Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network

China already possesses several means that could threaten this network. These include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) such as the HSU-001, unveiled in 2019, capable of reconnaissance and sabotage missions. (Picture source: Chinese MoD)

China's Asymmetric Challenge to U.S. Undersea Surveillance Dominance: PLAN Officers Advocate Systematic Targeting of American ASW Networks

Analysis reveals Chinese naval strategists view disruption of IUSS and SURTASS systems as critical to submarine force effectiveness

A striking admission of vulnerability has emerged from within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that illuminates both the effectiveness of U.S. anti-submarine warfare capabilities and China's emerging strategy to counter them. Recent analysis of internal Chinese military writings reveals that senior PLAN officers are advocating a systematic campaign to degrade or destroy America's undersea surveillance infrastructure, acknowledging their submarine force's current operational limitations while outlining an ambitious counterstrategy.

The Chinese Assessment: A "Devastating Indictment"

In a November 2023 article published in Military Art, a prestigious journal of the Chinese Academy of Military Science, three PLAN officers provided an unusually candid assessment of their submarine force's vulnerabilities. The article, titled "Effectively Responding to the Threat to China's Undersea Space Posed by the Powerful Enemy's Three-Dimensional Surveillance System," represents what Ryan Martinson of the China Maritime Studies Institute calls "a devastating indictment of the operational effectiveness of China's submarine force."

The Chinese officers acknowledge that "the probability that PRC submarines are discovered when leaving port is extremely high," and concede "a fairly high probability that PRC submarines will be detected and intercepted while operating in the Near Seas." This admission stands in stark contrast to the often-cited concern about China's expanding submarine fleet, which the Pentagon projects will reach 65 units in 2025 and 80 by 2035.

The Chinese assessment describes an American "integrated, three-dimensional surveillance system" that encompasses warships, submarines, aircraft, satellites, underwater drones, the fixed arrays of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), and the mobile Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) ships. This system, the Chinese authors argue, enables the United States to achieve "unilateral transparency" beneath the waves, effectively neutralizing China's submarine deterrent and operational capabilities.

Understanding the U.S. Surveillance Architecture

The American undersea surveillance network represents one of the most sophisticated intelligence-gathering systems ever deployed. At its core lies the IUSS, successor to the Cold War-era Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS), which consists of arrays of seabed acoustic sensors connected to shore stations by undersea cables. These fixed installations continuously monitor strategic maritime areas, particularly chokepoints and likely submarine transit routes.

Complementing the fixed arrays are SURTASS ships—specialized ocean surveillance vessels that deploy towed acoustic arrays capable of detecting submarines over vast distances. The current fleet includes aging Victorious-class and Impeccable-class vessels, with new TAGOS-25 class ships entering service to replace them. These platforms use Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) designs optimized for stability during slow-speed surveillance operations.

The surveillance network extends beyond these primary sensors to include P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters with dipping sonars, attack submarines with advanced towed arrays, and an extensive network of oceanographic research vessels that map underwater terrain and environmental conditions critical for optimizing detection capabilities.

China's Proposed Counterstrategy

The PLAN officers outline a comprehensive approach to neutralizing American undersea surveillance advantages, organized across strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Their recommendations reflect a sophisticated understanding of system vulnerabilities and a willingness to employ both conventional and unconventional methods to achieve their objectives.

At the strategic level, the Chinese authors call for prioritizing offensive capabilities over defensive measures. "China needs to combine both defensive measures and countermeasures, but it must place greater emphasis on countermeasures," they argue, advocating for the development of capabilities specifically designed to "attack and damage" the U.S. undersea surveillance system.

The tactical recommendations include developing advanced detection technologies that integrate acoustic, magnetic, optical, and electronic sensors with artificial intelligence to locate concealed undersea platforms. The authors specifically call for unmanned underwater vehicles capable of destroying U.S. sensor arrays, describing fixed seabed installations as "fragile and easily severed."

Perhaps most significantly, the Chinese strategy envisions leveraging the country's massive civilian maritime infrastructure, including its enormous fishing fleet, to support anti-surveillance operations. This approach reflects China's broader strategy of military-civil fusion, where commercial assets provide cover and support for military objectives.

China's Growing Underwater Capabilities

China has already demonstrated significant capabilities that could threaten U.S. surveillance networks. The HSU-001 Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle, first publicly displayed in 2019, represents a new class of autonomous underwater weapons optimized for seabed warfare and reconnaissance missions. With its distinctive bulbous nose housing advanced sonar arrays and apparent provisions for towed sensors, the HSU-001 appears designed for the precise missions outlined in the Military Art article.

Beyond the HSU-001, China has developed an extensive family of underwater vehicles, including the Qianlong series deep-sea exploration platforms, the Haishen-6000 research submersible, and the Sea Wing oceanographic drones. While officially designated for scientific research, these platforms possess dual-use capabilities that could be readily adapted for military applications.

China's underwater surveillance ambitions extend far beyond individual platforms. The "Underwater Great Wall" project, announced by China State Shipbuilding Corporation in 2015, envisions a comprehensive network of sensors throughout the South China Sea capable of real-time detection and tracking of underwater targets. This system represents China's attempt to create its own version of SOSUS tailored to the unique geography and strategic requirements of the Western Pacific.

Strategic Implications and American Responses

The revelation of Chinese anti-surveillance planning carries profound implications for U.S. naval strategy and force structure. Bryan Clark, a former submarine officer now at the Hudson Institute, acknowledges the credibility of the Chinese assessment while noting the practical challenges of implementing such a campaign.

"The PLA could easily attack deployed SURTASS ships at the onset of a conflict and maybe attack small vehicles or fixed arrays that support IUSS," Clark observes. However, he emphasizes that "finding small items in the water column or near the seabed is difficult" and such operations "would take forces away from other missions and could require a substantial amount of time."

Clark suggests that China might be better served by an alternative approach: "The PLA may be better off overwhelming IUSS by simply mounting a large submarine deployment before a conflict. U.S. forces would not be able to attack PLA subs, and there wouldn't be enough U.S. subs and DDGs to trail all the deploying PLA subs."

The U.S. Navy is already adapting to these challenges through several initiatives. The TAGOS-25 program represents a significant modernization of the SURTASS fleet, with the first ship expected in 2025 and additional vessels planned through 2028. The service is also developing expeditionary surveillance capabilities, including containerized SURTASS systems that can be deployed on various platform types.

The Broader Context of Undersea Competition

The Chinese focus on anti-surveillance operations reflects broader trends in undersea warfare that extend beyond traditional submarine-versus-submarine engagements. Modern undersea competition increasingly centers on the security of critical infrastructure, including the submarine cables that carry 95% of international internet traffic and trillions of dollars in financial transactions daily.

China's development of cable-laying capabilities through platforms like the Haiwei GD11000, capable of operating at depths exceeding 11,000 meters, provides potential access to the deepest cable installations. Combined with the country's expanding role in global cable infrastructure through the Digital Silk Road initiative, these capabilities create new vulnerabilities for American and allied communications networks.

The growing importance of underwater infrastructure security has prompted increased attention to seabed warfare concepts. China's research into autonomous mine-laying capabilities, demonstrated through platforms like the HSU-001, suggests preparation for conflicts that could target not only naval forces but also the undersea cables, pipelines, and sensors that support modern economic and military operations.

Future Trajectories and Recommendations

The Chinese anti-surveillance strategy outlined in Military Art represents more than academic speculation—it reflects serious consideration of options that could fundamentally alter the underwater balance of power in the Western Pacific. The unprecedented candor of the assessment, combined with China's demonstrated technological progress in relevant fields, suggests these concepts may already be influencing force development and operational planning.

For the United States and its allies, the revelation demands a comprehensive reassessment of surveillance network vulnerabilities and the development of more resilient architectures. This includes not only hardening existing systems but also developing redundant capabilities that can maintain coverage even under attack.

The challenge extends beyond technical solutions to encompass broader questions of deterrence and escalation management. If Chinese forces can effectively blind U.S. surveillance networks, the resulting operational uncertainty could create dangerous windows of opportunity for aggressive action while simultaneously complicating American decision-making during crises.

The emerging competition in the undersea domain reflects the broader transformation of naval warfare in the 21st century, where dominance depends as much on information superiority as on traditional measures of combat power. As China's submarine force expands and its anti-surveillance capabilities mature, the Navy must prepare for an era where underwater transparency can no longer be assumed—and where the protection of surveillance assets becomes as critical as the intelligence they provide.

The stakes of this competition could hardly be higher. As one Chinese analyst noted, future underwater conflicts may not be limited to naval encounters but could involve attacks on the critical undersea infrastructure that underpins global connectivity, commerce, and security. In this context, the preservation of undersea surveillance capabilities represents not just a military imperative but a requirement for maintaining the interconnected systems that define modern civilization.

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21. Analysis: China’s Strategy to Undermine the US Undersea Surveillance Network