Congressional report examines hypersonic weapons development and strategic implications

The Hypersonic Arms Race: How Ultra-Fast Missiles Are Reshaping Global Security

Latest Congressional analysis reveals America's strategic challenges in deploying weapons that travel five times the speed of sound

BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: The United States lags significantly behind China and Russia in hypersonic weapons deployment, with adversaries already fielding operational systems while America continues prototype testing. Despite a $3.9 billion FY2026 budget request, the Pentagon has established no programs of record and won't field operational hypersonic weapons before 2027. China and Russia possess nuclear-capable systems that can evade U.S. defenses, while American weapons focus on conventional payloads requiring greater accuracy and technical complexity. The strategic implications include compressed decision timelines, detection challenges, and potential arms race escalation in an unregulated weapons category.

The United States finds itself at a critical juncture in military technology development as it races to field hypersonic weapons capable of traveling at speeds exceeding Mach 5—approximately 3,800 miles per hour. The latest Congressional Research Service report, updated August 12, 2025, offers a sobering assessment of America's position in what has become a three-way arms race with China and Russia, two nations that have already deployed operational hypersonic systems while the U.S. continues testing prototypes.

Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow predictable arcs through space, hypersonic weapons maneuver within Earth's atmosphere, combining extreme speed with unpredictable flight paths that make them exceptionally difficult to detect and intercept. This combination of characteristics has fundamentally altered the strategic landscape, forcing military planners worldwide to reconsider both offensive capabilities and defensive strategies.

The Physics of Hypersonic Flight

The engineering challenges of hypersonic flight stem from the extreme conditions these weapons must endure. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air molecules compress and heat to thousands of degrees, creating a plasma sheath around the vehicle that disrupts communications and navigation systems. The intense thermal stress requires advanced materials and thermal protection systems that can withstand temperatures hot enough to melt steel.

Hypersonic weapons fall into two primary categories. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) are launched atop rockets and then glide toward their targets at hypersonic speeds, deriving lift from their aerodynamic design. Hypersonic cruise missiles, powered by advanced scramjet engines, maintain hypersonic speeds through powered flight. Both types represent significant technological achievements, with scramjet engines particularly challenging to develop as they must operate efficiently while ingesting air at supersonic speeds.

The detection challenge is particularly acute. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin noted that "hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S. normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit," making current space-based sensor architectures insufficient for tracking these weapons.

America's Evolving Hypersonic Portfolio

The Pentagon's fiscal year 2026 budget request reveals significant shifts in America's hypersonic strategy, with overall funding for hypersonic research dropping to $3.9 billion from $6.9 billion in the previous year. However, this reduction reflects a strategic pivot toward more focused development rather than diminished commitment to the technology.

Navy Programs: Maritime Hypersonic Capabilities

The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program remains the cornerstone of America's hypersonic effort, utilizing a Common Hypersonic Glide Body developed collaboratively across services. The program has experienced significant challenges, with early tests in June 2022 resulting in failure, followed by cancelled tests in March and September 2023 due to preflight check failures.

However, the program achieved critical milestones with successful "end-to-end" tests in June and December 2024, and again in April 2025. The Navy's FY2026 budget requests $798.3 million for CPS research and development, reflecting continued commitment despite earlier setbacks. The service plans to continue CPS integration on Zumwalt-class destroyers through 2026 and begin integration on Virginia-class submarines in FY2025, though deployment has been pushed to 2027.

Army Systems: Ground-Based Long-Range Fires

The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), nicknamed "Dark Eagle," represents the service's entry into strategic-range precision fires. With a reported range exceeding 1,725 miles, the system is designed to "provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long-Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets."

The Army is requesting $513 million for LRHW research and development in FY2026, alongside $353.4 million for procurement of ground support equipment and three All Up Rounds with canisters. Notably, the service has already fielded prototype LRHW equipment and "intends to field two additional batteries of LRHW" by FY2027, representing a significant acceleration in deployment timeline.

Air Force Innovation: Multiple Parallel Programs

The Air Force has pursued the most complex hypersonic strategy, operating multiple concurrent programs with varying degrees of success. The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) program experienced a tumultuous development cycle, with three successive test failures before completing three successful flight tests in 2022. Following mixed results in 2023, including at least one confirmed failure, the Air Force initially characterized the program as "completed" and requested no research funds for FY2025.

However, in a significant strategic reversal, the Air Force has revived ARRW for fiscal 2026 with $387.1 million in procurement funding, suggesting renewed confidence in the technology despite previous setbacks. This decision reflects the service's recognition that ARRW provides unique capabilities, with officials noting that a B-52 could potentially carry four ARRWs compared to traditional missile loadouts.

Simultaneously, the Air Force is advancing the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program, which received a substantial funding increase to $802.8 million in FY2026, up from $466.7 million in FY2025. HACM represents a different technological approach, integrating Air Force and DARPA scramjet technologies to create an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile capable of longer-range missions.

The Global Competitive Landscape

Recent intelligence assessments paint a concerning picture of America's relative position in hypersonic development. The Congressional Research Service report emphasizes that "both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide vehicles and fielded an operational capability," while noting that "the United States is unlikely to field an operational system before FY2027."

Russia's Operational Arsenal

Russia's hypersonic capabilities span multiple platforms and have moved beyond testing to combat deployment. The Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, launched from intercontinental ballistic missiles and capable of reaching speeds of Mach 20, entered combat duty in December 2019. With "effectively unlimited range," Avangard features onboard countermeasures and reportedly carries nuclear warheads, providing Russia with a means to penetrate U.S. missile defense systems.

The 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile represents an even more immediate threat, having been successfully used in combat against Ukraine in February 2024—marking the first confirmed use of a "true" hypersonic weapon in warfare. Capable of traveling at speeds between Mach 6 and Mach 8, Zircon can be fired from various naval platforms and has a maximum range of approximately 625 miles.

Russia has also fielded the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, though some analysts question whether it truly qualifies as a hypersonic weapon given its ballistic trajectory. Nevertheless, Russian media reports claim Kinzhal can reach Mach 10 speeds with a range of up to 1,200 miles when launched from MiG-31 aircraft.

China's Advanced Capabilities

China's hypersonic program may represent the most sophisticated challenge to U.S. technological superiority. The DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile, specifically designed to carry hypersonic glide vehicles, is reportedly operational with a range of 1,000 to 1,500 miles. More concerning is the DF-27, which the Pentagon notes "likely has a [hypersonic glide vehicle] payload option as well as conventional land-attack, conventional anti-ship, and nuclear capabilities."

Perhaps most strategically significant is China's test of a fractional orbital bombardment system in August 2021, which demonstrated the ability to launch a hypersonic glide vehicle into low Earth orbit before striking a target. This capability provides China with a space-based global strike option that can approach from any direction, effectively negating traditional early warning systems designed to detect polar-trajectory attacks.

China's testing infrastructure surpasses that of the United States, with former USD(R&E) Michael Griffin stating that "China has conducted 20 times as many hypersonic tests as the United States." The country operates extensive wind tunnel facilities, including the recently completed JF-22 wind tunnel capable of reaching speeds of Mach 30.

The Detection and Defense Challenge

The defensive implications of hypersonic weapons extend far beyond their speed. Traditional terrestrial-based radar systems cannot detect hypersonic weapons until late in their flight path due to line-of-sight limitations and the weapons' low altitude flight profiles. This delayed detection "compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only a single intercept attempt."

Space-Based Tracking Solutions

To address this vulnerability, the Pentagon is developing a multi-layered space-based detection architecture. The Space Development Agency's Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture includes dedicated tracking satellites designed to detect and follow hypersonic weapons throughout their flight. The Missile Defense Agency's Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program aims to provide more precise targeting data to defensive systems, with $57.2 million requested for FY2026.

The January 27, 2025, executive order "The Iron Dome for America" specifically directs the Secretary of Defense to develop plans to accelerate HBTSS deployment, reflecting the high priority placed on hypersonic defense capabilities.

Advanced Radar Technologies

Ground-based radar improvements are also progressing rapidly. Raytheon recently delivered the first AN/TPY-2 radar system equipped with gallium nitride technology, capable of detecting hypersonic weapons at twice the range of previous systems. This enhanced capability allows defensive systems to engage threats before they begin complex evasive maneuvers, addressing one of the key challenges in hypersonic defense.

The new gallium nitride arrays provide "twice the sensitivity, twice the range" compared to previous technology, enabling operators to "see those targets coming in, to be able to discriminate" between actual warheads and decoys or debris.

Testing Infrastructure: A Critical Bottleneck

A significant constraint on American hypersonic development remains testing infrastructure. According to a Pentagon-mandated study, the United States operated 48 critical hypersonic test facilities in 2014, but many lack the capability to replicate full-scale, time-dependent conditions above Mach 8. The Institute for Defense Analyses noted that "no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate these characteristics above Mach 8."

Recent investments have begun to address these limitations. The University of Notre Dame has opened Mach 6 and Mach 10 quiet wind tunnels, while Purdue University operates a new Mach 8 facility. Texas A&M University is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel in partnership with Army Futures Command, representing a significant expansion of testing capabilities.

The Pentagon has also developed the Multi-Service Advanced Capability Hypersonics Test Bed (MACH-TB) to "increase domestic capacity for hypersonic flight testing and leverage multiple commercially-available launch vehicles for ride-along hypersonic payloads." Successful tests of MACH-TB components occurred in December 2024 and March 2025, with full system recovery demonstrated.

International cooperation is expanding testing options through the Hypersonic Flight Test and Experimentation (HyFliTE) Project Arrangement with Australia and the United Kingdom. This agreement "includes up to six trilateral flight test campaigns to occur by 2028 with a total funding pool of $252 million."

Strategic Implications and Arms Control Concerns

The proliferation of hypersonic weapons raises profound questions about strategic stability and arms control. Unlike ballistic missiles, which follow predictable trajectories and are subject to various treaty limitations, hypersonic weapons operate in a regulatory gray area. The New START Treaty does not currently cover weapons that fly on a ballistic trajectory for less than 50% of their flight, effectively excluding hypersonic glide vehicles and cruise missiles from arms control regimes.

The conventional focus of U.S. hypersonic programs presents both opportunities and challenges. While avoiding the escalatory risks associated with nuclear-armed systems, conventional hypersonic weapons must achieve significantly greater accuracy to be effective. As one expert noted, "a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 times less accurate [than a conventionally armed glider]" due to nuclear blast effects.

Analysts worry about "warhead ambiguity"—the inability to distinguish between conventionally armed and nuclear-armed hypersonic weapons during flight. This uncertainty could lead to unintended escalation, particularly in countries that co-locate nuclear and conventional capabilities. The compressed decision timeline exacerbates these risks, potentially forcing leaders to make critical decisions with incomplete information.

Industrial Base Challenges

The Pentagon's establishment of a "hypersonic war room" in 2020 reflected growing concerns about the defense industrial base's capacity to produce these weapons at scale. A July 2022 DOD industry solicitation noted that "the expansion of industrial base capacity is required" to meet production goals of 48 to 72 hypersonic missiles annually.

Current funding patterns suggest confidence in technological maturity, with increased emphasis on procurement over research. The Army's FY2026 budget shows a shift toward missile acquisition funding, while the Air Force's revival of ARRW procurement indicates readiness for initial production runs.

However, questions remain about long-term industrial capacity. Former Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall cautioned that hypersonic weapons "are not going to be cheap anytime soon," suggesting initial deployments may be limited in scope. Congressional Budget Office analysis indicates that "hypersonic missiles could cost one-third more to procure and field than ballistic missiles of the same range with maneuverable warheads."

The Path Forward

As the United States prepares to deploy its first operational hypersonic weapons by 2027, fundamental questions remain about their role in military strategy and their implications for global security. The Pentagon has yet to establish formal programs of record for any hypersonic weapon, suggesting continued uncertainty about mission requirements and long-term funding commitments.

The Congressional Research Service report emphasizes that despite significant investment, "DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets." This prototyping approach reflects the experimental nature of current programs and the need for continued technological development.

Congressional oversight will be crucial in ensuring these weapons serve clear strategic purposes while maintaining fiscal responsibility. Key questions include determining cost-effective mission sets, balancing offensive and defensive capabilities, and managing the strategic stability implications of deploying these transformative weapons.

The report urges lawmakers to consider several critical issues: the rationale for deploying hypersonic weapons, their costs relative to alternatives, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. These questions become more pressing as adversaries continue to advance their own capabilities and the window for American technological advantage continues to narrow.

The hypersonic arms race represents more than a competition in military technology—it embodies fundamental questions about the future of warfare, the stability of international security arrangements, and the role of emerging technologies in shaping global power dynamics. As these weapons transition from laboratory curiosities to operational realities, their impact on international relations will likely prove as significant as their technical achievements.

The coming years will test not only America's ability to field effective hypersonic weapons but also the international community's capacity to manage the strategic implications of this transformative technology. The Congressional assessment makes clear that success will require not just technical innovation but also strategic wisdom in deploying these capabilities responsibly while maintaining competitive advantage in an increasingly contested global environment.

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