An Overview of Current U.S. Hypersonic Missile Developments - Defense Security Monitor

U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Programs Navigate Technical Challenges Amid Strategic Competition

BLUF: The United States is pursuing three primary hypersonic weapons programs—the Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike, and the Air Force's Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile—with an integrated approach emphasizing commonality and conventional precision strike capabilities. Despite significant investments exceeding $2 billion requested for FY2026, all three programs face substantial technical challenges, with recent testing revealing persistent reliability issues that have delayed operational deployment timelines beyond initial projections.

Testing Delays Push Fielding Dates Further Into Future

The Army and Navy achieved two successful end-to-end flight tests of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body in 2024, with tests conducted in June at Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii and December at Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida. The Navy conducted a successful ground-based flight test using a cold-gas launch approach in May 2025 at Cape Canaveral, marking the first time the service fired the hypersonic weapon using this method where the rocket motor ignites after the missile leaves the silo.

However, these successes came after years of setbacks. The Army and Navy had to abort flight tests in March, October and November 2023 due to challenges at the range related not to the round but the process of firing up the missile for launch. The Army is forecasting that the first unit to receive the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon will begin receiving rounds at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state in May 2025, more than a year behind the original 2023 fielding target.

The Navy delayed plans to field CPS aboard the Zumwalt class from Fiscal Year 2025 to FY 2026, with Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe stating the Navy wants to start testing the system aboard USS Zumwalt in 2027 or 2028. The destroyer is currently at HII's Ingalls Shipbuilding in Mississippi undergoing modifications to accommodate the weapon system.

Common Glide Body Anchors Joint Approach

Central to the Army and Navy programs is the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, a joint development effort intended to provide cost savings and operational interoperability. The C-HGB is based on the Army and Sandia National Laboratories' Alternate Re-Entry System and uses a booster rocket to accelerate to hypersonic speeds before jettisoning the booster, with its maneuverable glide body design intended to evade adversary detection and interception.

Several defense contractors, including Leidos, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and General Atomics, are working on the Common Hypersonic Glide Body. Dynetics, a Leidos subsidiary, builds the hypersonic glide vehicle, while Lockheed Martin manufactures the booster and assembles the complete missile and launch equipment.

The system is designed to achieve a range exceeding 1,725 miles, providing strategic strike capability against Anti-Access/Area Denial defenses and high-value targets. Lieutenant General Robert Rasch testified that the responsiveness and survivability of hypersonic weapons is unmatched by traditional ballistic capabilities for precision targeting, especially in anti-access/area denial environments.

Air Force Program Faces Design Delays, Cost Overruns

The Air Force's Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile program encountered significant delays that reduced its planned flight test campaign. The program's first design review was held in September 2024—six months later than expected—because more time was needed to finalize the missile's hardware design. As a result, the service will only conduct five flight tests for HACM before rapid fielding efforts begin in fiscal 2027, down from the originally planned seven tests.

Raytheon is projecting that it will significantly exceed its cost baseline for HACM, with the program's development cost as of January 2025 estimated at close to $2 billion. The Air Force is requesting $802.8 million for HACM development in FY2026, representing a substantial increase aimed at supporting the approaching flight test phase.

HACM employs an air-breathing scramjet engine developed by Northrop Grumman, distinguishing it from boost-glide designs. The Air Force is planning to integrate HACM on the F-15E Strike Eagle and F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, with the missile's smaller size compared to boost-glide alternatives allowing carriage on tactical aircraft rather than only bombers.

ARRW Program Resurrected After Cancellation

In a surprising reversal, the Air Force revived the AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon after canceling the program in 2024. The Air Force conducted its final test of ARRW in March 2024 after taking off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, though the service declined to identify whether the test was successful. The Air Force's FY25 budget included no procurement nor research and development funding for ARRW, with budget documents characterizing the program as completed.

However, the FY2026 budget request includes $387.1 million for ARRW procurement, signaling renewed commitment to the boost-glide missile despite its troubled test history. The resurrection appears driven by concerns over HACM delays and the desire to maintain multiple hypersonic options.

Strategic Context: Racing to Close the Gap

The U.S. hypersonic development effort unfolds against a backdrop of aggressive adversary programs. Jeffrey McCormick, senior intelligence analyst at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, said China leads Russia in support infrastructure and total hypersonic inventory. The Pentagon warned in 2023 that China has the leading hypersonic arsenal, both in number and technology.

China's DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle has been operational since 2020, optimized for strikes against US bases and carrier groups within the First and Second Island Chains. Russia announced in August 2025 that the Oreshnik hypersonic ballistic missile had entered production and would be deployed in Belarus by year's end, with the weapon capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 10.

An October 2025 Atlantic Council study warned that American sluggishness to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, coupled with Russian and Chinese determination to field their own arsenals, is fostering a battlefield asymmetry that threatens Western potency.

Budget Pressures and Competing Priorities

The Pentagon's FY2026 budget request for hypersonic research totals $3.9 billion—down from $6.9 billion in the FY2025 request. This reduction reflects completion of some development phases but also highlights competing budget pressures as programs transition from research to production.

Breaking down the service requests: the Army is requesting $513 million for LRHW research, development, test and evaluation in FY2026, plus $353.4 million for procurement of LRHW ground support equipment and three All-Up Rounds and canisters. The Navy is requesting $798.3 million for CPS RDT&E in FY2026—a decrease from the FY2025 request of $903.9 million. The Air Force's combined hypersonic funding includes the $802.8 million for HACM and $387.1 million for ARRW procurement.

The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $200.6 million for hypersonic defense in FY2026, up from its $182.3 million request in FY2025, reflecting growing emphasis on countering adversary hypersonic threats.

Technical Challenges Persist Despite Progress

The FY2024 Director Operational Test and Evaluation report states there is insufficient data to assess LRHW's effectiveness or survivability. Similarly, the FY2024 DOT&E report indicates insufficient data to fully assess CPS effectiveness.

The technical demands of hypersonic flight remain formidable. Because conventional warheads lack the broad destructive effects of nuclear weapons, U.S. hypersonic weapons must be highly accurate and reliable to provide effective military and deterrent value. This contrasts with Chinese and Russian programs reportedly designed for nuclear payloads, which can tolerate lower accuracy requirements.

Testing infrastructure limitations compound development challenges. U.S. hypersonic testing infrastructure consists of 48 critical facilities as of a 2014 study, including DOD, NASA, DOE and academic sites, with limitations remaining particularly for simulating Mach 8+ flight conditions. DOD spent $1.09 billion on hypersonic boost-glide testing and $221 million on cruise missile testing from FY2021 to FY2025.

Reusable Test Platforms Show Promise

Private industry is advancing reusable hypersonic test capabilities that could accelerate development cycles. Stratolaunch confirmed successful autonomous hypersonic drone tests in December 2024 and March 2025, with both flights achieving speeds higher than Mach 5 using the Talon-A2 vehicle. The tests represent the first US demonstration of a reusable hypersonic aircraft since NASA's X-15 program ended in 1968.

DOD has developed the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB), which aims to increase domestic capacity for hypersonic flight testing and leverage multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-along hypersonic payloads. This public-private approach could help address testing bottlenecks that have constrained program progress.

International Cooperation Expands

Allied cooperation is expanding to share testing resources and accelerate development. A trilateral arrangement between the U.S., Australia and the UK—the HyFliTE Project Arrangement—was signed in November 2024 to share facilities and technical data, with up to six flight tests planned by 2028 and a combined funding pool of $252 million.

On May 15, 2024, the U.S. and Japan signed a cooperative agreement to co-develop the Glide Phase Interceptor, with Japan leading propulsion development. The defensive system aims to provide regional hypersonic defense capability, though MDA's FY2025 budget documents still list FY2035 as the deployment goal despite Congress directing that initial and full operational capability be reached by 2029 and 2032 respectively.

The Road Ahead

The U.S. hypersonic weapons enterprise faces a critical transition period as programs move from development to fielding. Even with delays to work through challenges, the current timeline is still faster than the normal 10- to 15-year development timeline for weapon systems, according to Army officials.

The Army has fielded prototype LRHW equipment and intends to field two additional batteries of LRHW by FY2027. Navy integration timelines remain fluid, with deployment of the CPS-equipped USS Zumwalt expected in the fourth quarter of 2025, followed by USS Michael Mansoor in the fourth quarter of 2026, and USS Lyndon Johnson in the fourth quarter of 2027, with fielding on Virginia-class submarines expected in 2029.

Programs such as the C-HGB and HACM reflect a resource-conscious approach, with standardizing missile bodies across Army and Naval platforms streamlining development, enhancing interoperability, and ensuring that future upgrades can be applied across multiple domains. However, the gap between U.S. capabilities and those of China and Russia continues to widen as adversaries field operational systems while American programs remain in testing.

The ultimate success of U.S. hypersonic weapons development will depend on sustaining funding through the transition from prototypes to operational systems, resolving persistent technical challenges, and accelerating testing to validate performance under realistic operational conditions. As one defense official noted, the strategic imperative is clear even as the path forward remains demanding.

Verified Sources

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SIDEBAR: Startup Surge in Hypersonic Propulsion

A new generation of venture-backed aerospace startups is accelerating hypersonic technology development with innovative propulsion systems and rapid prototyping approaches that differ markedly from traditional defense contractors.

Venus Aerospace, a Houston-based company founded in 2020, is developing a Rotating Detonation Rocket Engine (RDRE) designed to operate across multiple flight regimes without engine switching. Through a NASA Small Business Innovation Research award, Venus tested new nozzle designs for its compact rocket engine, with the top-performing design exceeding expectations. The nozzle was produced using laser powder bed fusion with advanced NASA alloys—GRCop-42 for high thermal conductivity and GRX-810 for extreme temperature resistance. Venus conducted a subsonic drone flight reaching Mach 0.9 in February 2024, with plans to test a hypersonic drone by late 2025.

Hermeus, an Atlanta-based startup founded in 2018, has secured over $60 million in Air Force funding for its Quarterhorse test vehicle program. Hermeus is partnering with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Air Force Research Laboratory, and Pacific Air Forces under a Phase II SBIR contract to provide data and analysis of various hypersonic aircraft it is developing. The company unveiled its Quarterhorse Mk 1 aircraft in March 2024, with flight tests scheduled at Edwards Air Force Base. The Mk 2 iteration, set to roll out in 2025, will achieve supersonic speeds up to Mach 2.5 using a precooled F100 engine with a ramjet afterburner.

Ursa Major Technologies, a Colorado-based rocket engine manufacturer, achieved a significant milestone when its Hadley engine powered Stratolaunch's Talon-A test vehicle beyond Mach 5 in May 2024—the first U.S.-made aircraft to hit that mark since the 1960s. The company closed $100 million in Series E funding in November 2025 and announced more than $115 million in bookings through the first three quarters of 2025, including partnerships with the Department of Defense, Air Force Research Laboratory, Stratolaunch, and BAE Systems. The Hadley powerplant is 80% comprised of 3D-printed components and comes in three different variants. Ursa Major is developing a tactical version of Hadley that will combine the long-term storable attributes of solid rocket motors with active throttle control.

These startups benefit from SBIR/STTR programs that provide non-dilutive early-stage funding. The Navy's FY2025 SBIR topics included research on passive phased arrays for hypersonic vehicle navigation, seeking technologies that can track signals of opportunity to provide real-time position estimations and correct inertial measurement unit drift errors.

The venture-backed approach enables faster iteration cycles than traditional defense development. Industry officials note that limited funding forces startups to innovate quicker and operate on faster timelines, as it's a sprint to prove technology and manufacturability. However, the transition from prototype testing to operational military systems remains challenging, with startups needing to demonstrate reliability, producibility at scale, and long-term sustainability.

SIDEBAR: How Hypersonic Weapons Would Be Employed

U.S. hypersonic weapons are being designed for specific operational scenarios where their unique characteristics—extreme speed, maneuverability, and the ability to penetrate advanced air defenses—provide decisive advantages over conventional alternatives.

Breaking Through Anti-Access/Area Denial Networks

Highly capable platforms like B-21 stealth bombers or Virginia-class submarines can employ hypersonic weapons against high-value targets in enemy defenses, reducing the overall effectiveness of the enemy defense system at much lower cost than a more traditional force package. In the Pacific theater, for example, a hypersonic-equipped surface force can achieve lethality with improved survivability by launching from twice the range or more, putting forces beyond the reach of many defenses and reducing the size of enabling assets needed.

The weapons would target critical nodes in adversary integrated air defense systems—command and control facilities, advanced surface-to-air missile batteries, and early warning radars—creating corridors through which conventional forces could operate. Lieutenant General Robert Rasch testified that the responsiveness and survivability of hypersonic weapons is unmatched by traditional ballistic capabilities for precision targeting, especially in anti-access/area denial environments.

Time-Critical Target Engagement

Hypersonic weapons excel against fleeting, high-value targets that must be struck within minutes rather than hours. Hypersonic missiles are intended to be maneuverable and capable of striking targets quickly, in roughly 15 minutes to 30 minutes, from thousands of kilometers away. Scenarios include:

Mobile strategic weapon systems, such as adversary road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers
Leadership targets at known but temporary locations
Critical command posts during the opening phases of conflict
Naval surface action groups during narrow engagement windows

Conventional Prompt Strike Doctrine

Doctrinally, hypersonics fit within conventional prompt strike, offering rapid conventional options against strategic or mobile targets without resorting to nuclear use. This capability is particularly valuable for scenarios where nuclear weapons would be disproportionate but subsonic cruise missiles lack the speed to engage before targets move or air defenses concentrate.

Hypersonic missiles will augment, not replace, the current missile arsenal. Each CPS-armed vessel will carry only a small number of hypersonic missiles, reserved for long-range, time-sensitive or strongly defended high-value targets, and to eliminate A2/AD barriers such as air-defense or anti-ship-missile installations to open attack corridors for more conventional weapon systems.

Platform Employment Concepts

The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon batteries would provide theater commanders with ground-based strike options, supporting multi-domain operations by threatening adversary rear areas and strategic assets from positions outside enemy engagement zones.

Navy Conventional Prompt Strike missiles aboard Zumwalt-class destroyers would extend surface combatant strike ranges dramatically, while submarine-launched versions would provide stealthy, unpredictable launch points. Submarine-based CPS can be launched significantly closer to enemy shores, including from within the A2/AD zone, further shortening flight time or attacking targets deep inland.

Air Force HACM missiles on tactical aircraft would give fighter and bomber crews the ability to engage defended targets from standoff ranges, with the scramjet-powered design offering different trajectory options than boost-glide alternatives.

Operational Limitations

Despite their capabilities, hypersonic weapons face significant constraints. Congressional Budget Office estimates indicate that buying 300 ground- or sea-launched intermediate-range hypersonic missiles and sustaining the system for 20 years would cost $17.9 billion, compared to $13.4 billion for comparable ballistic missiles with maneuverable warheads. The high unit costs—reportedly above $40 million per missile in initial lots—mean inventories will remain limited.

Successful employment requires extensive enabling capabilities: space-based sensors for target tracking, robust communications for time-sensitive targeting, precision intelligence on adversary air defense networks, and sophisticated battle management systems to coordinate hypersonic strikes with conventional operations. Where there is a large U.S. military presence, enabling capabilities may already be in place or located nearby. In other parts of the globe, the required enabling capabilities may not be available.

The weapons represent what military planners call "door openers"—exquisite systems employed in limited numbers to create conditions for broader conventional force employment, rather than mass-produced weapons for sustained operations.

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SIDEBAR: Day Late and Dollar Short?

The ambitious fielding schedules for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs face an uncomfortable reality: they may arrive too late to influence the conflicts military planners consider most likely in the 2025-2028 timeframe.

The Taiwan Timeline

The "Davidson window"—named after Admiral Philip Davidson's 2021 warning that China could be ready to attempt control of Taiwan by 2027—has become central to Indo-Pacific defense planning. A December 2025 Pentagon draft report warned that Beijing expects to be able to fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027, with 2027 marking both the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army and a critical milestone in China's military modernization timeline.

Taiwan has officially identified 2027 as a possible year for a Chinese invasion, marking the first time the island has publicly named a specific timeline for potential military action. Taiwan's Defense Minister Wellington Koo warned that China's frequent military exercises could rapidly transform into actual combat operations with minimal warning time.

Against this timeline, U.S. hypersonic weapons face sobering delivery schedules. The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon won't achieve initial operational capability until late 2025 at the earliest, with only limited batteries fielded by 2027. The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike aboard Zumwalt-class destroyers has slipped to 2026 for first deployment, with submarine integration not expected until 2029. The Air Force's HACM program targets fiscal 2027 for initial fielding—precisely when the Davidson window closes.

Even these schedules assume no further delays. Pentagon officials stated in December 2024 that Xi Jinping's goal of having his military ready to carry out a short, sharp invasion of Taiwan by 2027 is not possible right now, but that assessment provides cold comfort given China's rapid military modernization. More critically, operational deployment schedules don't account for the time needed to build meaningful inventories, train crews, and integrate weapons into operational doctrine.

The European Threat Window

Europe faces its own compressed timeline. The most frequently forecast years for potential Russian attack on NATO territory are 2027 and 2028, with Germany's Bundeswehr Inspector General stating Russia will be militarily ready to attack NATO countries by 2029 at the earliest.

Polish President Andrzej Duda cited German research indicating Putin intends to attack NATO as early as 2026 or 2027. Baltic officials estimate Russia will be ready to conduct a limited operation against Baltic states in two to three years after the end of Russia-Ukraine hostilities.

Internal documents from Russia's primary tank manufacturer show plans to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028, with Russia aiming to modernize its armored forces with more than 2,000 tanks between 2026 and 2036. This reconstitution effort would restore Russia's conventional capabilities for large-scale operations beyond Ukraine.

For potential European contingencies, U.S. ground-based hypersonic weapons offer limited utility—the Army's LRHW batteries would need forward basing in Europe, a politically and logistically complex undertaking unlikely to occur before conflict. Air-launched HACM missiles provide more flexibility but won't achieve meaningful operational capability before 2027-2028.

The Inventory Problem

Even successful fielding schedules mask a deeper problem: initial operational capability doesn't mean meaningful combat power. Congressional Budget Office estimates indicate unit costs above $40 million per missile in initial production lots, severely limiting procurement quantities.

The Army plans to field three LRHW batteries by 2027, each with eight missiles—just 24 weapons total for the entire Indo-Pacific theater. The Navy's three Zumwalt-class destroyers will carry 12 missiles each (36 total), with submarine capability years away. These are not operationally significant inventories for deterring or fighting major regional conflicts.

By comparison, China's DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile with hypersonic glide vehicle has been operational since 2020, giving Beijing a multi-year head start in both capability development and operational integration. China unveiled two new sixth-generation fighter-bomber aircraft in December 2025, underscoring the speed of PLA advances in multiple new weapons programs.

Deterrence Through Development?

Some analysts argue that visible progress in hypersonic development provides deterrent value even before operational deployment. The logic holds that adversaries must account for emerging U.S. capabilities in their planning, potentially complicating their calculus regardless of current inventories.

However, this argument assumes adversaries view partially fielded, low-inventory systems as credible threats. Center for Strategic and International Studies research found 83% of China experts reject that China plans kinetic action against Taiwan by 2027, suggesting Beijing may discount U.S. developmental programs when making strategic decisions.

The Cost of Delay

The fundamental challenge is that hypersonic weapons were conceived as capabilities for potential future conflicts, but the timelines for those conflicts have compressed faster than development schedules could accommodate. Programs initiated in the late 2010s assumed a decade-plus development cycle—standard for complex weapons systems—but now confront threat windows opening before initial operational capabilities mature.

Global Guardian analysis indicates the window for Taiwan conflict is now open, with that window most likely remaining open between 2024-2028. If this assessment proves accurate, U.S. hypersonic weapons will arrive after the critical period has passed, leaving commanders to rely on conventional long-range strike systems developed decades earlier.

The sobering reality is that for the conflicts military planners consider most probable in the 2025-2028 timeframe, U.S. hypersonic weapons may indeed prove a day late—and given their extraordinary costs and limited inventories, potentially a dollar short as well.