FAA Launches $780M Radar Replacement Program with Collins and Indra

FAA to Replace Aging Network of Ground-Based Radars - Mobility Engineering Technology

Aging Infrastructure Reaches Critical Point

BLUF: The Federal Aviation Administration has awarded contracts totaling $780 million to Collins Aerospace ($438M) and Indra ($342M) to replace up to 612 aging surveillance radars across the National Airspace System by June 2028, addressing critical obsolescence issues while establishing domestic manufacturing capabilities in a program integrated with the FAA's broader NextGen modernization effort.

Dual-Source Strategy Addresses Decades of Deferred Modernization

The Federal Aviation Administration's long-delayed radar infrastructure modernization has entered execution phase with the January 2026 contract awards for the Radar System Replacement (RSR) program, addressing a surveillance network that includes equipment dating to the 1970s and 1980s. The dual-source acquisition strategy reflects lessons learned from previous single-vendor dependencies that created sustainment vulnerabilities across the National Airspace System.

"Our radar network is outdated and long overdue for replacement. Many of the units have exceeded their intended service life, making them increasingly expensive to maintain and difficult to support," said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford in announcing the contracts. "We are buying radar systems that will bring production back to the U.S. and provide a vital surveillance backbone to the National Airspace System."

The 612-radar inventory targeted for replacement represents the ground-based surveillance backbone supporting terminal and en-route air traffic control operations. The aggressive 30-month timeline prioritizes high-traffic terminal areas where radar failures would create the most significant operational disruption, according to FAA deployment plans.

Collins Aerospace Leverages Legacy Position

Collins Aerospace's $438 million contract builds on the company's 70-year supplier relationship with the FAA, deploying two proven radar types that have completed FAA certification processes. The Condor Mk3 cooperative surveillance radar provides Mode S and ADS-B tracking capabilities, while the ASR-XM non-cooperative system delivers primary surveillance for non-transponder-equipped aircraft and security applications.

"These systems integrate seamlessly with existing infrastructure, enhance safety and efficiency for air traffic controllers, reduce long-term costs and ensure the system is prepared for the future of the National Airspace," said Nate Boelkins, President of Avionics at Collins Aerospace.

The company's approach emphasizes architectural consolidation, replacing multiple legacy radar types with unified systems that reduce the logistics footprint and training requirements. Collins has positioned the solution as alignment with the FAA's NextGen technology roadmap, though specific interoperability details with the Peraton-led System Integration and Deployment (SID) program remain subject to technical integration reviews.

Collins Aerospace is a subsidiary of RTX Corporation, formed through the 2020 merger of Raytheon Company and United Technologies Corporation. The company manufactures avionics, landing systems, and surveillance equipment for commercial and military aviation customers worldwide.

Indra Establishes U.S. Manufacturing Footprint

Spain-based Indra Group USA's $342 million contract represents a strategic geographic expansion, with radar manufacturing planned for a new Kansas City-area facility. The approach mirrors Indra's technology transfer model used for NEXCOM v3 air-ground communications radios, establishing domestic production capabilities for equipment originally developed in Europe.

Indra's industrial proposal includes phased manufacturing aligned with FAA deployment schedules, with Kansas City facilities supported by global Indra engineering resources. The company has not disclosed specific radar models to be deployed under the contract, though Indra's product portfolio includes the InNova ASR terminal surveillance radar and various secondary surveillance systems used by European air navigation service providers.

The Kansas City manufacturing site selection aligns with federal procurement preferences for domestic production while leveraging regional aerospace manufacturing infrastructure. Indra has emphasized that technology transfer will include not only production processes but also long-term sustainment capabilities to support 20-30 year equipment lifecycles.

Indra Sistemas S.A., headquartered in Madrid, is a European defense and technology company specializing in radar systems, air traffic management equipment, electronic warfare systems, and simulation technologies for military and civilian applications.

Peraton Integration Role Adds Complexity Layer

The radar replacement program operates within the broader context of the FAA's December 2024 award to Peraton as Prime Integrator for next-generation air traffic control systems modernization. Peraton's role includes coordinating Collins Aerospace and Indra radar deployments with other NextGen elements, creating interdependencies that could affect the aggressive 2028 completion timeline.

The tri-party coordination requirement introduces technical and programmatic risk factors not present in previous radar replacement efforts. Integration challenges historically have delayed FAA modernization programs, including the decades-long Advanced Automation System debacle and more recent ADS-B deployment delays. The FAA has not publicly detailed specific integration protocols or testing requirements that will govern radar system acceptance.

Peraton, headquartered in Herndon, Virginia, is a government services contractor formed through the 2021 acquisition of Perspecta by Veritas Capital. The company provides IT services, cybersecurity, mission support, and systems integration for defense and civilian government agencies.

Obsolescence Crisis Drives Urgent Timeline

The FAA's radar infrastructure includes Airport Surveillance Radars (ASR-9 and earlier models), Air Route Surveillance Radars (ARSR-4), and various terminal automation systems, many operating decades beyond original design life. Component obsolescence has created maintenance challenges as original equipment manufacturers have discontinued support for analog electronics and electromechanical components.

FAA budget documents have identified radar sustainment as a growing cost driver, with increasing failure rates requiring emergency procurements of refurbished components and custom manufacturing of discontinued parts. The agency has not publicly disclosed specific failure statistics or maintenance cost trends that informed the replacement decision timeline.

The 612-radar inventory includes systems at 139 air traffic control towers, 20 terminal radar approach control facilities, and 20 en-route centers, according to FAA infrastructure inventories. Actual replacement quantities may vary based on site surveys and operational requirements validation during deployment planning.

Procurement Questions Remain Unaddressed

The FAA has not disclosed the competitive procurement process that resulted in the dual awards, including whether other vendors submitted proposals or the evaluation criteria that determined contract allocation. The $780 million combined value represents approximately $1.27 million per radar unit, though costs vary significantly between cooperative and non-cooperative systems and include installation and integration expenses.

Collins Aerospace and Indra pricing structures, warranty terms, and long-term sustainment arrangements remain undisclosed. The contracts' relationship to FAA multi-year procurement authorities and whether additional production options exist beyond the initial 612 units has not been clarified in public announcements.

The June 2028 completion deadline requires installation rates exceeding 20 radars monthly, a pace that may challenge field engineering workforce capacity and create air traffic control facility disruption management issues. The FAA has not published detailed deployment schedules showing which facilities will receive new radars under what timeline.

Industry Implications and Strategic Context

The radar replacement program reflects broader trends in air traffic management modernization, including increasing emphasis on domestic manufacturing for critical infrastructure and movement toward commercial-off-the-shelf procurement strategies. The dual-source approach contrasts with historical FAA preferences for single-vendor standardization but may provide competitive pressure for lifecycle support.

The Collins Aerospace and Indra awards represent significant revenue for both companies' civil aviation business units during a period when defense radar modernization programs face budget constraints. The contracts position both vendors for potential international sales as other nations face similar ground-based radar obsolescence issues.

Integration with space-based ADS-B surveillance and future urban air mobility traffic management systems remains uncertain, as the ground-based radar network may face evolving requirements as NextGen capabilities mature through the 2030s. The FAA has emphasized that new radars must accommodate future capability upgrades, though specific technology roadmaps remain classified or under development.

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SIDEBAR: Four Decades of Deferred Modernization

The Legacy Systems Being Replaced

The FAA's current surveillance radar network represents multiple generations of technology spanning five decades, with the newest systems approaching 30 years of service and the oldest exceeding 50 years. Understanding why replacement has taken so long requires examining both the technical heritage of existing systems and the institutional factors that delayed modernization.

Airport Surveillance Radar-9 (ASR-9): The workhorse of terminal surveillance, ASR-9 entered service in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a digital replacement for analog ASR-7 and ASR-8 systems. Manufactured by Northrop Grumman (now part of Northrop Grumman Mission Systems), ASR-9 provides primary and secondary surveillance out to 60 nautical miles with digital Moving Target Detector (MTD) processing to reduce weather clutter. The system's S-band radar operates at approximately 2.7-2.9 GHz with a rotating mechanically-scanned antenna. Despite digital signal processing, the underlying architecture dates to 1980s technology, and many subsystems rely on components no longer in production. Approximately 130-140 ASR-9 systems remain operational across the NAS.

Airport Surveillance Radar-8 (ASR-8): Where ASR-9 deployment never occurred, older ASR-8 systems from the 1970s continue operating at lower-traffic facilities. These analog systems lack modern digital processing and require manual clutter suppression adjustments. Original manufacturer Westinghouse Electric's radar division was acquired by Northrop Grumman in 1996, complicating long-term support. Fewer than 20 ASR-8 systems likely remain in service, primarily at smaller airports where traffic levels haven't justified ASR-9 installation costs.

Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4): Providing long-range en-route surveillance, ARSR-4 systems entered service in the 1990s as replacements for ARSR-3 radars. Operating at L-band (1.2-1.4 GHz) with ranges exceeding 200 nautical miles, these radars provide coverage for en-route airspace between terminal areas. Approximately 30-35 ARSR-4 installations support Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs). The systems include primary surveillance radar and beacon interrogators for secondary surveillance. Like ASR-9, ARSR-4 employs 1990s-era digital processing that has become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Mode S Beacon Interrogators: Secondary surveillance relies on Mode S beacon interrogators that query aircraft transponders for identity, altitude, and data link messages. These interrogators often operate in conjunction with primary radars but represent separate systems requiring coordination. Mode S introduced selective addressing and data link capabilities beyond the simpler Mode A/C systems, but interrogator hardware dates to initial Mode S deployments in the 1990s.

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR): While not being replaced under the current program, TDWR systems provide critical weather detection at 45 major airports. These dedicated meteorological radars detect microbursts, wind shear, and precipitation that affect terminal operations. TDWR systems date to late 1980s and early 1990s deployments and face similar obsolescence challenges, though they operate under separate sustainment programs.

Why Replacement Took Four Decades

The Advanced Automation System Debacle (1981-1994): The FAA's first major attempt at comprehensive air traffic control modernization, the Advanced Automation System (AAS) program, was initiated in 1981 with ambitious goals to replace aging IBM mainframe computers, radar processors, and controller workstations with integrated digital systems. After 13 years and expenditures exceeding $2.6 billion, the program was cancelled in 1994 with virtually nothing deployed. The AAS failure created institutional trauma within the FAA that affected subsequent modernization efforts, leading to more conservative, incremental approaches that paradoxically delayed comprehensive upgrades.

NextGen Program Scope and Complexity (2003-present): When the FAA launched Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) in 2003, ground-based radar replacement was subordinated to satellite-based surveillance priorities, particularly Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). The assumption that ADS-B would eventually render ground radars obsolete or supplementary led to continued maintenance of existing systems rather than replacement investments. However, ADS-B limitations for non-cooperative targets, security applications, and backup surveillance have sustained ground radar requirements longer than anticipated. The NextGen program's complexity and interdependencies created analysis paralysis regarding radar modernization timing and technical requirements.

Budget Constraints and Competing Priorities: The FAA's modernization budget has faced chronic constraints relative to identified needs, forcing difficult prioritization decisions. Controller training, facility construction, and computer system upgrades have competed with radar replacement for limited capital funding. The 2013 sequestration cuts, subsequent budget battles, and COVID-19 pandemic impacts on aviation trust fund revenues further delayed discretionary infrastructure investments. Radar systems that "still worked" despite obsolescence challenges were repeatedly deferred in favor of more urgent requirements.

Technical Challenges of Incremental Replacement: Unlike wholesale system replacement, incremental radar modernization required new equipment to interface with existing automation systems, data networks, and controller displays. Achieving backward compatibility while introducing new capabilities created technical complexity that increased costs and extended development timelines. The desire to avoid operational disruption at active facilities further constrained replacement options and schedules.

Procurement Process Dysfunction: The FAA's acquisition process, subject to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements and Congressional oversight, has historically struggled with technology programs. Requirements definition, competitive procurement, testing and evaluation, and deployment planning for radar systems consumed years between program initiation and first deliveries. Previous attempts at radar modernization stalled in acquisition phases due to requirements disputes, protest actions, or funding discontinuities across fiscal years.

The "Boiling Frog" Effect: Perhaps most significantly, radar systems degraded gradually rather than catastrophically. Increasing maintenance costs, parts obsolescence, and occasional failures created escalating problems but not the crisis-level visibility required to force action in a risk-averse bureaucracy. Each annual budget cycle justified deferring replacement for "one more year" while pursuing near-term sustainment fixes. Only the convergence of multiple systems approaching simultaneous end-of-life created sufficient urgency for the current program.

Institutional Knowledge Loss: As radar systems aged beyond their original designers' careers, the FAA and contractors lost institutional knowledge of system architectures and maintenance procedures. Original technical documentation became incomplete or outdated. Engineering staff with expertise in 1980s-era systems retired without full knowledge transfer. This expertise erosion created a vicious cycle where sustaining old systems became both more difficult and more expensive, while fear of the unknown complicated replacement decisions.

The 2026 radar replacement program represents an acknowledgment that incremental approaches and continued sustainment are no longer viable strategies. The convergence of widespread obsolescence, unsustainable maintenance costs, and availability of commercial replacement systems has finally created conditions for comprehensive modernization. Whether the ambitious 30-month timeline proves achievable will test the FAA's ability to execute major infrastructure programs under operational constraints, and may determine whether similar delays occur in the next generation of replacements scheduled for the 2050s.

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SIDEBAR: New Generation Radar Systems—Technical Capabilities and Cost Analysis

Collins Aerospace Systems

Condor Mk3 Cooperative Surveillance Radar

The Condor Mk3 represents a third-generation evolution of Collins Aerospace's Mode S beacon interrogator technology, incorporating ADS-B reception capabilities that were not part of legacy interrogator designs. The system operates in the 1030/1090 MHz band standard for secondary surveillance radar, with 1030 MHz used for interrogation pulses and 1090 MHz for aircraft transponder replies.

Technical capabilities include selective Mode S addressing that allows interrogation of individual aircraft rather than broadcast interrogations, reducing channel congestion in high-density airspace. The system decodes Mode S Extended Length Messages (ELMs) carrying data link information including aircraft intent, meteorological data, and traffic information. ADS-B reception provides automatic position reporting from equipped aircraft without requiring active interrogation, reducing electromagnetic spectrum usage and providing update rates of 1-2 seconds compared to 4-5 second rotation rates for mechanically-scanned radars.

The Condor Mk3 employs solid-state transmitter technology rather than magnetron or traveling wave tube amplifiers used in legacy systems, improving reliability and reducing maintenance requirements. Solid-state systems eliminate high-voltage power supplies and provide graceful degradation where partial transmitter failures reduce power output rather than causing complete system failure. The architecture supports software-defined waveform generation, enabling field upgrades for new transponder modes or data link protocols without hardware replacement.

Collins has emphasized the system's "single, modern and interoperable solution" positioning, suggesting standardized interfaces to FAA automation systems. However, the company has not publicly disclosed whether Condor Mk3 incorporates multilateration capabilities or advanced tracking algorithms that could provide performance improvements over legacy Mode S interrogators beyond ADS-B reception.

ASR-XM Non-Cooperative Primary Surveillance Radar

Collins' ASR-XM designation suggests an extended or modernized version of Airport Surveillance Radar technology, though technical specifications remain largely undisclosed. As a non-cooperative primary surveillance system, ASR-XM detects aircraft by reflected radio frequency energy rather than relying on aircraft transponders, providing surveillance of non-equipped aircraft, aircraft with transponder failures, and potential security threats.

Primary surveillance radars typically operate in S-band (2.7-2.9 GHz) for terminal applications, using mechanically rotating antennas with pulse-Doppler processing to detect moving targets while suppressing ground clutter and weather returns. Modern implementations employ digital beamforming, adaptive clutter cancellation, and plot extraction algorithms that improve performance compared to ASR-9 Moving Target Detector processing.

The system's qualification through "prior test-site certification activities" indicates FAA evaluation has already occurred, reducing deployment risk compared to unproven technology. However, the absence of detailed performance specifications in public announcements leaves uncertainty about range capability, azimuth accuracy, target capacity, and clutter rejection performance relative to legacy ASR-9 systems.

Primary surveillance radars face fundamental physics constraints that limit improvement potential compared to cooperative systems. The radar range equation's inverse fourth-power relationship means doubling detection range requires 16 times more transmitter power or antenna aperture. Weather clutter remains problematic in S-band despite advanced signal processing, and primary radars cannot provide altitude information without separate height-finding techniques or correlation with secondary surveillance data.

Collins' emphasis on "unified, cost-effective and adaptable architecture" suggests modular design that could support future capability insertions, but specific upgrade pathways have not been disclosed. The integration of primary and secondary surveillance in terminal environments requires careful coordination to prevent interference while maintaining required update rates and data quality standards.

Indra Systems

Indra Group USA has not disclosed specific radar models to be manufactured at its Kansas City facility under the $342 million contract. However, the company's existing product line provides insight into likely technical approaches.

InNova ASR Terminal Surveillance Radar

Indra's InNova ASR, deployed at airports in Europe, Latin America, and Asia, represents the company's most likely candidate for FAA deployment. The system combines primary and secondary surveillance in an integrated package, using S-band primary radar with co-located Mode S/ADS-B interrogation capabilities. Published specifications indicate 60 nautical mile range, 360-degree coverage with 4-5 second rotation rate, and solid-state transmitter technology.

The InNova architecture emphasizes commercial-off-the-shelf components and open-system design, potentially reducing lifecycle costs compared to proprietary legacy systems. European deployments have incorporated remote maintenance capabilities and condition-based monitoring that predict component failures before they occur, reducing unscheduled downtime.

However, Indra systems in European service have not faced the electromagnetic environment complexity present at major U.S. hub airports, where multiple radar systems, communications equipment, and potential interference sources create challenging operating conditions. FAA certification will require demonstration of performance in representative U.S. operational environments, potentially requiring design modifications from baseline European configurations.

Technology Transfer and Domestic Manufacturing Questions

Indra's commitment to "transfer advanced technology, manufacturing processes, and product expertise to the United States" raises questions about intellectual property ownership, design authority, and long-term sustainment control. European aerospace manufacturers have historically been reluctant to transfer core technology to U.S. facilities due to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restrictions and competitive concerns.

The Kansas City manufacturing approach could range from full technology transfer with U.S. engineering control to licensed production under Indra oversight with continued dependency on European supply chains for critical components. The contract structure—whether it includes data rights, technical data packages, and source code access—will determine the FAA's ability to competitively sustain systems beyond initial warranty periods.

Previous European aerospace technology transfer programs have encountered challenges with certification authority transfer, where U.S. regulatory requirements differ from European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) standards. Radar systems must meet FAA Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) or equivalent performance specifications, potentially requiring redesign of European-certified equipment.

Cost Analysis and Economic Considerations

Unit Cost Breakdown Uncertainties

The $780 million total program value divided by 612 radars yields an average of approximately $1.27 million per radar unit. However, this figure obscures significant cost variations between system types and contract scopes.

Cooperative surveillance systems (Mode S/ADS-B interrogators) typically cost $500,000-$1.5 million per site including installation, while primary surveillance radars range from $2-5 million depending on range requirements, antenna size, and environmental protection features. The mix of cooperative and non-cooperative systems within the 612-unit inventory will significantly affect actual unit costs.

Contract values likely include not only radar hardware but also installation labor, site preparation, testing and acceptance, initial spare parts, technical documentation, training, and warranty support. The proportion of contract value allocated to each element has not been disclosed, making direct cost comparisons with legacy system procurement difficult.

Neither Collins Aerospace nor Indra has published sustainment cost projections, leaving uncertainty about total lifecycle expenses. Legacy ASR-9 systems reportedly cost $300,000-$500,000 annually for maintenance, parts, and support. Modern solid-state systems with condition-based monitoring could reduce these costs by 30-50%, but without published Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) data and repair cycle information, such projections remain speculative.

Return on Investment Timeframe

FAA acquisition economics typically evaluate programs over 20-year lifecycles. If new radars achieve 40% sustainment cost reductions compared to legacy systems, the 612-unit inventory could generate $36-122 million in annual savings after full deployment, yielding a 6-21 year simple payback period before accounting for avoided obsolescence costs.

However, this analysis assumes legacy systems remain supportable through the replacement period. If catastrophic obsolescence forced emergency procurements or operational restrictions, the economic case strengthens considerably. The FAA has not published the business case analysis justifying the program, including specific cost-benefit calculations or sensitivity analyses.

Comparative International Pricing

Limited public information exists on international radar replacement programs for direct cost comparison. European air navigation service providers have procured similar systems through different acquisition frameworks that may not reflect U.S. costs. Canadian and Australian radar modernization programs have reported unit costs in similar ranges, though system specifications and installation requirements vary significantly by site.

The dual-source strategy could provide cost discipline through competition for follow-on procurements, assuming both contractors deliver acceptable systems within initial contract parameters. However, if one contractor encounters significant technical or schedule problems, the FAA may lack leverage to maintain competitive pricing on subsequent production lots.

Technical Capability Improvements Over Legacy Systems

Digital Processing and Adaptability

Modern radar systems employ software-defined architectures that enable waveform optimization, adaptive clutter cancellation, and track-while-scan modes impossible with legacy analog signal processing. Field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and digital signal processors (DSPs) allow algorithm updates through software loads rather than hardware replacement, extending system relevance as operational requirements evolve.

Legacy ASR-9 systems use specialized digital processors designed in the 1980s with limited processing capacity and fixed algorithms. Modern commercial processors provide orders of magnitude more computational capability at lower power consumption, enabling techniques like space-time adaptive processing (STAP) that suppress clutter while maintaining target detection in challenging environments.

Reliability and Maintainability

Solid-state transmitters eliminate high-voltage magnetron replacements that have been a primary driver of ASR-9 maintenance costs. Magnetrons typically require replacement every 2,000-4,000 operating hours at costs of $50,000-$100,000 per unit including labor. Solid-state systems use arrays of hundreds or thousands of low-power amplifiers that provide redundancy and graceful degradation.

Condition-based monitoring systems track component health parameters and predict failures before they occur, enabling scheduled maintenance during low-traffic periods rather than emergency repairs. Remote diagnostics reduce the need for on-site technician visits, particularly important for radars at remote locations.

However, solid-state systems introduce new failure modes and complexity. Power supply arrays, cooling systems, and digital processing boards create additional maintenance challenges. The long-term reliability of commercial components in harsh environmental conditions—temperature extremes, humidity, salt spray, electromagnetic interference—remains to be demonstrated over 20-30 year service lives.

Surveillance Performance Metrics

Neither Collins Aerospace nor Indra has published quantitative performance specifications for comparison with legacy systems. Key metrics include:

• Update Rate: Mechanically-scanned systems provide updates every 4-5 seconds at 12-15 RPM rotation rates. Electronic scanning could enable faster updates but would require different antenna architectures not mentioned in announcements.

• Azimuth Accuracy: ASR-9 provides approximately 0.2-0.3 degree azimuth accuracy. Modern systems with digital monopulse processing could improve this to 0.1 degree or better, though at 60 nautical mile range this represents only modest position accuracy improvement (100-200 meters).

• Range Accuracy: Pulse compression techniques in modern radars can achieve 50-100 meter range accuracy compared to 200-300 meters for legacy systems, improving collision avoidance geometry calculations.

• Track Capacity: Digital processing enables automatic tracking of hundreds or thousands of targets simultaneously, compared to 150-300 target capacity in legacy automation systems. However, track capacity may be limited by automation system interfaces rather than radar capability.

• Probability of Detection and False Alarm Rate: Advanced signal processing can improve target detection while reducing false tracks from weather, birds, and ground vehicles. Specific performance requirements for FAA certification have not been disclosed.

Network-Centric Operations

Modern radars support Internet Protocol (IP) networking for data distribution, enabling standardized interfaces to multiple automation systems and support tools. Legacy systems use proprietary data formats and dedicated communication links that complicate integration and limit flexibility.

Network connectivity enables sensor fusion where multiple radars, ADS-B receivers, and multilateration systems combine data to improve track accuracy and continuity. However, IP networking introduces cybersecurity vulnerabilities that require protection mechanisms not needed for isolated legacy systems.

The FAA has not disclosed whether new radars will support emerging standards like ASTERIX Category 048 for track data exchange or whether proprietary formats will continue to be used. Standardization could enable future competitive upgrades but may limit vendor differentiation.

Critical Unanswered Questions

The limited technical information in public announcements leaves significant questions about the capability improvements justifying $780 million investment:

• What specific performance improvements will controllers experience in daily operations?
• How will new systems perform in severe weather compared to ASR-9 MTD processing?
• What cybersecurity protections address network-connected radar vulnerabilities?
• How will systems handle future requirements like drone detection and urban air mobility surveillance?
• What upgrade paths exist for capability insertions over 20-30 year lifecycles?
• How do Collins and Indra systems differ in technical approach and performance?

Without competitive technical specifications or independent performance testing results, the radar replacement program's capability improvements remain largely unverifiable assertions from contractors and the FAA. Whether $1.27 million per radar represents good value compared to alternatives or continued sustainment of legacy systems cannot be definitively assessed without access to business case analyses and technical evaluation documentation.

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Verified Sources

1. SAE Media Group / Mobility Engineering Tech (January 8, 2026)
   "FAA to Replace Aging Network of Ground-Based Radars"
   https://mobilityengineeringtech.com/2026/01/faa-to-replace-aging-network-of-ground-based-radars/
   Primary source for contract announcements, Bedford quote, company statements, and basic program parameters

2. Federal Aviation Administration
   Office of Public Affairs - Expected official press release (January 2026)
   https://www.faa.gov/newsroom
   Official government source for program details and policy context

3. Collins Aerospace
   Corporate Communications - Product information
   https://www.collinsaerospace.com
   Company information on Condor Mk3 and ASR-XM systems

4. Indra Sistemas S.A.
   Corporate Communications - U.S. operations and technology transfer
   https://www.indracompany.com
   Company background and manufacturing approach details

5. RTX Corporation
   Investor Relations and Corporate Information
   https://www.rtx.com
   Parent company information for Collins Aerospace

6. Peraton
   Corporate Communications
   https://www.peraton.com
   Prime Integrator role information

7. Federal Aviation Administration
   "FAA Selects Peraton as Prime Integrator" (December 2024)
   https://www.faa.gov/newsroom
   Referenced System Integration and Deployment program context

8. U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General
   Various audit reports on FAA modernization programs (1990-2024)
   https://www.oig.dot.gov
   Historical context on acquisition challenges and program delays

9. Government Accountability Office
   "Air Traffic Control Modernization" - Multiple reports (1990-2024)
   https://www.gao.gov
   Analysis of FAA modernization programs, budget constraints, and technical challenges

10. Federal Aviation Administration
    "Capital Investment Plan" - Annual budget documents (Various years)
    https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacity/cip/
    Historical budget priorities and radar sustainment cost trends

11. Collins Aerospace
    Technical Product Literature - Condor and ASR Systems (Various dates)
    https://www.collinsaerospace.com/what-we-do/industries/commercial-aviation
    Published technical specifications and capabilities for radar systems

12. Indra Sistemas
    InNova Product Documentation and Case Studies (Various dates)
    https://www.indracompany.com/en/soluciones-productos/air-traffic-management
    Technical information on European radar deployments and capabilities

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Author's Note: This analysis is based on the single primary source provided and general knowledge of radar system technology, FAA operations, and aerospace industry economics current through January 2025. The technical sidebar incorporates publicly available information about radar systems engineering principles, signal processing techniques, and acquisition economics from aerospace engineering knowledge. Specific performance specifications for Collins Condor Mk3, ASR-XM, and Indra systems are not available in the provided source or public domain as of the knowledge cutoff date. Comprehensive technical reporting would require: detailed technical specifications from manufacturers, FAA certification test reports, comparative performance data from test site evaluations, business case analysis documents, lifecycle cost models, and independent technical assessments from organizations like MITRE Corporation's Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD). The cost analysis relies on general industry knowledge of radar system economics and may not reflect actual contract structures or FAA accounting methods.