Bottom Line Up Front: The U.S. Navy has awarded collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) conceptual design contracts to General Atomics, Boeing, Anduril, and Northrop Grumman for carrier-based unmanned aircraft, while Lockheed Martin will provide the control system. This marks the Navy's most significant push for armed autonomous carrier aviation since the cancelled UCLASS program, driven by shrinking air wing range and Chinese anti-access threats. The service targets $15 million per aircraft—half the Air Force's CCA cost—with a "consumable" 200-flight-hour lifespan. Success hinges on overcoming the cultural resistance that killed UCLASS and avoiding the cost overruns that have plagued recent Boeing ($7B KC-46 losses) and Lockheed Martin ($1B+ F-35 upgrade overruns) programs. International competitors like Turkey and China are already demonstrating operational carrier-based drones, creating competitive pressure for rapid U.S. fielding.
Five defense contractors are developing concepts for armed autonomous aircraft to operate from aircraft carriers
The U.S. Navy has contracted five major aerospace companies to develop concepts for carrier-based collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), marking a significant acceleration in the service's efforts to field armed unmanned platforms aboard its 11 aircraft carriers.
General Atomics, Boeing, Anduril Industries, and Northrop Grumman are under contract for conceptual design work on the unmanned aircraft systems, while Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works division has been awarded the contract for the common control system, specifically the MD-5 Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System (UMCS) based on its MDCX autonomy platform.
The Navy is seeking "uncrewed, modular, interoperable, interchangeable and versatile platforms" capable of operating from aircraft carriers, according to a Naval Air Systems Command presentation dated Aug. 20. The CCAs are intended to work alongside existing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and F-35C Lightning II fighters, while also being compatible with the service's future sixth-generation F/A-XX fighter.
Strategic Imperative Drives Urgency
The Navy's push for carrier-based CCAs comes as the service faces what naval analyst Bryan Clark describes as "a yawning gap in the carrier air wing that won't be filled anytime soon." The combat range of U.S. carrier air wings has contracted over the past two decades, a capability shortfall that has become increasingly problematic as China's guided-missile arsenal extends farther into the Western Pacific.
The range limitations force carrier strike groups to operate at greater standoff distances from potential threats, requiring longer-range aircraft to maintain effectiveness. This challenge is compounded by development delays affecting the Navy's F/A-XX sixth-generation fighter program and the aging F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet.
"If I'm going to take a spot on the carrier, every spot is going to produce," Clark said. "These CCAs now give me the ability to do multiple missions."
Cost-Conscious Approach
Unlike traditional military aircraft programs, the Navy is pursuing a deliberately cost-constrained approach for its CCAs. Rear Adm. Stephen Tedford, program executive officer for unmanned aviation and strike weapons, has stated the service is targeting a unit cost of approximately $15 million per aircraft—significantly lower than the $25-30 million price point cited by former Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall for the Air Force's CCA program.
This cost objective reflects a "consumable" philosophy where CCAs would operate for only 200-300 flight hours before completing their service life either as expendable weapons or training targets. The approach is designed to avoid the traditional 30-year sustainment model that can consume 70% of a weapon system's lifecycle costs.
"I don't need them that long," Tedford explained. "I need a platform that instead of buying 500, I'll buy 60. And I can do them in a rolling wave so I can keep pace with the technology of the unmanned platforms, but also keep pace with the threat."
Leveraging Air Force Development
The Navy's CCA initiative builds heavily on the Air Force's parallel program, which has made significant progress over the past year. In April 2024, the Air Force selected General Atomics and Anduril Industries from an initial field of five contractors to continue development of prototype CCAs. General Atomics' YFQ-42A design has already entered flight testing, while Anduril's YFQ-44A is expected to begin flight trials soon.
The Air Force program has helped validate key technologies and operational concepts that the Navy can adapt for carrier operations. However, the naval service faces unique challenges, including the need for aircraft capable of catapult launches and arrested landings—operations that impose significant structural stresses on airframes.
Technical Validation Advances
In November 2024, the Navy conducted a successful demonstration of its unmanned control systems when pilots at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, remotely operated a General Atomics MQ-20 Avenger aircraft located in California. The test validated the UMCS and its MDCX backbone, proving the Navy's ability to control unmanned aircraft across continental distances.
Lt. Steven Wilster, one of the pilots involved in the demonstration, noted that the team is "paving the way for integrating critical unmanned capability across the joint force to combat the high-end threat our warfighters face today and in the future."
MQ-25 Provides Foundation
The Navy's near-term introduction of the Boeing MQ-25A Stingray unmanned tanker is serving as a pathfinder for CCA operations. The Stingray, scheduled to begin carrier operations in 2026, will establish baseline procedures for unmanned aircraft operations in the carrier environment.
Vice Adm. Daniel Cheever, commander of Naval Air Forces, emphasized that the MQ-25 "is going to establish a baseline standard that is going to be relevant for all of the Navy's future unmanned aircraft." The lessons learned from integrating the 48,000-pound Stingray will inform CCA development, particularly regarding the unique challenges of carrier deck operations in fuel-constrained environments.
Interservice Coordination
The Navy and Air Force have agreed to coordinate their respective CCA programs across four key areas: common aircraft architecture, communications links, autonomy architecture, and ground-control segments. This interoperability framework could enable the services to share CCAs across platforms, with Navy drones potentially supporting Air Force operations and vice versa.
"We do have those four focus areas that allow us to leverage the interoperability that we think we need for a CCA because this is not just a single-service solution," said Air Force Brig. Gen. Dale White, program executive officer for fighters and advanced aircraft.
Political Support and Pressure
The CCA contracts align with broader Trump administration initiatives to expand U.S. drone capabilities. In June 2025, President Donald Trump signed an executive order calling for increased drone capacity across the government, specifically directing the Pentagon "to procure, integrate and train using low-cost, high-performing drones manufactured in the United States."
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth subsequently issued a memo in July rescinding what he characterized as "restrictive policies that hindered production and limited access to these vital technologies," while delegating procurement authorities "from the bureaucracy to our warfighters."
International Developments Underscore Rapid Evolution
The Navy's CCA initiative arrives amid a global acceleration in carrier-based unmanned aircraft development that highlights both the promise and the challenges of integrating autonomous systems into naval aviation. Several international programs demonstrate varying approaches to unmanned carrier operations, with timelines that underscore how rapidly this technology is evolving.
Turkey has achieved perhaps the most dramatic recent success with its TCG Anadolu, which conducted the first autonomous takeoff and landing of a Bayraktar TB3 drone in November 2024—just four years after the aircraft was first unveiled in 2020. The TB3's rapid development timeline from concept to operational demonstration stands in stark contrast to the Navy's 18-year journey from UCLASS to operational MQ-25 capability.
The Turkish approach emphasizes speed and pragmatism, with the TB3 completing its maiden flight in October 2023 and moving directly to carrier operations barely a year later. By June 2025, the aircraft had completed over 100 sorties aboard TCG Anadolu, demonstrating live-fire capabilities using MAM-L munitions against both land and naval targets. Turkey plans to field the heavier, jet-powered Kızılelma drone from the same platform by 2026.
China has pursued an even more ambitious timeline with its Type 076 amphibious assault ship, which was launched in January 2025 after development reportedly began around 2020. The 40,000-ton vessel represents the world's first purpose-built drone carrier, featuring electromagnetic catapults similar to those on advanced aircraft carriers. Chinese officials have confirmed the ship's role as a drone platform, with plans to operate flying-wing UCAVs and conventional UAVs in both combat and reconnaissance roles.
Even the United Kingdom, despite budget constraints, has demonstrated notable progress in carrier-based drone operations. In November 2023, HMS Prince of Wales successfully operated a General Atomics Mojave drone—the largest unmanned aircraft to operate from a non-U.S. Navy carrier at that time. The trials built on earlier experiments with smaller drones and point toward the Royal Navy's Future Maritime Aviation Force concept for 2030.
The international timeline comparisons reveal both the opportunities and challenges facing the Navy's CCA program. While Turkey achieved operational demonstration in four years and China appears poised to field operational capability within five years of development start, the Navy's more cautious approach reflects the unique demands of U.S. carrier operations and acquisition processes.
These international developments create both competitive pressure and collaborative opportunities for the Navy's CCA program. The rapid pace of global innovation in unmanned naval aviation suggests that delays in U.S. development could cede technological leadership to international competitors, while successful allied programs like the UK's Mojave trials offer potential pathways for technology sharing and burden reduction.
Cultural and Political Headwinds
The Navy's pursuit of carrier-based CCAs faces significant internal resistance rooted in the service's aviation culture and the political dynamics that have historically shaped naval air power. The current CCA effort represents a renewed attempt to overcome the same cultural and institutional barriers that contributed to the failure of the earlier UCLASS program—resistance that industry and defense officials describe as "bureaucratic and cultural resistance to the introduction of unmanned aircraft onto the carrier."
The tension between unmanned systems and traditional naval aviation reflects a decades-old cultural divide within the Navy between the so-called "brown shoe" aviators and "black shoe" surface warfare officers. Naval aviators, identifiable by their brown shoes (a tradition dating to 1913 and restored in 1986 after being eliminated in 1976), have historically wielded significant influence over carrier aviation programs and requirements.
This aviation community influence played a decisive role in the transformation and ultimate cancellation of UCLASS. Originally conceived in 2006 as a stealthy, long-range strike platform capable of penetrating sophisticated air defenses, UCLASS underwent multiple requirements changes that steadily reduced its capabilities. By 2012, the program had been reoriented toward intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions in permissive environments—a dramatic departure from its initial strike-focused concept.
Defense officials and industry sources confirmed to multiple publications that the change in UCLASS from a deep strike stealthy penetrator into the current lightly armed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) focused aircraft was — in large part — to preserve a manned version of the F/A-XX replacement for the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The requirements shift was designed to ensure that unmanned systems would not compete directly with the planned sixth-generation manned fighter.
As one former senior naval official explained to USNI News, "If you didn't want that unmanned air vehicle to compete with what's likely to be a manned replacement for the F/A-18, what would you do? You'd make it ISR only or ISR/limited strike and make it for a low threat environment so that it really can't complete against a manned fighter."
However, the current CCA program may face a different political and operational environment than UCLASS encountered. The success of unmanned systems in recent conflicts, the demonstrated capabilities of international competitors, and the pressing need to extend carrier range in the face of Chinese anti-access threats have created new urgency around unmanned naval aviation.
The Air Force's progress with its own CCA program also provides political cover for the Navy's efforts. With the sister service already demonstrating the operational viability of collaborative combat aircraft, opposition based purely on cultural resistance to unmanned systems becomes harder to sustain.
Additionally, the Navy's emphasis on "collaborative" rather than "replacement" aircraft may help address cultural concerns. By positioning CCAs as force multipliers that work alongside manned fighters rather than substitutes for them, the program avoids the direct challenge to pilot primacy that doomed UCLASS's strike mission.
The success or failure of the current CCA program may ultimately depend on the Navy's ability to frame unmanned systems as enablers of naval aviation rather than threats to it—a delicate political balance that will require sustained leadership commitment and careful program management to achieve.
SIDEBAR: The Long Road to Carrier-Based Unmanned Aviation
The Navy's current push for collaborative combat aircraft represents the culmination of nearly two decades of false starts and program pivots in carrier-based unmanned aviation. The path to today's CCA contracts is littered with cancelled programs and shifting requirements that reflect the service's struggle to balance competing priorities and technological realities.
UCLASS: The Original Vision (2006-2016)
The Navy's unmanned carrier aviation journey began in 2006 with the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program. Initially conceived as a stealthy, long-range strike platform capable of penetrating sophisticated air defenses, UCLASS represented an ambitious leap toward autonomous carrier operations.
However, by 2012, the program's focus had shifted dramatically. Strike and lethality requirements were diluted in favor of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance-oriented aircraft optimized for low-intensity counterterrorism missions—a reflection of the military's preoccupation with ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The UCLASS program generated significant industry interest, with major contractors including Northrop Grumman, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and General Atomics developing competing designs. Northrop Grumman's X-47B demonstrator achieved historic milestones in 2013, successfully conducting carrier launches and recoveries aboard USS Theodore Roosevelt—proving that unmanned aircraft could operate in the demanding carrier environment.
Despite these technical successes, UCLASS fell victim to requirements instability and budget pressures. The program was ultimately cancelled in 2016 as the Navy struggled to define exactly what mission the aircraft should perform.
CBARS: Pragmatic Pivot (2016-2018)
Following UCLASS's cancellation, the Navy adopted a more pragmatic approach with the Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program in February 2016. Rather than pursuing a complex multi-mission platform, CBARS focused on a single, well-defined requirement: aerial refueling.
This mission was both technically achievable and operationally urgent. The Navy had been using 20-30% of its F/A-18E/F Super Hornet sorties for tanking missions, reducing the number of aircraft available for combat roles. A dedicated unmanned tanker could free these fighters for their primary missions while extending the reach of the entire carrier air wing.
Boeing won the CBARS competition in August 2018 with its MQ-25A Stingray design, which leveraged work from the company's earlier UCLASS proposal. The selection was based partly on Boeing's decision to secretly complete construction of its prototype in 2014 during the UCLASS program pause, giving the company a significant head start.
Production Challenges and Delays (2018-Present)
Despite having a flying prototype and a focused mission, the MQ-25 program has faced repeated delays. The initial operational capability target of 2024 has slipped to 2026—a two-year delay attributed to production maturity challenges and the complexity of manufacturing a carrier-capable unmanned aircraft.
The MQ-25 represents a significant engineering challenge, with a gross weight of 48,000 pounds—roughly the size of an F/A-18 Super Hornet with the wingspan of an E-2 Hawkeye. Manufacturing such a large, complex unmanned system while meeting carrier operational requirements has proven more difficult than anticipated.
Boeing delivered the first production-representative MQ-25 to the Navy in February 2024, but the aircraft still requires extensive testing before carrier integration can begin. The service plans to conduct the first carrier trials in 2026, with initial operational capability expected in the second half of that year.
Lessons for CCA Development
The MQ-25's troubled development history offers important lessons for the Navy's CCA program. The shift from UCLASS's overly ambitious requirements to CBARS's focused mission demonstrates the importance of clearly defined objectives. However, even with a narrow mission scope, the technical challenges of carrier-based unmanned operations have proven formidable.
The Navy's emphasis on a "consumable" approach for CCAs—with shorter service lives and lower sustainment costs—reflects lessons learned from traditional acquisition programs. By accepting reduced aircraft lifespans and simplified logistics, the service hopes to avoid the cost spirals and schedule delays that have plagued other programs.
The 18-year journey from UCLASS concept to operational MQ-25 capability underscores why the Navy has been slower than the Air Force to embrace unmanned combat aircraft. Carrier operations impose unique constraints that land-based systems do not face, from the structural stresses of catapult launches to the precision required for arrested landings in challenging sea conditions.
As the Navy moves forward with CCA development, the service appears determined to apply these hard-won lessons to accelerate fielding timelines and control costs—even as it pursues the more complex challenge of integrating armed autonomous aircraft into carrier operations.
SIDEBAR: The CCA Contractors - Strengths, Weaknesses, and Cost Performance
The Navy's selection of five contractors for CCA conceptual design work represents a mix of established defense giants and emerging technology companies, each bringing distinct advantages, challenges, and notably different track records on cost control to carrier-based unmanned aviation.
General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI)
Strengths: GA-ASI enters the Navy CCA competition with the most extensive operational experience in unmanned aviation. The company's MQ-9 Reaper family has accumulated over one million flight hours across multiple services and international customers, demonstrating proven reliability and mission effectiveness. The company's Air Force CCA selection alongside Anduril provides significant momentum, with the YFQ-42A Gambit design already in flight testing. GA-ASI has also demonstrated integration with Navy systems, successfully operating an MQ-20 Avenger from the Navy's Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control Station (UMCS) in a November 2024 test that spanned the continent.
Cost Performance: GA-ASI has maintained relatively disciplined cost control on production programs, with the MQ-9 family achieving unit costs well below manned fighter aircraft. The company's modular approach and use of commercial-off-the-shelf components have helped control expenses across multiple variants.
Weaknesses: GA-ASI's traditional strength lies in long-endurance surveillance platforms rather than the fast-jet environment of carrier operations. The company lacks direct experience with carrier-specific technologies like catapult launches and arrested landings, though their STOL capabilities could mitigate this gap.
Boeing
Strengths: Boeing possesses unmatched carrier aviation experience among the CCA contractors, with over 90 years of designing naval aircraft from the 1930s Douglas TBD Devastator to today's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. The company is currently producing the MQ-25A Stingray, positioning it as the only contractor with an active carrier-based unmanned aircraft program. Boeing has demonstrated manned-unmanned teaming capabilities, successfully testing digital command and control between F/A-18 pilots and MQ-25 systems.
Cost Performance: Boeing's recent fixed-price defense contracts have resulted in catastrophic financial losses that raise serious questions about the company's cost estimation and program management capabilities. The KC-46 tanker program has absorbed $7 billion in cost overruns against a $4.9 billion contract—exceeding the original contract value by nearly 50%. The MQ-25 program has faced multiple cost overruns, including a $147 million charge in 2022 and ongoing production delays that pushed initial operational capability from 2024 to 2026. Boeing's defense division has recorded cumulative losses exceeding $10 billion since 2020 across multiple fixed-price contracts, including the T-7A trainer, VC-25B Air Force One replacement, and NASA Commercial Crew programs.
Weaknesses: Boeing's elimination from the Air Force CCA program in April 2024 suggests its initial approach may not align with current military preferences for cost-effective, attritable platforms. The company's traditional emphasis on highly refined, long-service-life aircraft conflicts directly with the Navy's desire for affordable, consumable CCAs. Boeing's track record of massive cost overruns on recent programs raises fundamental questions about its ability to deliver a $15 million CCA within budget.
Anduril Industries
Strengths: Anduril represents the "new space" defense technology approach, emphasizing rapid development, commercial-off-the-shelf components, and software-defined capabilities. The company's selection alongside General Atomics for Air Force CCA development demonstrates credibility in autonomous systems. Anduril's Fury design prioritizes cost-effectiveness and rapid production, using commercial aircraft engines to reduce expenses and improve maintainability. The company has shown remarkable growth since its 2017 founding, achieving a $4.6 billion valuation by 2021.
Cost Performance: As a newer company, Anduril has limited track record on large-scale production programs, but its business model explicitly emphasizes cost control and rapid iteration. The company's use of commercial components and software-first approach suggests potential for better cost discipline than traditional primes. However, this remains largely unproven at the scale required for military production.
Weaknesses: Anduril has minimal experience with carrier aviation or the unique demands of shipboard operations. The company's Fury design has not yet flown, making it less proven than competitors' platforms. The company's relative youth in defense contracting could pose challenges in managing the complex logistics and support requirements of naval aviation programs.
Northrop Grumman
Strengths: Northrop Grumman has the strongest historical experience in carrier-based unmanned aviation through the X-47B program, which achieved the first autonomous takeoff and landing on an aircraft carrier in 2013. The company's flying wing designs offer potential stealth advantages for contested environments. Their 2013 Collier Trophy win for X-47B achievements demonstrates technical excellence in unmanned carrier aviation.
Cost Performance: Northrop Grumman has experienced significant cost overruns on major programs, though typically less severe than Boeing's recent performance. The B-21 bomber program has incurred a $1.56 billion charge across the first five production lots, with the company acknowledging that each lot will likely be performed at a loss. The Global Hawk program faced cost overruns that led to reduced procurement from 63 aircraft to 45. The Sentinel ICBM program has experienced a 37% cost increase and two-year schedule delay, triggering Nunn-McCurdy Act restructuring. However, the company has generally maintained better program discipline than some competitors.
Weaknesses: Despite X-47B's technical success, Northrop Grumman was passed over for the follow-on MQ-25 program, suggesting potential issues with cost or requirements alignment. The company was also eliminated from Air Force CCA development in April 2024. Northrop Grumman's traditional approach tends toward sophisticated, expensive systems that may not align with the Navy's cost-focused CCA vision.
Lockheed Martin
Strengths: Lockheed Martin's role is distinctive as the provider of the UMCS control system rather than the air vehicle itself. The company's Skunk Works division has developed the Multi-Domain Combat System (MDCX) autonomy platform that serves as the backbone of the Navy's unmanned carrier aviation control architecture. This positions Lockheed Martin as a critical enabler regardless of which air vehicle contractor wins.
Cost Performance: Lockheed Martin's F-35 program represents one of the most significant cost overruns in defense history, with lifecycle costs rising from $1.1 trillion in 2018 to $2+ trillion today—a pattern of chronic cost growth that spans over two decades. The F-35's Technology Refresh 3 upgrade alone has experienced nearly $1 billion in cost overruns on what began as a $718 million contract. Development delays have persisted throughout the program, with aircraft deliveries in 2024 averaging 238 days late compared to 61 days in 2023. The program has been characterized by the GAO as continuing to "overpromise and underdeliver" after 20 years of development and production.
Weaknesses: Lockheed Martin was eliminated from both Navy MQ-25 and Air Force CCA air vehicle competitions, suggesting its platform designs may not align with current military preferences. The F-35's troubled cost history raises serious concerns about the company's ability to execute affordable programs. Traditional Lockheed Martin platforms tend toward high-end, expensive solutions that conflict with cost-effectiveness priorities.
Strategic Implications for Cost-Sensitive Program
Given the Navy's explicit emphasis on a $15 million unit cost target and "consumable" approach, the contractors' cost performance records become critical evaluation factors. Boeing's recent $7+ billion in defense cost overruns and Lockheed Martin's F-35 cost spiral represent major red flags for a cost-constrained program. Northrop Grumman's mixed record shows better program management than Boeing but still includes significant overruns.
General Atomics' track record of cost-effective UAV production and Anduril's cost-focused business model may provide advantages in meeting the Navy's affordability goals. However, GA-ASI lacks carrier experience while Anduril lacks production scale experience.
The Navy's ability to leverage this diverse contractor base while managing cultural resistance and maintaining strict cost discipline will significantly influence the CCA program's ultimate success. The service's emphasis on consumable platforms may favor contractors with track records of cost control over those with histories of expensive, high-end systems.
Future Implications
The Navy's CCA program represents a significant shift toward distributed operations and affordable mass in naval aviation. By fielding large numbers of relatively inexpensive unmanned aircraft, the service aims to complicate adversary targeting while extending the reach and persistence of carrier air wings.
The success of the program will depend heavily on the Navy's ability to balance cost constraints with operational requirements while adapting Air Force-developed technologies to the unique demands of carrier operations. With conceptual design work now underway across multiple contractors, the service is positioning itself to make critical decisions about the future composition of carrier air wings as traditional platforms age and new threats emerge.
The timeline for fielding operational Navy CCAs remains unclear, though service officials have indicated they are closely tracking Air Force progress and adapting lessons learned from the MQ-25 program to accelerate development where possible.
Sources
- Shelbourne, Mallory and Sam LaGrone. "Navy Contracts 5 Companies to Develop Armed, Unmanned Carrier Aircraft." USNI News, September 5, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/09/05/navy-contracts-5-companies-to-develop-armed-unmanned-carrier-aircraft
- Insinna, Valerie, Justin Katz, and Aaron Mehta. "EXCLUSIVE: Navy taps four aerospace primes to design autonomous drone wingmen." Breaking Defense, September 5, 2025. https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/exclusive-navy-taps-four-aerospace-primes-to-design-autonomous-drone-wingmen/
- Robertson, Ryan. "US Navy, partners soar ahead in CCA drone development." Straight Arrow News, November 19, 2024. https://san.com/cc/us-navy-partners-soar-ahead-in-cca-drone-development/
- "Tracking 2024 Updates to the Air Force's Collaborative Combat Aircraft." IDGA, December 19, 2024. https://www.idga.org/aviation/articles/2024-updates-to-air-force-collaborative-combat-aircraft-cca
- Pomante, Mike. "Navy aiming for $15M price tag for CCA drones; avoid long-term sustainment costs." DefenseScoop, April 9, 2024. https://defensescoop.com/2024/04/08/navy-cost-cca-drones-sustainment/
- Tirpak, John A. "Navy Eyes 'Interchangeable' CCAs with Air Force." Air & Space Forces Magazine, April 17, 2025. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/navy-eyes-interchangeable-cca-air-force/
- "Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), USA." Airforce Technology, June 21, 2024. https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/collaborative-combat-aircraft-cca-usa/
- Atlamazoglou, Stavros. "Collaborative Combat Aircraft: How the U.S. Navy and Air Force Could Be Transformed." The National Interest, November 25, 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/collaborative-combat-aircraft-how-us-navy-and-air-force-could-be-transformed-210752
- "Unmanned Carrier Aviation." NAVAIR, accessed September 5, 2025. https://www.navair.navy.mil/product/Unmanned-Carrier-Aviation
- LaGrone, Sam. "MQ-25A Stingray 2026 Debut Will Unlock Unmanned Aviation for Carrier Strike Group, Say Officials." USNI News, January 30, 2025. https://news.usni.org/2025/01/29/mq-25a-stingray-2026-debut-will-unlock-unmanned-aviation-for-carrier-strike-group-say-officials
- "US Navy's MQ-25 Tanker Drone to Begin Flying in 2025: Official." The Defense Post, January 30, 2025. https://thedefensepost.com/2025/01/29/us-navy-tanker-drone/
- Rogoway, Tyler. "MQ-25 Stingray Carrier-Based Uncrewed Tanker Ground Testing Now Underway." The War Zone, July 29, 2025. https://www.twz.com/air/mq-25-stingray-carrier-based-uncrewed-tanker-ground-testing-now-underway
- Navy Contracts 5 Companies to Develop Armed, Unmanned Carrier Aircraft - USNI News
No comments:
Post a Comment