From World War II to Modern Network-Centric Warfare

Time on Target Artillery Coordination

Bottom Line Up Front (BLUF)

Time on Target (TOT) artillery coordination has evolved from a manually synchronized bombardment technique developed during World War II into a sophisticated, computer-controlled capability enabled by digital fire control systems, precision-guided munitions, and tactical data links. This evolution has fundamentally transformed artillery operations, extending effective ranges from approximately 24 kilometers to over 70 kilometers while reducing response times from hours to minutes. However, recent combat operations in Ukraine have exposed vulnerabilities in GPS-dependent systems, forcing a reassessment of doctrine and technology resilience in contested electromagnetic environments.

Modern artillery coordination has achieved unprecedented precision and speed through digitization, but the Ukraine conflict exposes critical vulnerabilities requiring fundamental changes to ensure effectiveness in peer warfare. GPS-guided munitions that revolutionized artillery accuracy have proven vulnerable to electronic warfare, with Excalibur success rates collapsing to 6% under Russian jamming. The U.S. Army's Extended Range Cannon Artillery program was canceled in 2024 due to unsolvable barrel wear issues, leaving American artillery outranged by Russian and Chinese systems. Success requires: 

(1) advanced IMU technology enabling navigation without GPS, 
(2) resilient fire control systems operating in contested networks, 
(3) integration of multiple guidance modes and precision strike assets, and 
(4) restored capability to conduct mass fires using conventional munitions when precision systems fail. 

Russia and China have developed automated fire control achieving 30-second response times while integrating loitering munitions directly into artillery networks—capabilities the U.S. must match while maintaining advantages in network architecture and joint integration.

Historical Origins: World War II Innovation

Development and Doctrine

Time on Target emerged as a tactical innovation addressing a critical vulnerability discovered through combat experience: artillery bombardments inflict the majority of casualties within the first few seconds before enemy forces can seek cover. Research conducted by the U.S. Army in the 1970s through "Troop Reaction and Posture Sequencing" tests confirmed that within two seconds of initial impact, only 29 percent of soldiers remained standing, with all achieving protective cover within eight seconds. This finding validated the doctrine that simultaneous impact from multiple firing units would maximize lethality by preventing defensive reactions.

The technique was initially developed by the British Army during the North African campaign in late 1941 and early 1942, particularly for counter-battery fire operations. British officers synchronized their watches using BBC time signals, avoiding military radio networks that could compromise surprise and eliminate the need for additional field telephone infrastructure in desert operations. American forces adopted and refined the technique, developing sophisticated fire direction procedures at Fort Sill, Oklahoma during the 1930s under the leadership of Director of Gunnery Carlos Brewer.

World War II Implementation

During World War II, TOT demonstrated devastating effectiveness in European operations. A notable example occurred in November 1944 when 17 Corps battalions and 20 Divisional battalions coordinated fire from almost 600 artillery pieces supporting the 26th, 35th, and 80th Infantry Divisions. During the Battle of the Bulge, American artillery units fired over 10,000 rounds in eight hours at Dom Butgegnbach, enabling the 2nd Infantry Division to hold the northern shoulder of the German offensive.

The effectiveness of American artillery, particularly TOT missions, impressed both Allied and Axis observers. General George Patton stated that "we won the war, and it was largely won by the artillery." Even German military assessments, while critical of American infantry tactics, consistently praised American artillery capabilities. German prisoners attested to the catastrophic psychological and physical effects of TOT firing, which delivered overwhelming firepower with no warning before impact.

The Fire Direction Center Revolution

Doctrinal Foundation

The Fire Direction Center (FDC) concept, developed at Fort Sill during the 1930s, represented a fundamental shift from terrain-feature-based massing of fires to precision coordinate-based fire control. This innovation created a standardized process where forward observers identified targets, communicated coordinates to the FDC, which then calculated firing data for gun crews. The FDC processed information from multiple observers and coordinated fires from multiple batteries, enabling truly synchronized TOT missions.

The hierarchical FDC structure extended from battery level through battalion, brigade, and division echelons. Higher-level FDCs monitor subordinate unit fire missions and coordinate multiple batteries or battalions in what became known as "brigade/regimental time on target" missions. The operational principle of "silence is consent" allowed missions to proceed unless higher commands issued "cancel the mission" or "check firing" orders, enabling rapid coordination while maintaining command oversight.

Manual Era Limitations

Despite its revolutionary nature, manual FDC operations remained labor-intensive and time-consuming. Calculations for elevation, deflection, propellant charges, and time-of-flight required trained personnel using firing tables, plotting boards, and manual computation. Coordinating TOT missions across multiple battalions demanded precise timing calculations accounting for different projectile trajectories, barrel wear, meteorological conditions, and ammunition lot variations.

Computer-Controlled Artillery: The Digital Revolution

AFATDS Development and Capabilities

The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) emerged in the 1990s as a network of computer workstations processing and exchanging information from forward observers to fire support elements for all fire support assets including field artillery, mortars, close air support, naval gunfire, and attack helicopters. The system achieved Initial Operating Test and Evaluation in 1995 and entered full production with subsequent versions (AFATDS 96, 97, 98, and 99) incorporating expanded capabilities.

AFATDS provides automatic processing of fire requests, generation of multiple tactical fire solutions, monitoring of mission execution, and support for fire planning creation and distribution. The system integrates with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and was adopted by both Army and Marine Corps forces. The automated fire control eliminated manual calculation errors, reduced response times from minutes to seconds, and enabled coordination of fires across unprecedented numbers of batteries simultaneously.

Current Modernization: AFATDS AXS

The Army initiated a comprehensive modernization effort recognizing that AFATDS, built on 1995-era code architecture, requires fundamental restructuring for future joint all-domain operations. The legacy system's monolithic "spaghetti code" architecture makes updates cumbersome, sometimes requiring an entire year to integrate new munitions. Colonel Matt Paul, Project Manager for Mission Command, noted that AFATDS "was not built for how we have to share data in the future."

The AFATDS Artillery Execution Suite (AXS) represents a shift to modular, microservice-based architecture with three distinct applications: fires support, technical fire direction, and mission command. This approach enables rapid updates, reduces hardware footprint, and supports cloud-based deployment. Usability testing conducted in July 2024 with 10th Mountain Division Artillery at Fort Drum demonstrated that the new system operates "10 times faster" than legacy AFATDS while providing more intuitive interfaces. The Army requested $55 million for fiscal year 2025 to continue development.

Precision-Guided Munitions: Accuracy Revolution

M982 Excalibur Development

The M982 Excalibur precision-guided 155mm artillery shell, developed jointly by Raytheon and BAE Systems Bofors, represents a quantum leap in artillery accuracy. First fielded in Iraq in 2007, Excalibur employs GPS guidance with inertial navigation backup to achieve a Circular Error Probable (CEP) of less than two meters regardless of range. The munition features canard control surfaces and base bleed technology extending ranges to approximately 40 kilometers from L/39 barrels and 50 kilometers from L/52 systems.

Excalibur's precision enables artillery to engage targets in urban environments with minimal collateral damage and allows fire missions within 50 meters of friendly forces. The GPS-guided system requires no laser designation or forward observer terminal guidance, operating as a true "fire-and-forget" munition. Captain Victor Scharstein, who employed Excalibur during Operation Arrowhead Ripper in Baquba, stated: "This precision accuracy has brought artillery back into the close urban fight."

Excalibur-S and Alternative Guidance

The Excalibur-S variant incorporates semi-active laser terminal guidance, enabling engagement of moving land and maritime targets with sub-two-meter accuracy. This development addresses GPS jamming vulnerabilities by providing alternative terminal guidance. Spain announced procurement of Excalibur-S in December 2023, with testing on SIAC 155/52 towed howitzers and M109A5 self-propelled systems.

The M1156 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK), manufactured by Northrop Grumman, provides a lower-cost alternative by converting conventional 155mm projectiles into near-precision munitions. The PGK screws into standard artillery shells as a GPS-guided fuze, achieving accuracy within 10-50 meters at significantly lower cost than purpose-built guided projectiles. The Army awarded a $26.9 million contract in 2025 for continued PGK production, with completion expected in May 2028.

Ukraine Conflict: The GPS Jamming Challenge

The effectiveness of GPS-guided munitions has been significantly degraded by Russian electronic warfare capabilities in Ukraine. By mid-2023, Ukrainian assessments indicated Excalibur's success rate had fallen to approximately 6 percent due to sophisticated GPS jamming systems including Krasukha-4 and Zhitel. This dramatic decline prompted reduced usage and eventual U.S. delivery suspension.

The Washington Post reported in May 2024 that Ukrainian military sources confirmed Russian jamming had eroded battlefield utility of both Excalibur and HIMARS precision rockets. Russian systems emit powerful radio waves jamming satellite navigation signals, causing GPS-guided munitions to lose coordinate locks and miss targets by dozens of meters. This vulnerability has sparked Pentagon debates about GPS-dependent weapon futures, with engineers exploring laser guidance, autonomous AI-based targeting, and anti-jam technologies including Home-on-Jam capabilities for JDAM-ER weapons scheduled for October 2025 delivery to Ukraine.

Data Links and Network Integration

Link 16/JTIDS Architecture

The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), implementing Link 16 protocols, provides jam-resistant, high-speed digital data exchange operating in the 960-1,215 MHz frequency band. Link 16 employs Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) with frequency-hopping spread spectrum waveforms supporting data rates of 31.6, 57.6, or 115.2 kilobits per second. The system enables military aircraft, ships, and ground forces to exchange tactical pictures in near-real time with three-second synchronization standards.

Link 16 uses J-series binary data messages grouped into Network Participation Groups (NPGs) supporting functions including Precise Participant Location and Identification (NPGs 5 and 6), and Electronic Warfare Coordination (NPG 10). The U.S. Army currently uses NPGs 15, 16, and 25 for ground force operations. The system provides common situational awareness across joint forces, though full Army integration remains incomplete compared to Air Force and Navy implementations.

Fire Support Integration Challenges

Despite Link 16's sophisticated capabilities, artillery integration faces persistent challenges. AFATDS data outputs in proprietary formats limiting collaborative data sharing across joint networks. Mark Kitz, Program Executive Office for Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, stated: "Today, that data comes out of AFATDS in a very proprietary way. We can't collaborate that way."

The modernization strategy emphasizes open architecture standards enabling AFATDS data to flow seamlessly through Command Post Computing Environment (CP CE) and integrate with Link 16 networks. Cloud-based AFATDS deployment, demonstrated by I Corps, allows access through web browsers and Android Team Awareness Kit devices, reducing hardware requirements while expanding access. This transformation addresses the fundamental requirement that future fires systems must support multi-domain operations with rapid sensor-to-shooter integration.

Extended Range Systems: The ERCA Challenge

M1299 Development and Cancellation

The Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) program aimed to extend M109 Paladin effective range by mounting a 58-caliber, 9.1-meter gun tube (XM907) on the M109A7 chassis. Combined with XM1113 rocket-assisted projectiles, the system successfully hit targets at 70 kilometers during December 2020 testing at Yuma Proving Ground—more than twice the standard M109A7 range of 38 kilometers.

Despite promising test results, the Army canceled ERCA in March 2024 after concluding the prototyping phase. Assistant Secretary Doug Bush announced: "We concluded the prototyping activity last fall. Unfortunately, [it was] not successful enough to go straight into production." The primary technical challenge involved excessive barrel wear from the extended tube length and high-pressure propellant charges. The 58-caliber barrel's increased length resulted in accelerated erosion, reducing barrel life below operational requirements despite achieving range objectives.

Alternative Approaches and Future Directions

Following ERCA cancellation, the Army initiated an "exhaustive" tactical fires study revalidating extended-range requirements while exploring existing domestic and international solutions. The service requested $55 million in fiscal year 2025 to evaluate mature systems from industry. This shift represents pragmatic acknowledgment that developmental systems face longer timelines than operational needs permit.

The Army continues developing munitions technologies including the XM1113 rocket-assisted projectile and XM659 stub charge, which extend ranges of existing systems while maintaining compatibility across the artillery fleet. European systems including Germany's PzH 2000, Sweden's Archer, and France's Caesar provide 52-caliber options achieving 40+ kilometer ranges with conventional ammunition, offering potential models or acquisition targets for U.S. requirements.

Counter-Battery Operations

Radar Systems

Modern counter-battery operations rely on sophisticated target acquisition radars detecting enemy firing positions through projectile trajectory tracking. The AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder and AN/TPQ-53 (EQ-36) systems, manufactured by Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, provide automated target location and transmit firing data directly to AFATDS for immediate counter-fire missions.

The AN/TPQ-36 provides short-range detection optimized for mortars and artillery up to approximately 18 kilometers, while the AN/TPQ-53 extends detection ranges to 60+ kilometers for rocket and artillery systems. These radars integrate with fire control networks enabling "sensor-to-shooter" times measured in seconds rather than minutes. The U.S. delivered multiple AN/TPQ-36 systems to Ukraine beginning in 2015, though Russian electronic warfare and precision fires have successfully targeted numerous counter-battery radars throughout the conflict.

Electronic Warfare Environment

The Ukraine conflict demonstrates unprecedented electronic warfare intensity affecting all artillery operations. Russian systems including Leer-3 employ unmanned aerial vehicles to jam cellular networks used by Ukrainian forces, track movements, and designate artillery targets. The Krasukha-4 jams radar systems and communication links at ranges exceeding 300 kilometers, while smaller tactical jammers disrupt GPS, drone control, and tactical radio communications across the battlefield.

Ukrainian forces have responded with indigenous electronic warfare development through private companies supported by the Brave1 platform. Systems including Bukovel, Pokrova, and Piranha provide drone intercept, GPS spoofing, and communications jamming capabilities. Ukrainian electronic warfare units neutralized approximately 8,000 Russian drones during one week in July 2024, demonstrating the effectiveness of adaptive defensive measures. However, the electronic warfare environment remains highly contested, with both sides continuously developing countermeasures.

Advanced Inertial Measurement Units: Resilience Against GPS Denial

MEMS Technology Evolution

The vulnerability of GPS-guided munitions to electronic warfare has accelerated development of advanced Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) as critical backup navigation systems. Modern tactical-grade MEMS (Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems) IMUs incorporate three-axis gyroscopes and accelerometers providing position, navigation, and timing data independent of external satellite signals. Unlike GPS receivers, IMUs measure angular velocity and linear acceleration directly, enabling dead reckoning navigation when satellite signals are jammed or spoofed.

Collins Aerospace and other defense contractors are developing next-generation IMUs specifically designed for the extreme conditions encountered by artillery projectiles. These "gun-hard" IMUs must survive firing accelerations exceeding 15,000 G-forces while maintaining tactical-grade accuracy throughout flight. The miniaturization of IMU technology has enabled integration into 155mm artillery shells that previously could only accommodate GPS receivers, transforming conventional munitions into guided weapons even in GPS-denied environments.

Hybrid Navigation Architecture

Contemporary precision munitions increasingly employ hybrid navigation combining GPS, IMU, and alternative guidance modes. The M982 Excalibur integrates GPS with inertial navigation as backup, though current IMU accuracy degrades significantly over the projectile's flight time without GPS updates. Advanced systems under development fuse IMU data with terrain contour matching, celestial navigation, or magnetic field referencing to maintain accuracy throughout extended trajectories.

The most promising development involves coupling high-performance Ring Laser Gyroscope (RLG) or Fiber Optic Gyroscope (FOG) IMUs with GPS receivers featuring anti-jam technology. When GPS signals are contested but not completely denied, these systems can filter jamming interference while using IMU data to validate satellite inputs, rejecting spoofed signals that would mislead purely GPS-dependent systems. This redundancy architecture ensures munitions can complete missions even when adversaries achieve partial success in electronic warfare.

Operational Impact

The improved accuracy and jamming resistance of modern IMUs directly address the vulnerability exposed in Ukraine where Excalibur success rates collapsed under Russian electronic warfare. Artillery shells equipped with tactical-grade IMUs can maintain Circular Error Probable under 50 meters throughout trajectories exceeding 40 kilometers, even without GPS updates. While this represents reduced precision compared to GPS-guided flight (2-meter CEP), it provides sufficient accuracy for most tactical targets while denying adversaries the ability to completely neutralize precision fires through jamming.

The integration of advanced IMUs also enables new artillery concepts including autonomous terminal guidance where projectiles use IMU-derived position estimates combined with seeker sensors to identify and engage moving targets. Ukrainian forces have pioneered AI-guided drones that use IMU navigation with terminal visual targeting, maintaining effectiveness despite widespread jamming. These same principles apply to next-generation artillery munitions that will employ IMU navigation to GPS-denied terminal areas, then activate millimeter-wave radar or imaging infrared seekers for final targeting, creating truly all-weather, jam-resistant precision fires.

International Artillery Coordination: Russia and China

Russian Reconnaissance-Fire System

The Russian Armed Forces have implemented comprehensive modernization of artillery coordination through the Reconnaissance-Fire System (Razvedyvatel'no-Ognevoy Sistema—ROS), representing a technological transformation from Soviet-era manual fire control. The ROS integrates reconnaissance assets including UAVs, counter-battery radars, and forward observer stations with automated fire direction through digital networks coordinated by Information Control Subsystems (ISBU). This architecture enables near-real-time targeting where intelligence feeds directly into fire control computers that calculate firing solutions and transmit commands to batteries.

Russian automated artillery fire control systems including the 1V181, 1V198, and Planshet-A provide comprehensive digital coordination for battalion-level operations. The Planshet-A system completes the command cycle for an artillery battery in 30 seconds and coordinates fire for an entire battalion within an additional 20 seconds. These systems automatically process reconnaissance data from multiple sources, calculate firing data accounting for meteorological conditions, and distribute mission orders to individual guns through secure radio links operating up to 7 kilometers. According to Rostec announcements, modern fire control systems increase accuracy by 25-30 percent while reducing fire preparation time by one-half to two-thirds compared to manual methods.

The Malakhit automated fire control station exemplifies Russian forward observer technology, integrating day/thermal imaging, laser rangefinder/designator, GPS positioning, and firing data computers in tripod-mounted units. Upon target detection, Malakhit derives target coordinates and calculates firing data deliverable to batteries within 15 seconds. Integration with Orlan-30 UAVs enables laser designation for Krasnopol precision-guided 152mm projectiles, providing combined reconnaissance-strike capability at ranges exceeding 20 kilometers.

Russian Counter-Battery Operations

Russian counter-battery doctrine relies on multi-layered detection and strike systems integrated through battalion-level fire control networks. The Zoopark-1 (1L219M) counter-battery radar detects firing positions of artillery, rockets, and mortars, transmitting target coordinates directly to Planshet-A fire control systems. Upon detection, Russian forces employ rapid response protocols utilizing either massed artillery fires or precision strikes with Krasnopol guided projectiles or Lancet loitering munitions.

Operational analysis from Ukraine indicates Russian forces have shifted from massed detection systems to more distributed reconnaissance using smaller UAVs combined with precision strike assets. The Lancet loitering munition has become central to Russian counter-battery operations, with over 2,722 documented uses by January 2025. Lancet's ability to loiter over Ukrainian lines and intercept howitzers during displacement movements makes it highly effective against shoot-and-scoot tactics. When counter-battery radars detect Ukrainian firing positions, coordinates enter the fire control network enabling Lancet launch within minutes while artillery prepares conventional fires as backup.

Chinese Artillery Integration and Automation

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has modernized artillery through comprehensive digitization emphasizing network-centric operations and automated fire control. The PCL-181 truck-mounted 155mm howitzer exemplifies Chinese integration philosophy, featuring automatic fire control systems that calculate trajectories and automatically lay guns based on operator input of target coordinates. The semi-automatic ammunition handling system and 52-caliber barrel provide 40-kilometer range with conventional ammunition and 72 kilometers with extended-range projectiles. Chinese systems also fire laser-guided munitions enabling all-weather precision strikes.

The PLZ-05 self-propelled howitzer incorporates fully automatic loading systems providing 8 rounds per minute sustained fire rate and burst capability of 4 rounds per 15 seconds. Chinese forces have demonstrated emphasis on rapid displacement following engagements, with PLZ-05's mobility and automated systems enabling shoot-and-scoot operations reducing vulnerability to counter-battery fires. Recent upgrades observed during 2024 exercises include anti-drone protection systems including mesh screens and electronic jamming, reflecting Ukrainian conflict lessons about artillery vulnerability to small UAV attacks.

Chinese artillery doctrine emphasizes integration within the broader Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) network enabling coordinated fires across multiple domains. The Information Support Force (ISF), established in 2024, coordinates military network management and electromagnetic spectrum operations supporting artillery targeting and communications. Chinese systems increasingly incorporate autonomous capabilities with unmanned ground vehicles deployed alongside conventional artillery to provide reconnaissance, ammunition resupply, and potentially autonomous firing capabilities in high-threat environments.

Comparative Analysis: Fire Control Philosophy

Russian and Chinese artillery automation follows distinct yet parallel development paths reflecting different operational priorities. Russian systems emphasize robust operation in contested electromagnetic environments with redundant communication modes and demonstrated effectiveness under actual combat conditions in Ukraine. The integration of loitering munitions with conventional artillery creates layered strike capability where precision and massed fires complement each other. However, Russian systems face challenges from persistent Ukrainian electronic warfare and precision strikes that have destroyed numerous high-value assets including counter-battery radars and fire control vehicles.

Chinese systems reflect peacetime development emphasizing technological sophistication and network integration rather than combat-proven resilience. The PLAGF's emphasis on informatization and intelligentization creates highly capable systems on paper, though operational effectiveness remains largely unproven in peer conflict. China's 2025 military parade showcased integration of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and advanced networking across artillery platforms, suggesting future Chinese artillery may achieve higher levels of automation than either Russian or Western systems. However, questions persist about performance degradation under electronic warfare conditions comparable to those in Ukraine.

Both nations have achieved capabilities enabling Time on Target missions comparable to Western systems, with automated fire control coordinating multiple batteries to achieve simultaneous impact. Russian forces regularly conduct battalion-level TOT missions in Ukraine, while Chinese systems theoretically enable brigade-level coordination through networked fire control. The key distinction from Western systems involves greater integration of precision strike assets (loitering munitions, tactical ballistic missiles) directly into artillery fire control networks, creating more comprehensive fires architecture than traditional artillery-centric Western approaches.

Contemporary Operations and Future Trends

Lessons from Ukraine

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides critical insights into artillery operations in peer-conflict scenarios. Ukrainian forces achieved 90 percent hit rates within five minutes of target identification when artillery coordinates with drone reconnaissance—compared to 60 percent without drone support. However, ammunition expenditure rates far exceed peacetime production capabilities, with Russian forces maintaining approximately 10:1 artillery advantage through sustained industrial mobilization.

Electronic warfare has emerged as the decisive factor in artillery effectiveness. Beyond GPS jamming affecting precision munitions, Russian forces employ comprehensive spectrum denial targeting communications, targeting systems, and command networks. Ukrainian forces adapted by reverting to wire communications, employing runners, and developing AI-guided drones maintaining target lock despite jamming. These adaptations demonstrate the requirement for artillery forces to operate effectively in contested electromagnetic environments without continuous digital connectivity.

Multi-Domain Integration

Future artillery operations emphasize multi-domain integration where fires synchronize with air, cyber, and electronic warfare effects through common operational pictures. The Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) initiatives aim to connect sensors and shooters across services and domains, enabling artillery to receive targeting from space-based sensors, airborne ISR platforms, and cyber operations.

This integration enables "any sensor, any shooter" operations where the optimal fire support asset engages each target regardless of command relationships. However, achieving this vision requires overcoming interoperability challenges, ensuring communications resilience in denied environments, and developing doctrine for decentralized execution when networks fail. The Ukraine experience suggests that while networked operations provide decisive advantages, forces must maintain capability to operate in degraded communications environments using traditional fire control methods.

Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy

Emerging technologies including artificial intelligence promise further transformation of artillery operations. AI-enabled systems can process multiple sensor inputs, predict target movements, optimize firing solutions accounting for complex variables, and coordinate fires across distributed units without centralized control. Ukrainian forces pioneered AI-guided drones that lock onto targets during final approach phases, maintaining effectiveness despite jamming.

The Army explores AI applications for predictive maintenance, automated target recognition, and fire mission planning. However, implementation faces challenges including adversary AI countermeasures, reliability in contested environments, and command authority questions for autonomous lethal systems. The fundamental requirement remains human decision-making for weapons release while leveraging AI to compress decision timelines and optimize effectiveness.

Conclusion

Time on Target artillery coordination has evolved from a WWII technique requiring synchronized watches and manual calculations into a sophisticated system-of-systems integrating precision munitions, automated fire control, and tactical data networks. Computer-controlled systems like AFATDS reduce response times from hours to seconds while coordinating fires from dozens of batteries simultaneously. Precision-guided munitions extend accurate engagement ranges beyond 50 kilometers while minimizing collateral damage.

However, the Ukraine conflict exposes critical vulnerabilities in GPS-dependent systems and highlights the enduring importance of artillery fundamentals including massed fires, rapid displacement, and operations in contested electromagnetic environments. The cancellation of ERCA demonstrates technical challenges in extending ranges while the degradation of Excalibur effectiveness reveals the vulnerability of satellite-dependent systems.

Future artillery effectiveness requires balancing technological sophistication with resilience, ensuring systems remain effective when networks fail and precision guidance becomes unavailable. The enduring principles of artillery—mass, surprise, and violence of action—remain valid even as the methods for achieving them transform through digital fire control, network integration, and precision munitions. The challenge for military planners involves maintaining these capabilities across the full spectrum from permissive to highly contested operational environments.

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Time on Target Artillery Coordination: From World War II to Modern Network-Centric Warfare | Claude | Claude