellular base stations connect to core network infrastructure through secure wired connections—typically fiber optic cables housed in protected conduits. UAV base stations, by necessity, use wireless backhaul links that are inherently vulnerable to jamming and interception. Jamming attacks can disrupt connectivity for potentially hundreds or thousands of user devices simultaneously, while interception may expose sensitive control-plane information exchanged between the access network and core infrastructure.

Multiple jamming categories exist—constant, reactive, random, and deceptive—each with different detection and mitigation challenges. For UAV systems, proposed defensive techniques include beam nulling (deactivating the receiver in the direction of the jamming signal), UAV repositioning to avoid targeted jamming, and deploying cooperative defense using additional UAV base stations to maintain coverage when the primary UAV is under attack.

GPS Spoofing: Hijacking the Platform Itself

Perhaps the most fundamental vulnerability stems from UAVs' dependence on GNSS signals for navigation and flight control. GPS spoofing attacks—where false satellite signals trick a receiver into calculating an incorrect position—can misdirect UAV flight paths, create coverage blackouts, force UAVs into restricted airspace, or even cause collisions between multiple UAVs.

Unlike jamming, which simply disrupts signals, spoofing is more insidious because the UAV continues to believe it's receiving legitimate navigation data. An attacker could potentially redirect a UAV base station away from the area it's meant to serve, push it into a no-fly zone where it might be captured or destroyed, or manipulate its position to optimize conditions for other attacks like handover manipulation.

Mitigation strategies under investigation include multi-constellation fusion (combining data from GPS, Galileo, and BeiDou systems to detect inconsistencies), signal power monitoring (spoofed signals often arrive at anomalous power levels), angle-of-arrival estimation, and a technique particularly relevant to 6G hybrid terrestrial-non-terrestrial networks: cross-checking UAV positions against location data from terrestrial base stations.

The Military Dimension: Lessons from Ukraine

The security vulnerabilities of UAV-based cellular networks take on heightened significance when considered in military contexts, where the stakes extend beyond civilian inconvenience to tactical advantage and battlefield survival. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has provided an inadvertent proving ground for both the potential and the dangers of rapidly deployable communications infrastructure in contested environments.

Communications as Critical Infrastructure in Modern Warfare

Modern military operations depend on robust communications for command and control, intelligence gathering, coordination of forces, and increasingly, for operating autonomous systems and remotely piloted vehicles. When Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, one of the immediate priorities was attacking Ukraine's telecommunications infrastructure. Russian forces targeted cell towers, fiber optic cables, and switching centers, creating vast communications blackouts in occupied and contested areas.

The rapid restoration of connectivity in these areas became a strategic priority. While much attention has focused on Starlink satellite terminals provided by SpaceX, the broader challenge of maintaining cellular connectivity for military forces, civil defense, and civilian populations has driven interest in rapidly deployable solutions—precisely the niche that UAV base stations are designed to fill.

Tactical Applications and Vulnerabilities

In military contexts, UAV base stations offer several advantages over traditional communications solutions. They can be deployed within hours rather than weeks, repositioned as battle lines shift, and provide coverage in areas where terrestrial infrastructure has been destroyed or where building permanent installations isn't feasible. For forces operating in denied or contested territory, a UAV base station can establish a communications bubble for tactical operations without requiring vulnerable ground-based equipment.

However, every advantage creates a corresponding vulnerability when facing a sophisticated adversary. The same GPS dependence that allows UAV base stations to maintain precise positioning makes them vulnerable to military-grade GPS spoofing and jamming systems. Russia has demonstrated extensive electronic warfare capabilities in Ukraine, including jamming of GPS signals, disruption of drone operations, and interference with communications systems. A UAV base station operating in such an environment faces not just the theoretical attacks outlined in academic research, but active, well-resourced attempts to disrupt, capture, or destroy it.

The wireless backhaul vulnerability becomes particularly acute in military scenarios. While civilian UAV base stations might use standard 5G frequencies for backhaul communications, military applications would require encrypted tactical data links. Yet even encrypted communications reveal information through traffic analysis—patterns of activity, timing of transmissions, and locations of communication nodes can provide intelligence to adversaries even when message content remains protected.

Information Operations and Deception

The emergency alert spoofing capability identified in the KAUST research acquires a different character in military information warfare. A hostile UAV base station could broadcast fake emergency alerts to civilian populations in occupied territories, sowing panic, directing evacuations along preferred routes, or undermining trust in legitimate government communications. During active combat operations, false alerts about incoming missile strikes, chemical weapons attacks, or evacuation orders could create chaos that facilitates military operations or covers other activities.

Ukraine has reported numerous Russian information operations attempts, including fake emergency alerts, spoofed messages purporting to come from Ukrainian military or government sources, and attempts to intercept or disrupt legitimate communications. The mobility of UAV base stations makes attribution and countermeasures more difficult—a ground-based fake cell tower can be located and destroyed, but a UAV can broadcast its false messages and relocate before countermeasures can be employed.

Conversely, Ukrainian forces could potentially use UAV base stations to provide communications for military operations in temporarily seized Russian territory, or to broadcast information to civilian populations in occupied areas. The dual-use nature of the technology means that the same system that provides disaster relief in peacetime becomes a tool of information operations in conflict.

Electronic Warfare Integration

Modern military electronic warfare doctrine increasingly treats the electromagnetic spectrum as a contested domain comparable to air, sea, or land. UAV base stations represent both assets to be protected and targets to be attacked within this domain. The research on jamming attacks against wireless backhaul links directly parallels military electronic warfare techniques, while GPS spoofing attacks described in academic literature are essentially civilian adaptations of military electronic warfare capabilities.

The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that electronic warfare operates at scales and intensities rarely seen in civilian contexts. Russian forces have employed powerful jamming systems covering broad areas and multiple frequency bands, GPS spoofing that has affected civilian aviation and maritime navigation, and targeted attacks against specific communications systems. In such an environment, the mitigation techniques proposed for UAV base stations—beam nulling, repositioning, multi-constellation fusion—must operate against adversaries with sophisticated understanding of these defenses and the resources to overcome them.

Ukraine's experience has also highlighted the importance of communications resilience through redundancy and diversity. Military operations have employed a mix of Starlink terminals, tactical radios, civilian cellular networks, and improvised solutions. UAV base stations would add another layer to this communications architecture, but their value depends on them not representing a single point of failure that could be targeted by electronic warfare or kinetic attack.

Capture and Exploitation Risks

The physical vulnerability of UAV base stations creates unique risks in military contexts. A downed or captured UAV base station potentially provides adversaries with cryptographic keys, network architecture information, operational procedures, and technical intelligence about friendly communications systems. The research notes that UAVs can be forced into restricted zones through GPS spoofing, but in warfare, "restricted zones" might be enemy-controlled territory where capture becomes likely.

During the Ukraine conflict, both sides have captured substantial quantities of enemy equipment, including drones, communications gear, and electronic warfare systems. The intelligence value of a captured UAV base station would depend on the security architecture—whether keys are stored in tamper-resistant modules, whether the system can remotely wipe sensitive data if capture appears imminent, and whether compromise of one unit could affect the security of the broader network.

This creates a challenging trade-off for military UAV base station design. Robust security mechanisms require additional computing power, which increases weight, power consumption, and cost—all critical constraints for UAV platforms. Military systems must balance the need for sophisticated security with the practical realities of platform limitations, especially for systems intended for rapid deployment in austere conditions.

The Escalation Problem

The military applications of UAV base stations raise broader questions about escalation and conflict dynamics. Communications infrastructure has traditionally occupied an ambiguous space in the laws of war—civilian communications are generally protected, but military communications are legitimate targets. A dual-use technology that can rapidly shift between civilian and military applications complicates these distinctions.

If a nation deploys UAV base stations to restore civilian connectivity in disaster-affected areas during peacetime, and then uses the same technology for military communications during conflict, adversaries may treat all UAV base stations as legitimate military targets regardless of their actual use in specific instances. This creates risks for humanitarian organizations and civilian authorities who might deploy these systems for disaster relief but find them targeted based on their potential military applications.

The Ukraine experience suggests these concerns are not merely theoretical. Russia has targeted civilian communications infrastructure throughout the conflict, claiming it serves military purposes. The international community's response to these attacks has highlighted disagreements about proportionality, dual-use infrastructure, and civilian harm. UAV base stations, with their rapid deployability and flexibility between civilian and military uses, would likely face similar scrutiny in future conflicts.

Toward Military-Grade Security

The military imperative for secure UAV base stations drives different requirements than civilian applications. Latency requirements may be less stringent if encryption adds milliseconds to communications, but the cryptographic strength must withstand nation-state level cryptanalysis. Authentication mechanisms must resist spoofing even when adversaries have substantial signals intelligence capabilities and captured equipment to study. The systems must remain operational under intensive electronic warfare conditions that would never be encountered in civilian scenarios.

Some mitigation strategies become more feasible in military contexts. Cooperative defense using multiple UAV base stations aligns with military doctrine of redundancy and resilience. Cross-layer verification between terrestrial and non-terrestrial networks could incorporate military-specific position verification systems beyond civilian GPS. The computational resources for sophisticated security mechanisms might be available on larger military UAV platforms even if civilian systems must make different trade-offs.

The conflict in Ukraine has accelerated military interest in adaptable, resilient communications systems. As this technology matures and moves toward 6G implementation, the security lessons learned in military applications will likely inform civilian system design, just as military communications innovations have historically migrated to civilian use. However, the security requirements for military UAV base stations represent an upper bound on the threat model—if systems can be secured against sophisticated nation-state adversaries in active combat, they should withstand the threats facing civilian deployments.

The Broader Context of Cellular Security

These UAV-specific vulnerabilities exist within the already challenging landscape of cellular network security. Securing terrestrial networks has proven difficult due to standards complexity, vendor-specific implementations, backward compatibility requirements, and the presence of unauthenticated broadcast signals—issues well-documented in research on rogue base station attacks against 4G and 5G networks.

Studies over the past several years have demonstrated various attacks on terrestrial cellular systems, from identity catching and location tracking to exposing device capabilities and manipulating the connection process. The extension of these challenges to 6G non-terrestrial networks, particularly UAV base stations, introduces further vulnerabilities related to wireless backhauling and limited resources while also creating novel opportunities for defensive strategies that leverage UAV mobility.

Toward Secure Airborne Networks

Addressing these security challenges requires what researchers call a fundamental rethinking of network security assumptions. When connectivity extends into the air, design principles that worked for ground-based infrastructure may no longer apply. The research community has identified several promising directions for securing UAV-based networks:

Authentication of broadcast information: One approach involves implementing integrity checks for system information blocks to prevent spoofing, or enabling user devices to verify received emergency alerts against governmental alert registries before displaying them. For military applications, this might extend to cryptographic authentication of all broadcast signals, accepting the trade-off of limiting service to authorized users in exchange for preventing spoofing attacks.

Anomaly detection systems: For attacks like handover manipulation and RRC signaling storms, profiling normal behavior patterns and flagging deviations could provide early warning. Physical signal characteristics—received power levels, angle of arrival, distribution of connection requests over time—offer potential indicators for distinguishing legitimate traffic from attacks. Military systems might incorporate threat intelligence feeds and electronic warfare detection capabilities to enhance these systems.

Leveraging UAV mobility: Paradoxically, the same mobility that creates security challenges can also enable defenses. Adaptive repositioning allows UAV base stations to evade localized jamming or optimize defensive configurations. The ability to rapidly deploy additional UAVs means compromised or overwhelmed units can be supplemented or replaced more quickly than in terrestrial networks. In military contexts, UAV base stations could coordinate with other aerial assets for mutual protection and electronic warfare support.

Cross-layer verification: Hybrid terrestrial-non-terrestrial 6G networks create opportunities for what researchers call "backhaul-assisted validation," where UAV positions determined via GNSS can be cross-checked against positions calculated by terrestrial base stations, providing a mechanism to detect GPS spoofing. Military implementations might incorporate inertial navigation, terrain reference navigation, or other GPS-independent positioning systems to maintain operations when satellite navigation is denied.

Resource management optimization: Given the severe computational and energy constraints of UAV platforms, security mechanisms must be designed with efficiency as a primary goal. This requires careful trade-offs between processing performance that permits robust security measures and lightweight design that enables better flight capabilities. Military UAV base stations, operating on larger platforms with more power available, may implement more sophisticated security at the cost of reduced flight time or operational radius.

Tamper resistance and secure key management: Particularly for military applications, protecting cryptographic keys and sensitive configuration data from physical capture requires tamper-resistant hardware modules, secure boot procedures, and remote wipe capabilities. These features add cost and complexity but become essential when facing adversaries who actively seek to capture equipment for intelligence exploitation.

The Path Forward

The security challenges of UAV-based 6G networks sit at the intersection of multiple technical domains: cybersecurity, wireless communications, aviation systems, artificial intelligence, and increasingly, military electronic warfare. Addressing them will require what El Falou characterizes as "cross-disciplinary cooperation between cybersecurity, communications, and aviation communities"—and, given the military applications, defense and intelligence communities as well.

Critically, security cannot be an afterthought bolted onto UAV-based systems after deployment. The research emphasizes integrating security as a design principle in NTN standards from the ground up—a lesson learned from decades of retrofitting security onto cellular systems originally designed without sufficient security considerations. The military experiences in Ukraine and other recent conflicts underscore the urgency of this integration, as these systems will operate in environments where adversaries have both the motivation and resources to exploit every vulnerability.

The development of secure UAV base stations faces a fundamental tension between civilian and military requirements. Civilian systems prioritize accessibility, cost-effectiveness, and ease of deployment, sometimes accepting security trade-offs to achieve these goals. Military systems demand higher security even at the cost of complexity, expense, and operational constraints. The 6G standards must somehow accommodate both use cases, potentially through configurable security profiles that allow systems to operate in different modes depending on operational context.

International cooperation on UAV base station security faces additional complications from the technology's military applications. While civilian telecommunications standards benefit from open international collaboration through bodies like 3GPP, military communications requirements often involve classified information and national security considerations that limit information sharing. Nations may be reluctant to disclose sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities or defense mechanisms that could provide operational advantages in potential conflicts.

Yet the fundamental security research—understanding attack vectors, developing mitigation techniques, and establishing best practices—serves both civilian and military communities. The academic security community can contribute to more secure 6G networks regardless of application, while military research on operating in contested electromagnetic environments can inform civilian systems designed to be resilient against sophisticated attacks.

As standards bodies like 3GPP continue developing 6G specifications and as telecommunications companies and military organizations begin pilot deployments of UAV base stations, the window for addressing these fundamental security issues before widespread deployment remains open but narrowing. The promise of ubiquitous connectivity—from dense urban centers to remote disaster zones, from routine civilian communications to critical military operations—depends on building these flying networks with security as their foundation, not as an addition.

The stakes are considerable. UAV base stations will be indispensable for emergency connectivity, smart city ecosystems, bridging the digital divide in underserved regions, and providing tactical communications for military forces. But without comprehensive security measures, these same systems could become vectors for mass phishing campaigns, enable widespread service disruptions, compromise the privacy and safety of millions of users, or fail at critical moments in military operations where communications can mean the difference between mission success and catastrophic failure. The challenge now is ensuring that when base stations take flight, they carry robust security mechanisms along with their antennas—mechanisms tested not just against theoretical attacks but against the demonstrated capabilities of nation-state adversaries operating in the contested electromagnetic environment of modern warfare.


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When the Base Station Flies: Rethinking Security for UAV-Based 6G Networks

The integration of non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) into 6G systems is crucial for achieving seamless global coverage, particularly in underserved and disaster-prone regions. Among NTN platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are especially promising due to their rapid deployability. However, this shift from fixed, wired base stations (BSs) to mobile, wireless, energy-constrained UAV-BSs introduces unique security challenges. Their central role in emergency communications makes them attractive candidates for emergency alert spoofing. Their limited computing and energy resources make them more vulnerable to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and their dependence on wireless backhaul links and GNSS navigation exposes them to jamming, interception, and spoofing. Furthermore, UAV mobility opens new attack vectors such as malicious handover manipulation. This paper identifies several attack surfaces of UAV-BS systems and outlines principles for mitigating their threats.
Comments: To appear in the International Conference on 6G Networking (6GNet 2025)
Subjects: Signal Processing (eess.SP); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2512.21574 [eess.SP]
  (or arXiv:2512.21574v1 [eess.SP] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2512.21574

Submission history

From: Ammar El Falou [view email]
[v1] Thu, 25 Dec 2025 08:37:09 UTC (1,927 KB)

 

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