China Conducts Major Hypersonic ICBM Test

Exposes Critical Gaps in U.S. Missile Defense

Strategic missile demonstration showcases advanced technologies designed to evade American defense systems, accelerating global arms race

BEIJING — China carried out a strategically significant intercontinental ballistic missile test on September 25, 2025, launching what defense analysts believe to be a new hypersonic-capable ICBM using an advanced depressed trajectory profile, marking a watershed moment in the global hypersonic arms race and exposing critical vulnerabilities in U.S. missile defense systems.

The evening launch from northern China at approximately 6 p.m. local time produced a dramatic silver-white plume visible across multiple provinces, with civilian videos quickly spreading across Chinese social media platforms Weibo and Douyin. The spectacular visual display immediately captured international attention and sparked intensive analysis by defense experts worldwide.

Advanced Technology on Display

Independent analysts examining the visual evidence concluded the missile likely integrated hypersonic glide vehicle technology, advanced solid-fuel boosters, and a depressed trajectory profile specifically designed to evade U.S. and allied missile defense systems. The Chinese government has not issued official statements confirming details of the test.

Observers noted distinctive patterns in the plume, including knots and corkscrew-like formations consistent with multi-stage booster separation and mid-flight vectoring technologies designed to optimize glide-vehicle deployment. The trajectory appeared straight during the boost phase but showed a shallow dive profile toward the terminal phase, strongly suggesting deployment of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle.

Unconfirmed reports indicate the test may have covered over 7,456 miles, with the missile transiting near the Philippines and Guam before a dummy payload splashed down near French Polynesia's Marquesas Islands, demonstrating intercontinental strike capability.

Context: China's Nuclear Expansion

The September test comes amid a dramatic expansion of China's nuclear arsenal. According to the Pentagon's annual assessment published in December 2024, China's nuclear arsenal likely exceeds 600 operational nuclear warheads as of mid-2024, with projections that China will have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.

China showcased its expanding strategic capabilities at a September 3, 2025 military parade in Beijing, publicly displaying for the first time a complete nuclear triad including the new DF-61 and DF-31BJ land-based ICBMs, the JL-3 submarine-launched ICBM, and the JL-1 air-launched ballistic missile. The parade also featured multiple new hypersonic anti-ship missiles including the YJ-17, YJ-19, YJ-20, and YJ-21, alongside the upgraded DF-26D "Guam Killer" missile.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies noted that China only publicly displayed nuclear capabilities that can reach the continental United States, signaling Beijing's intent to challenge the foundations of U.S. strategic superiority.

Critical Challenge to U.S. Missile Defense

The September test represents a fundamental challenge to America's multi-layered missile defense architecture, which was designed primarily to counter traditional ballistic threats following predictable parabolic trajectories.

Depressed Trajectory Complications

A depressed trajectory—flattened and low-altitude—reduces flight time and detection and reaction time for defenders, increasing drag and stress on the weapon while complicating interception by systems like THAAD and Aegis, which rely on predictable flight paths.

Terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in the weapon's flight, dramatically compressing warning times. The speed and maneuverability of hypersonic weapons challenge existing missile defense systems, reducing reaction times and increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Hypersonic Maneuverability Problem

In the September test, the suspected glide phase could enable the warhead to execute wide lateral shifts across thousands of kilometers, allowing it to bypass U.S. interceptor fields in Alaska or California. Unlike traditional reentry vehicles that follow ballistic arcs, hypersonic glide vehicles can shift trajectory mid-flight, rendering them unpredictable and severely reducing the effectiveness of missile defense architectures.

As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, point-defense systems like THAAD could potentially be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles, but to defend the whole continental United States would require an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries. Some analysts have argued that the United States' current command and control architecture would be incapable of processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.

U.S. Response and Defense Gaps

The United States is racing to develop countermeasures, but significant gaps remain in America's ability to defend against hypersonic threats.

Space-Based Tracking Systems

The Missile Defense Agency and Space Development Agency are developing elements of the Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, including tracking and transport layers designed to provide global coverage for detecting and tracking hypersonic weapons.

The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor system is being developed by MDA in collaboration with SDA to provide sensitive target-quality data to ground-based interceptors, with a March 2025 test demonstrating the ability to detect, track, and perform a simulated engagement of a maneuvering hypersonic target.

Raytheon delivered an upgraded THAAD AN/TPY-2 radar to the Missile Defense Agency in May 2025, with enhanced capability to detect very small targets when a missile's booster separates from its warhead, potentially enabling interception before the missile starts maneuvering.

Glide Phase Interceptor Development Delays

The most critical U.S. counter-hypersonic program—the Glide Phase Interceptor—faces significant delays. In September 2024, MDA selected Northrop Grumman as the sole contractor to develop the GPI, which is designed to intercept hypersonic weapons during their glide phase. The agency plans for the missiles to reach initial operational capability by the end of 2029 and full operational capability by the 2030s.

However, MDA is facing a roughly three-year delay in delivering an interceptor capable of defeating a hypersonic weapon in the glide phase of flight, according to MDA Director Lt. Gen. Heath Collins, with the delay attributed to priorities and resourcing decisions. Congress mandated in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act that the agency reach full operational capability by the end of 2032, but current timelines suggest this deadline may not be met.

Despite the urgency, MDA's fiscal 2025 budget request actually cut funds for regional hypersonic missile defense slightly, from $209 million in FY24 to $182 million, though Congress doubled authorized spending for hypersonic defense in the 2024 NDAA, adding $225 million to accelerate development.

U.S. Offensive Hypersonic Programs

The Army is planning to field its first Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon battery, officially named "Dark Eagle," by the end of fiscal year 2025, which would be the first hypersonic weapon fielded by the United States. The president's fiscal year 2026 budget request included $6.5 billion for conventional and hypersonic munitions and invests over $3.9 billion in hypersonic weapons.

Strategic Implications

At a strategic level, this test cements China's progress toward a credible and survivable nuclear triad capable of assured retaliation against the United States and its allies, with hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and depressed trajectory profiles reducing warning times to mere minutes.

The test erodes U.S. nuclear superiority by enhancing China's second-strike capability, forcing investments into new countermeasures such as hypersonic weapons interceptors and complicating deterrence as defenses optimized for parabolic threats become obsolete.

Regional Reactions

In New Delhi, defense planners expressed concern that the depressed trajectory profile could be adapted for regional targets, drastically reducing Indian early warning times in a potential conflict. Japan, already alarmed by repeated Chinese and North Korean missile overflights, is expected to intensify its investment in counter-hypersonic defenses, including railgun and directed-energy research.

Arms Race Acceleration

The rapid development of space-based tracking systems and the Glide Phase Interceptor is not just about enhancing missile defense but about restoring strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries.

The test is expected to accelerate defense spending globally on counter-hypersonic systems, with major implications for U.S. defense contractors and regional security architectures across the Indo-Pacific.

China's decision to allow this launch to be so publicly visible, unlike many of its secretive underground silo tests, appears calculated to signal both deterrence and technological confidence.

Conclusion

China's September 29, 2025, hypersonic ICBM test represents a watershed moment in the global arms race, blending depressed trajectories, hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, and solid-fuel staging into a single platform. The test exposes critical gaps in U.S. missile defense capabilities while key American counter-hypersonic programs face funding shortfalls and multi-year delays.

For the United States and its allies, the pressing question is not whether China has mastered hypersonic ICBM technology, but how quickly they can adapt their defenses before such systems are deployed in operational numbers. With the Glide Phase Interceptor not expected to reach full operational capability until the 2030s, the United States faces a critical window of vulnerability to China's advancing hypersonic arsenal.

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