Allied ISR Mission Along NATO's Eastern Flank

 

RAF RC-135W and P-8A Fly 10,000 Mile Patrol Along the NATO’s Eastern Flank - The Aviationist

I'll revise the article to incorporate the MQ-9 Reaper's GMTI/DMTI capabilities with STAP as a critical middle layer in NATO's air defense architecture. Let me integrate this throughout the piece where it strengthens the technical and strategic analysis.

NATO's Eastern Flank Surveillance Exposes Alliance Air Defense Gap as Europe Races to Build "Drone Wall"

A 10,000-mile RAF reconnaissance mission demonstrates sophisticated intelligence capabilities while highlighting the urgent need for transformative counter-drone defenses against mounting Russian airspace violations.

On 9 October 2025, Royal Air Force RC-135W Rivet Joint and P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft executed a comprehensive 12-hour intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission spanning NATO's entire eastern frontier, from the High North to the Black Sea. The operation—requiring U.S. Air Force tanker support and involving sophisticated signals intelligence and maritime surveillance sensors—achieved its immediate objective of monitoring Russian military activity. Yet it simultaneously exposed a fundamental asymmetry in NATO's defensive architecture: billion-dollar ISR platforms tracking threats they cannot stop, while inexpensive drones penetrate Alliance airspace with relative impunity.

This operational reality has catalyzed the most significant shift in European air defense strategy since the Cold War—a proposed "drone wall" extending across NATO's eastern flank that would fundamentally alter how the Alliance defends its airspace. Understanding the relationship between conventional ISR missions, unmanned persistent surveillance capabilities, and the emerging drone defense architecture reveals both NATO's technical sophistication and its persistent strategic vulnerabilities.

Strategic Context: Russia's Escalating Airspace Campaign

The RAF mission responded directly to aggressive Russian airspace incursions throughout September 2025, including approximately 20 drones violating Polish airspace on 9 September, Russian drone violations of Romanian airspace on 13 September, and three MiG-31 jets penetrating Estonian airspace for 12 minutes on 19 September. These violations prompted NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich to announce Operation Eastern Sentry on 12 September, a comprehensive effort to bolster NATO's posture along the eastern flank.

The North Atlantic Council convened twice under Article 4 within two weeks, with NATO declaring these actions "part of a wider pattern of increasingly irresponsible Russian behaviour" that is "escalatory, risk miscalculation and endanger lives". By late September and early October, incidents were occurring almost daily, including drones regularly closing Nordic airports such as Copenhagen.

The frequency and brazenness of violations revealed a deliberate Russian strategy. Estonian defense officials characterized the September MiG-31 intrusion as "unprecedentedly brazen", while Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen declared that Europe was experiencing "the most difficult and dangerous situation since the end of the Second World War".

Mission Architecture and Intelligence Collection

The RC-135W, operating with callsign RRR7209, launched from RAF Waddington (home to No. 51 Squadron), while the P-8A departed RAF Lossiemouth (42 Torpedo Bomber Squadron). A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing at RAF Mildenhall provided essential aerial refueling.

The RC-135W's routing maximized signals intelligence collection while respecting international boundaries: northward through the North Sea along Norway's coast, into Finnish airspace, southward over Estonia and Latvia while paralleling the Russian border, continuing over Lithuania and Poland outside Belarusian and Ukrainian territory, across Slovakia, over eastern Romania, and into the Black Sea for circular pattern surveillance before reversing course through Central Europe.

Flight track observations indicated the P-8A largely mirrored this route rather than conducting planned Baltic Sea patrols, suggesting dynamic retasking based on real-time intelligence requirements—precisely the operational flexibility that sophisticated ISR platforms enable.

RC-135W Rivet Joint: Electromagnetic Spectrum Dominance

The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint supports theater and national level consumers with near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination capabilities. Onboard capabilities encompass rapid search, detection, measurement, identification, demodulation, geolocation, and fusion of data from potentially thousands of electronic emitters.

The Rivet Joint conducts ELINT and COMINT intercept operations against targets at ranges up to 240 kilometers, enabling standoff collection without violating sovereign airspace. Recent Baseline 11/12 upgrades modernized cockpit and operator interfaces, added new direction finding COMINT systems, precision ELINT/SIGINT capabilities, improved collection in dense-signal environments, enhanced near-real-time data dissemination, integrated wideband SATCOM, and added steerable beam antennas.

The reconnaissance compartment accommodates 12 cryptologic crew members managing signals collection through four management positions and eight operator positions, including a data link operator who coordinates with the ELINT compartment to fuse collected data, a signals search and development operator who searches for new emitters and communications systems, and a reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition operator who works known digital data systems.

This sophisticated architecture enables the RC-135W to intercept Russian military communications, map electronic warfare capabilities, geolocate command-and-control nodes, and characterize radar systems—intelligence directly applicable to understanding how Russian forces control drones and conduct hybrid warfare operations.

P-8A Poseidon: Multi-Domain Surveillance with Advanced Target Detection

The P-8A Poseidon conducts long-range anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions. While optimized for maritime operations, its advanced sensor suite provides significant overland intelligence collection capabilities.

The aircraft features the Raytheon AN/APY-10 multi-mission surface search radar, which compared to previous-generation systems offers reduced size, weight and power requirements, additional target track capabilities, color weather avoidance mode, and room for technology growth. The AN/APY-10 provides ultra-high-resolution imaging modes for maritime and overland operations.

The AN/APY-10 has six radar modes including surface search, periscope detection, colour weather/navigation, multi-target track-while-scan, synthetic aperture radar/inverse SAR and maritime strike precision targeting. The radar can precisely track surface targets in the open sea, cluttered littoral areas near coastlines and on land.

The AN/APY-10's SAR/ISAR capabilities and multi-target track-while-scan modes employ advanced signal processing techniques including Space-Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) for clutter suppression—critical for detecting low-observable, slow-moving targets in cluttered environments. This capability makes the P-8A particularly effective in littoral regions where it must discriminate small targets against complex coastal backgrounds.

The aircraft's MX-20HD digital electro-optical and infrared multi-spectral sensor turret, manufactured by L3Harris Wescam, is gyro-stabilized and accommodates up to seven sensors including infrared, CCDTV, image intensifier, laser rangefinder, and laser illuminator. With synthetic aperture radar, electro-optical infrared sensors, and increased acoustic capability, the aircraft conducts concurrent passive and active processing.

A subset of P-8A aircraft carry even more sophisticated capabilities. The AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor is a podded active electronically-scanned array radar with moving target indicator and synthetic aperture functionality, capable of tracking moving targets at sea and on land while taking high-quality radar imagery even at night or in poor weather. The AAS is specifically designed for littoral regions where it must scan both water and land areas simultaneously.

The Missing Middle Layer: MQ-9 Reaper Persistent Surveillance

Between high-altitude manned ISR platforms and the proposed ground-based drone wall sensors lies a critical capability gap that existing NATO assets could immediately fill: persistent surveillance optimized for slow-moving target detection. The MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft, already operated by multiple NATO air forces, provides precisely this capability through its STAP-enabled radar system.

The MQ-9 Reaper is equipped with the Lynx Multi-mode Radar that contains synthetic aperture radar that can operate in both spotlight and strip modes, and ground moving target indication with Dismount Moving Target Indicator and Maritime Wide-Area Search capabilities.

The Lynx radar (designated AN/APY-8) was upgraded with Space Time Adaptive Processing under DARPA's Dual Beam Development Program, which significantly enhanced its GMTI capability and enabled detection of slow-moving targets. The DMTI mode allows operators to detect very slow moving vehicles and personnel (dismounts) moving at about 1 mph. In addition, operators can select a GMTI/DMTI target and automatically cross-cue to the EO/IR sensor in narrow field of view for visual identification of the target.

This capability is transformative for counter-drone operations. Most commercial and military drones operate at speeds well above 1 mph, making them readily detectable by the Lynx GMTI/DMTI system. The STAP processing enables the radar to suppress ground clutter and detect these slow-moving targets against complex backgrounds—exactly the operational requirement for monitoring NATO's eastern flank for drone incursions.

MQ-9 Advantages for Persistent Counter-Drone Surveillance

The MQ-9 Reaper offers several operational advantages over manned platforms for continuous drone detection missions:

Endurance: MQ-9 Reapers can conduct missions exceeding 27 hours, compared to the 12-hour sortie flown by the RC-135W and P-8A. This extended endurance enables true persistent surveillance over critical sectors.

Cost-Effectiveness: Operating costs for unmanned platforms are significantly lower than manned ISR aircraft, enabling sustainable continuous operations across multiple sectors simultaneously.

Operator Efficiency: Ground-based crews can conduct shift rotations without aircraft recovery, maintaining continuous surveillance while managing crew fatigue more effectively than manned missions.

NATO Fleet Availability: The Lynx Multi-mode Radar is deployed on RPA throughout the world, used by the U.S. Air Force, Royal Air Force, Italian Air Force, and French Air Force on their MQ-9/Reaper aircraft. This represents an immediately available capability requiring minimal additional investment.

Sensor Integration: The ability to cross-cue between GMTI detection and EO/IR visual confirmation enables rapid threat classification—distinguishing between legitimate civilian drones, commercial traffic, and potential hostile UAVs without requiring interceptor launch.

The operational concept is straightforward: MQ-9 Reapers conduct continuous patrol orbits along priority sectors of NATO's eastern frontier, using GMTI/DMTI to detect any slow-moving airborne targets. Detections are immediately cross-cued to EO/IR sensors for visual confirmation, with data fused into the broader NATO air surveillance network. This persistent coverage fills the gap between episodic manned ISR missions and ground-based drone wall sensors still under development.

The Aerial Refueling Constraint and European Dependency

The mission's dependence on U.S. Air Force tanker support exposes critical structural vulnerability. RAF Voyager KC2 and KC3 tankers, based on the Airbus A330 MRTT platform, employ hose-and-drogue refueling systems compatible only with Typhoons and F-35Bs, rendering them unable to refuel RC-135Ws, P-8As, E-7A Wedgetail or C-17 Globemaster IIIs, which require boom-equipped tankers.

On 17 September 2025, during Exercise Cobra Warrior 25-2, an RAF P-8A conducted its first aerial refueling from a USAF KC-135. While the USAF characterized the event as "simulated," RAF statements mentioned two sorties, suggesting actual connection and fuel transfer may have occurred during a second sortie. The October mission likely represents the first operational employment of this capability.

This interoperability deficiency is not trivial—the RAF's entire fleet of strategic ISR and airlift platforms cannot be sustained on extended missions without American tanker support. This dependency fundamentally constrains European military autonomy and complicates operational planning for contingencies where U.S. assets may not be available.

Notably, the MQ-9 Reaper does not face this constraint—its 27-hour endurance is achieved without aerial refueling, making it operationally independent and simplifying mission planning for continuous surveillance operations.

The Cost-Effectiveness Crisis: Why Conventional ISR Cannot Scale

The 9 October mission illuminates a fundamental problem confronting NATO air defense: cost asymmetry. The operation required:

• Two high-value ISR platforms (RC-135W acquisition cost approximately £634 million for three aircraft; P-8A unit cost approximately $125 million)
• One KC-135 tanker and crew
• Multiple aerial refuelings consuming thousands of pounds of jet fuel
• 12-hour crew operations requiring specialized training and qualification
• Extensive ground-based intelligence analysis infrastructure
• Coordination across multiple NATO nations

This massive resource commitment provided 12 hours of surveillance along one portion of NATO's 1,300-kilometer eastern frontier—invaluable intelligence, but not persistent coverage and certainly not the ability to intercept violations.

NATO's response to Russian drones entering Polish airspace has been criticized as disproportionate, with only a fraction of drones shot down using costly missiles and jets. Experts warn that deployment of hundreds of cheap drones could quickly overwhelm the alliance's limited interceptors, leaving airspace unprotected while systems reload.

MQ-9 Reaper operations offer dramatically improved cost-effectiveness for persistent surveillance. While acquisition costs are substantial, operational costs per flight hour are significantly lower than manned platforms, and the capability to maintain continuous presence over critical areas provides vastly superior coverage compared to episodic manned missions.

This operational mathematics forced a strategic reckoning: NATO cannot afford to defend its airspace using current methods against an adversary employing mass drone tactics.

The Drone Wall: Europe's Transformative Response

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that "Europe must deliver a strong and united response to Russia's drone incursions at our borders. We will propose immediate actions to create the drone wall as part of the Eastern Flank Watch".

The drone wall would not be a physical structure but a layered network of detection and interception systems building on individual EU members' anti-drone capabilities—a coordinated counter-drone system to detect, track and intercept unauthorized UAVs violating European airspace.

According to German drone manufacturer Quantum Systems, "the drone wall is not a wall, but a system of systems—reconnaissance, sensor fusion and defence, integrated across thousands of kilometres. At its core, the project is a network of sensors and defence systems aimed at securing NATO's eastern flank".

Technical Architecture and Implementation

EU Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius said the drone shield could take a year to build, with the top priority being an "effective detection system." Within the first year, a network of sensors will be developed to better spot drone incursions, with the longer-term plan building capabilities to intercept drones. However, German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius cautioned that development could take three or four years.

The drone wall would expand the network of sensors along NATO's eastern flank, allowing countries to identify and track potential drone incursions more effectively. Previously, NATO's air defense was designed to counter fast-moving air threats—aircraft, missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, hypersonics—not slow, small, low-altitude drones.

Counter-drone solutions include interceptor drones far cheaper to deploy than manned aircraft. Quantum Systems produces the Hunter interceptor drone, largely 3D-printed and set up like portable air-defense batteries. "We make sure the interceptor drone is cheaper than the target it shoots down. That's how you 'win'".

Anti-drone interception would incorporate cheaper electronic warfare methods including jamming, spoofing or disrupting electronic signals rather than countering drones with expensive defense systems like Patriots.

Ukrainian Expertise Integration

Ukraine is "the most experienced country in Europe when it comes to drone and counter drone warfare," and utilizing expertise from Ukrainian advisers could help the continent understand the best way to fight back against Russian drones.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized at the Copenhagen summit that "the expertise of Ukrainian professionals and Ukrainian technologies must become an important part of the EU's drone wall initiative". Ukraine's Defence Minister stated: "The drone wall will create a fundamentally new defence ecosystem in Europe, of which Ukraine is ready to be a part".

Ukraine's three years of intensive drone warfare experience provides invaluable operational knowledge that European forces lack. The integration of Ukrainian expertise represents pragmatic recognition that combat experience trumps theoretical planning.

Layered ISR Architecture: Integration Across Domains

The complete counter-drone architecture requires integration across three complementary layers, each addressing different aspects of the air defense problem:

Strategic Intelligence Layer (Manned ISR Platforms)

The RC-135W and P-8A provide theater and national-level intelligence through signals interception and surveillance, enabling NATO to understand Russian capabilities, intentions, and operational patterns. The RC-135W's signals intelligence directly informs all other defensive layers by:

• Detecting command-and-control signals used to operate Russian drones
• Identifying electronic warfare frequencies for drone communications
• Providing geolocation data on drone operators and launch sites
• Characterizing drone navigation and guidance systems
• Mapping Russian electronic warfare capabilities

The P-8A's AN/APY-10 radar with SAR/ISAR modes and STAP processing provides high-resolution surveillance of maritime and littoral regions, detecting surface and airborne targets while discriminating against clutter—capabilities particularly relevant for monitoring approaches from the Baltic and Black Seas.

Tactical Persistent Surveillance Layer (Unmanned ISR Platforms)

MQ-9 Reapers equipped with STAP-enabled Lynx GMTI/DMTI radars provide the critical middle layer: persistent, continuous surveillance specifically optimized for slow-moving target detection. This layer:

• Maintains 24/7 coverage over priority sectors through continuous patrol orbits
• Detects drones and slow-moving airborne targets using GMTI/DMTI processing
• Provides immediate visual confirmation through cross-cued EO/IR sensors
• Enables rapid threat classification without requiring interceptor launch
• Operates independently without aerial refueling requirements
• Feeds detection data into broader NATO air surveillance network

This persistent surveillance fills the temporal gap between episodic manned ISR missions, providing the continuous monitoring required to detect and track drone incursions in near-real-time.

Detection and Engagement Layer (Ground-Based Drone Wall)

The proposed drone wall provides distributed ground-based sensors and interceptors specifically designed for counter-UAS operations:

• Wide-area sensor networks optimized for small, slow, low-altitude targets
• Automated detection and tracking without continuous human monitoring
• Cost-effective interceptor drones and electronic warfare systems
• Integration with national air defense networks
• Scalable architecture adaptable to evolving threats

Sensor Fusion and Data Integration

The intelligence collected during missions like the 9 October flight feeds the entire integrated system. Understanding Russian drone operating frequencies enables effective jamming. Identifying command-and-control patterns allows predictive deployment of countermeasures. Mapping launch sites enables preemptive targeting.

MQ-9 GMTI/DMTI detections provide tactical warning of specific incursions, triggering ground-based drone wall sensors to focus on specific sectors. The cross-cued EO/IR imagery enables threat classification before engagement decisions. The RC-135W's signals intelligence characterizes the electronic environment, informing electronic warfare response options.

This sensor fusion architecture transforms individual capabilities into an integrated defense system where each layer enhances the effectiveness of others.

Persistent Capability Gaps and Implementation Challenges

Despite complementary capabilities across layers, significant vulnerabilities remain:

Coverage Gaps: Even with MQ-9 persistent surveillance supplementing manned ISR, providing comprehensive coverage of NATO's 1,300-kilometer eastern frontier requires substantial fleet expansion. Current MQ-9 inventories across NATO members cannot provide simultaneous coverage of all priority sectors.

Internal Threats: The threat can also come from inside Europe—in Denmark, drones could have been operated from another European country, making a border-focused wall useless if Russia managed to plant agents inside the EU. In Poland, authorities arrested a Belarusian and a Ukrainian accused of flying a drone over the presidential palace.

Technological Evolution: Drones are becoming smaller and faster, making them harder to spot. Artificial intelligence enables creation of large swarms that can fly in formation and operate autonomously. Such swarms could easily overwhelm interception capabilities.

Resource Requirements: Current NATO forces involved in Operation Eastern Sentry appear to be largely fighter aircraft and thus insufficient for comprehensive drone defense. Expanding MQ-9 fleets, deploying ground-based sensors, and integrating systems across national boundaries requires sustained investment.

Financial and Political Constraints: Experts questioned whether Europe has the money, time or political will to make the drone wall real. The system requires massive infrastructure investment across multiple nations with varying threat perceptions and budget priorities.

Data Link Resilience: Mission intelligence value depends on secure, resilient data links for real-time dissemination. Russian electronic warfare capabilities threaten these links, requiring investment in jam-resistant communications and alternative dissemination pathways.

Minimum Detectable Velocity Limitations: While GMTI/DMTI systems can detect targets moving as slowly as 1 mph, stationary or hovering drones may escape detection. This requires complementary detection methods including acoustic sensors, RF detection, and visual surveillance.

Historical Precedent and Operational Continuity

The October 2025 mission builds upon precedent established on 11 October 2024, when an RAF RC-135W became the first Allied aircraft to complete a full transit along NATO's eastern border from Greece to Finland. The repeatability demonstrates institutional knowledge maturation and sustained commitment.

The RC-135 family has maintained continuous operational presence in Central Command for over two decades, representing the longest unbroken presence of any aircraft in Air Force inventory, flying over 8,000 combat missions. U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force RC-135W aircraft were deployed numerous times around Poland and Kaliningrad during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.

This operational legacy provides NATO with mature ISR capabilities immediately available while transformative drone defense systems remain under development. The MQ-9 Reaper fleet similarly brings proven operational experience—these platforms have conducted persistent surveillance missions across multiple theaters, providing the operational foundation for expanding counter-drone missions.

Strategic Implications: Deterrence, Defense, and Decision

The divergence between NATO's current capabilities and required capabilities crystallizes in comparing the three-layer architecture with operational gaps:

Current Capability:

• Episodic high-altitude strategic ISR providing theater-level intelligence
• Limited persistent surveillance over priority sectors
• Reactive scramble of fighters using expensive missiles against individual drones
• Intelligence documentation of violations without prevention

Required Capability:

• Continuous persistent surveillance across the entire eastern frontier
• Real-time detection and classification of slow-moving airborne threats
• Cost-effective automated interception at scale
• Integrated sensor fusion across national boundaries
• Proactive defense preventing violations rather than documenting them

Available Near-Term Solution: Expanding MQ-9 Reaper operations with GMTI/DMTI-optimized flight patterns provides immediate improvement in persistent surveillance capability while ground-based drone wall sensors are developed and deployed. This middle layer transforms NATO's defensive posture from episodic to continuous, from reactive to proactive.

NATO Secretary General Rutte emphasized that "whether or not Russia's actions were deliberate, Russia violated NATO airspace. Therefore, we must, as NATO, make clear our resolve and our ability to defend our territory". Eastern Sentry and missions like the 9 October operation demonstrate resolve. The drone wall must demonstrate ability. Persistent MQ-9 surveillance provides the critical bridge between current capabilities and future requirements.

The strategic question transcends technical capability: does surveillance capability translate into deterrent effect? As one CEPA fellow argued, "If the alliance doesn't make a clear decision one way or the other, that's not a very effective position, because it doesn't deter the Russians".

Russia continues violating Alliance airspace because consequences remain limited to diplomatic protests and increased surveillance—which Moscow apparently considers acceptable costs for gathering intelligence on NATO reaction times, testing air defense gaps, and demonstrating Western inability to enforce its own airspace sovereignty.

Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna noted it was "very important that the president of the United States put it very clearly on the table in terms of speaking in the language that Putin understands" when President Trump suggested NATO should shoot down intruding Russian aircraft. Yet establishing clear engagement criteria for drone interception remains politically fraught, with allies disagreeing on threat thresholds and response proportionality.

Conclusion: Transformation Under Pressure

The RAF's 10,000-mile reconnaissance mission demonstrates NATO's technical sophistication—mature ISR platforms, coalition interoperability, extended-range operations, and near-real-time intelligence dissemination. It also exposes fundamental constraints: the Alliance cannot afford to defend its airspace using conventional methods against adversaries employing asymmetric drone tactics.

The proposed three-layer architecture addresses these constraints through capability integration:

Strategic Layer: RC-135W and P-8A provide theater intelligence on Russian capabilities, intentions, and electronic warfare environment, informing all defensive operations.

Tactical Layer: MQ-9 Reapers with STAP-enabled GMTI/DMTI provide persistent surveillance detecting slow-moving targets, filling the critical gap between episodic manned missions and ground-based sensors.

Engagement Layer: Ground-based drone wall sensors and interceptors provide cost-effective, scalable defense optimized specifically for counter-UAS operations.

Success requires overcoming technical, financial, and political obstacles within compressed timelines while Russian provocations continue unabated. The MQ-9 middle layer offers immediate operational improvement using existing NATO assets, providing persistent surveillance capability while more comprehensive drone wall infrastructure is developed and deployed.

Yet the operational mathematics remain stark: even with expanded MQ-9 operations, providing truly comprehensive coverage of 1,300 kilometers of frontier requires substantial fleet expansion and sustained investment. Until the complete layered architecture achieves operational capability—whether in one year as optimistically projected or three to four years as realistically estimated—NATO's eastern flank remains vulnerable to persistent low-intensity violations that test Alliance cohesion and political resolve.

Danish President Mette Frederiksen assessed that Europe faces "the most difficult and dangerous situation since the end of the Second World War". The 9 October RAF mission, NATO's MQ-9 Reaper fleets, and the proposed drone wall represent Europe's layered response: leveraging existing sophisticated capabilities, expanding persistent surveillance, and racing to develop transformative systems matched to evolving threats.

The mission succeeded in its immediate objectives—comprehensive intelligence collection along NATO's eastern frontier. The strategic question is whether that intelligence enables decisive action, or merely documents adversary aggression that the Alliance proves unable to stop. The drone wall must answer that question. Until it does, sophisticated surveillance combined with persistent MQ-9 operations will continue compensating for inadequate active defense, and Russian violations will continue testing NATO's resolve to enforce its own airspace sovereignty.

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