First of San Diego's futuristic Zumwalt destroyers gets new hypersonic missiles

But Missiles Won't Arrive Until 2026 at Earliest

BLUF: The USS Zumwalt has completed integration of launch systems for hypersonic missiles it cannot yet fire—marking the second time in a decade that the troubled destroyer class has been outfitted with weapons systems lacking ammunition. While the Navy touts the conversion as a "pivotal milestone," Congress has yet to fund procurement of any Conventional Prompt Strike missiles, deferring first purchases to FY2026 at the earliest. Meanwhile, the Navy is allowing four purpose-built cruise missile submarines—ideal platforms for hypersonic weapons—to retire without CPS integration, choosing instead to rely on slow-production Virginia-class attack submarines that won't deploy the weapons until the early 2030s. The combined strategy represents a high-risk procurement approach that raises fundamental questions about naval acquisition priorities and program management.

From One Empty Magazine to Another

The USS Zumwalt departed Huntington Ingalls Industries' Ingalls Shipbuilding facility in Pascagoula, Mississippi, on January 15, 2025, following completion of a conversion that fundamentally alters the ship's offensive capabilities. The destroyer now carries four Large Vertical Launch System tubes designed to hold twelve Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missiles—three per tube—replacing the two massive 155mm Advanced Gun Systems that have sat silent and useless since the ship's commissioning.

The conversion addresses one of modern naval history's most expensive capability gaps. The Zumwalt class was originally designed around the Advanced Gun System, intended to deliver precision naval surface fire support using Long Range Land Attack Projectiles at ranges exceeding 60 nautical miles. However, when unit costs for LRLAP exceeded $800,000 per round—making each projectile more expensive than a Tomahawk cruise missile while delivering only a 225-pound warhead—the Navy canceled procurement in 2016, leaving three destroyers with functioning guns but no ammunition.

The solution was to replace the AGS mounts with hypersonic missile launchers, approved in the Navy's fiscal year 2023 budget request. Yet this fix creates a troubling echo: the Zumwalt now has sophisticated launch tubes for weapons that don't yet exist in operational form and won't be purchased for at least another year.

Congress removed the Navy's FY2024 request for $341.4 million to procure eight CPS missiles. According to Defense Security Monitor reporting, the first actual procurement has been deferred to FY2026, when the Navy plans to purchase just six rounds, followed by 22 in FY2027, 16 in FY2028, and 17 in FY2029. Even these modest numbers assume congressional approval and successful completion of developmental testing—neither of which is guaranteed.

"We have achieved a pivotal milestone with our Navy and industry partners to advance this complex modernization work that will set a precedent for the Zumwalt class," said Brian Blanchette, Ingalls Shipbuilding president. What he didn't mention is that the ship can't actually fire the weapons it was designed to carry.

The Submarine Question: Perfect Platforms Sailing to Retirement

While the Navy struggles to field CPS on surface ships and attack submarines, a more troubling story emerges beneath the waves: the service is allowing the ideal platforms for hypersonic weapons to retire without ever carrying them.

The four Ohio-class guided missile submarines (SSGNs)—USS Ohio (SSGN-726), USS Michigan (SSGN-727), USS Florida (SSGN-728), and USS Georgia (SSGN-729)—were converted from ballistic missile submarines between 2002-2008 at a cost of approximately $1 billion per boat. Each SSGN currently carries 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 22 converted Trident missile tubes, with each tube holding seven Tomahawks. These submarines represent more than half of the Navy's undersea vertical launch payload capacity.

The SSGNs' large 88-inch diameter missile tubes are nearly ideal for CPS deployment. In 2017, the Navy and Defense Department specifically tested an early hypersonic prototype "in the form factor that would eventually, could eventually be utilized if leadership chooses to do so, in an Ohio-class tube," according to then-Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, who directed the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs. The test demonstrated that CPS could be adapted to these large tubes, potentially allowing each SSGN to carry 66 or more hypersonic missiles—roughly five times the capacity of a Zumwalt-class destroyer.

Yet all four SSGNs are scheduled to retire by 2028 without ever receiving CPS:

USS Ohio and USS Florida: retiring in 2026
USS Michigan and USS Georgia: retiring in 2028

The timing is particularly frustrating. The Navy began CPS development in the mid-2010s, overlapping with years when these submarines were operational and could have been modified. Instead, the service chose to let the window close, allowing the only large-tube conventional missile submarines in the fleet to retire without exploiting their unique capacity for hypersonic weapons.

Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert told Congress in 2014 that putting hypersonic weapons on the SSGNs would create a capability where "it will put the fear of god into our adversaries once we marry those two platforms together." That marriage never happened.

Why Not SSBNs? The Nuclear Mission Takes Priority

The Navy operates 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) armed with Trident II nuclear missiles, forming the sea-based leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. As the Columbia-class replacement submarines enter service starting in the 2030s, Ohio SSBNs will progressively retire through the 2040s. This raises an obvious question: why not convert retiring Ohio SSBNs to carry CPS, as was done with the four SSGNs?

The answer reveals the Navy's strategic priorities and constraints:

Treaty Limitations: The New START treaty limits the United States to 14 SSBNs. Converting any to conventional weapons would reduce the nuclear deterrent's sea-based leg, which the Navy considers unacceptable. All 14 Ohio SSBNs must remain on nuclear deterrence duty until Columbia-class boats replace them.

Columbia-Class Delays: The Columbia-class program is experiencing schedule delays and cost increases. The Navy cannot afford to take Ohio SSBNs offline for conversion when they're needed to maintain continuous nuclear deterrence patrols until sufficient Columbia boats are operational.

Cost and Timing: SSBN-to-SSGN conversions cost approximately $1 billion per boat in 2008 dollars—likely $4-5 billion today when accounting for inflation and refueling. This investment only makes sense if the converted boat has substantial service life remaining. By the time Columbia-class production is sufficiently advanced to free up Ohio SSBNs for conversion, those boats will be near the end of their 42-year service lives.

Future Opportunity Missed: However, the Navy could theoretically convert some Ohio SSBNs to CPS-armed SSGNs once Columbia-class boats are available in sufficient numbers to maintain nuclear deterrence—potentially in the late 2030s or early 2040s. Each converted boat could carry 66-88 CPS missiles using the large Trident tubes, providing massive strike capacity at a fraction of the cost of building new platforms.

A 2025 analysis in 19FortyFive proposed converting four retiring Ohio SSBNs to CPS-armed SSGNs, which would provide 264 hypersonic missiles—more than the current plan of approximately 258 missiles distributed across three Zumwalt-class destroyers and roughly 19 Virginia-class submarines. But the Navy has shown no indication it will pursue this option, planning instead to scrap Ohio SSBNs as Columbia boats replace them.

The Virginia-Class Compromise: Less Capacity, Later Delivery

With the four existing SSGNs retiring and Ohio SSBNs unavailable for conversion, the Navy has chosen Virginia-class attack submarines as the primary submarine platform for CPS. Beginning with Block V boats, Virginia-class submarines will be equipped with the Virginia Payload Module (VPM)—a 25.5-meter mid-body section containing four large-diameter vertical launch tubes.

Each VPM tube can accommodate three CPS hypersonic missiles, giving each VPM-equipped Virginia a capacity of 12 CPS rounds—the same as a Zumwalt-class destroyer but only about one-fifth the capacity of a converted Ohio SSGN. The VPM can alternatively carry seven Tomahawk cruise missiles per tube, unmanned underwater vehicles, or special operations equipment.

The VPM was originally designed to help replace the massive Tomahawk capacity lost when the four Ohio SSGNs retire. The submarines were intended to restore undersea strike capability lost with SSGN retirement, but the math is unfavorable: the Navy needs 22 VPM-equipped Virginia submarines to match the Tomahawk payload capacity of four Ohio SSGNs.

For CPS deployment, the Virginia approach offers several advantages:

Doesn't reduce nuclear deterrent capacity by converting SSBNs
Virginia production is ongoing, though significantly delayed
VPM integration was already planned, reducing additional platform modifications
Attack submarines offer tactical flexibility beyond pure strike missions

But the disadvantages are substantial:

Much smaller per-platform capacity: 12 CPS missiles versus 66+ on a converted Ohio
Virginia construction is running at only 1.2 boats per year instead of the planned 2.0 per year
Industrial base constraints from AUKUS submarine commitments further strain production
CPS integration on Virginia-class has been repeatedly delayed

Originally, the Navy planned for CPS to achieve initial operational capability on Virginia-class submarines in FY2028. Current reporting indicates that timeline has slipped to the early 2030s. The FY2024 Director of Operational Test & Evaluation report notes "insufficient data to fully assess CPS effectiveness," suggesting developmental work remains incomplete.

The Navy is constructing an underwater testbed to validate CPS launch from VPM-representative modules, but this testing infrastructure only recently came online. Phase three of the CPS acquisition program, which includes submarine integration, won't complete operational testing until 2029 according to program documents.

Even after operational testing succeeds, the Navy faces a procurement and inventory challenge. Current plans call for equipping approximately 19 Virginia-class submarines with CPS across Block V, Block VI, and Block VII variants—providing a theoretical maximum capacity of 228 missiles on submarines, plus 36 on the three Zumwalt-class destroyers, for a total of 264 sea-based hypersonic missiles by the late 2030s or early 2040s.

Compare this to what four converted Ohio SSGNs could have provided: 264 missiles on just four platforms, all available years earlier and with the stealth, endurance, and survivability advantages of nuclear-powered submarines optimized for the strike mission.

A Weapon System Still in Development

The Conventional Prompt Strike missile system remains developmental, with significant testing and evaluation work still ahead. The FY2024 report from the Pentagon's Director of Operational Test & Evaluation states there is "insufficient data to fully assess CPS effectiveness"—a sobering assessment for a program that has consumed hundreds of millions in development funding.

The CPS weapon employs a two-stage solid rocket booster to accelerate a Common Hypersonic Glide Body to speeds exceeding Mach 5, after which the glide body separates and maneuvers to the target using aerodynamic control surfaces while traveling at speeds above 3,800 miles per hour. Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles maintain sustained flight within the atmosphere, complicating defensive targeting and providing enhanced maneuverability.

According to Department of Defense budget documents and Congressional Research Service reports, the system is designed to strike targets at ranges greater than 1,725 nautical miles, providing commanders with prompt strike capability against time-sensitive, high-value targets. The weapon offers several operational advantages: extremely short time-to-target compared to subsonic cruise missiles, ability to hold hardened targets at risk, and capacity to penetrate sophisticated integrated air defense systems.

But development has proven challenging. The program conducted successful test flights in October 2017 and March 2020 from Pacific ranges. However, a June 2022 test in Hawaii resulted in a launch failure before the glide body could ignite. Multiple additional tests were canceled or delayed in 2023. A successful flight test occurred in December 2024, and a May 2025 test from Cape Canaveral validated the full cold-gas launch sequence planned for fleet use. These recent successes represent progress, but scattered test points across nearly eight years hardly constitute a robust validation program.

The joint Navy-Army program shares a common All-Up-Round that includes the Common Hypersonic Glide Body developed by Sandia National Laboratories and manufactured by Dynetics, a Leidos subsidiary. Lockheed Martin serves as prime contractor for CPS integration, responsible for the weapon control system, launcher integration, and fire control elements. General Dynamics develops the booster systems, while Northrop Grumman provides guidance and control systems.

Current program schedules originally called for initial operational capability in 2025, but this timeline appears increasingly unrealistic. Defense Security Monitor reporting indicates that CPS integration work aboard Zumwalt-class destroyers continues through 2026, with Virginia-class submarine integration beginning in FY2025 and first operational deployment now projected for the early 2030s.

The Navy's FY2025 budget request included $798.3 million for continued CPS development and testing—development money, not procurement funding. The FY2026 request adds another $798.3 million for research, development, test and evaluation. These investments will fund additional flight tests, software integration, and operational evaluation, but won't produce a single operational missile available for combat loading.

Meanwhile, the Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW), which shares the identical Common Hypersonic Glide Body and booster with CPS, achieved initial operational capability by September 30, 2025. The first battery of eight missiles is assigned to the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force at Joint Base Lewis-McChord for Indo-Pacific operations. This demonstrates that the missile technology itself can be fielded—the Navy's delays appear to stem from platform integration challenges and procurement decisions rather than fundamental weapon system problems.

Technical Integration: Getting the Ships Ready

The physical integration of CPS launchers required extensive modifications to the Zumwalt's forward section. Each Advanced Gun System mount and its associated ammunition handling system has been replaced with two LVLS tubes, each measuring approximately 87 inches in diameter and 34 feet in length—significantly larger than the standard Mk 41 Vertical Launch System used for Tomahawk and other missiles.

The LVLS tubes are arranged in pairs on either side of the ship's centerline, occupying the volume previously used for the AGS mounts and their magazines. This configuration provides capacity for twelve CPS missiles in four tubes, plus 80 cells of Mk 57 Peripheral Vertical Launch System for Standard missiles, Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Vertical Launch Anti-Submarine Rockets.

Integration required significant modifications to the ship's Total Ship Computing Environment, the integrated combat system controlling all weapons, sensors, and ship systems. The Zumwalt class employs a revolutionary computing architecture based on commercial off-the-shelf servers and software-defined systems, but integrating CPS fire control software, mission planning systems, and weapon interfaces presented substantial challenges.

CPS weapons require over-the-horizon targeting data, potentially provided by Navy P-8A Poseidon aircraft, MQ-4C Triton unmanned aerial vehicles, or satellite reconnaissance assets through the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air network. Establishing these data links and validating their performance under operational conditions represents additional work still in progress.

Power requirements for CPS launch systems appear manageable within the Zumwalt class's electrical generation capacity. The class features an Integrated Power System built around two Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbines and two Rolls-Royce RR4500 gas turbines, generating 78 megawatts of electrical power—more than any other U.S. surface combatant. This power supports not only propulsion through advanced induction motors but also the ship's AN/SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar and future directed-energy weapons.

Software integration remains a critical path item. The CPS weapon control system must integrate seamlessly with Zumwalt's combat systems, fire control networks, and off-board targeting infrastructure. Historical patterns in complex weapon system development suggest this software integration typically requires extensive testing and multiple iterations to achieve full functionality—work that extends well beyond installing physical launch tubes.

For Virginia-class submarines, integration challenges are even more complex. The Navy is constructing specialized underwater launch test facilities to validate CPS ejection, ignition, and flight characteristics from submerged platforms. Cold-gas launch from a pressurized submarine tube presents different engineering challenges than surface launch, requiring extensive testing to ensure crew safety and weapon reliability.

The VPM tubes themselves are compatible with CPS—they were designed with sufficient diameter and length to accommodate the weapon. However, the weapon control systems, launch sequencing, safety interlocks, and crew procedures for handling large solid rocket motors in confined submarine spaces all require development and certification. This work is ongoing but not yet complete.

Strategic Implications: A Capability Transformed

The addition of hypersonic strike capability fundamentally alters the operational role of platforms equipped to carry these weapons—once the missiles actually arrive and platforms are cleared to fire them.

In the context of distributed maritime operations and the Navy's evolving concept for deterring peer competitors, CPS-equipped platforms would provide several critical capabilities:

Extended Reach in Contested Environments: With ranges exceeding 1,700 nautical miles, a Zumwalt operating in the Philippine Sea or a Virginia-class submarine in the Western Pacific could theoretically strike targets throughout the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, or eastern Chinese mainland without entering range of land-based anti-ship missile systems. This standoff capability is essential in scenarios where adversary anti-access/area-denial systems make close approach prohibitively risky.

Time-Sensitive Strike: Hypersonic weapons compress decision cycles dramatically. Where a Tomahawk cruise missile might require two hours to reach a target 1,000 miles away, a CPS missile could arrive in approximately 10-12 minutes, enabling engagement of fleeting targets such as mobile missile launchers, relocatable command posts, or ships getting underway from port.

Penetrating High-End Air Defenses: Modern integrated air defense systems like China's HQ-9 or Russia's S-400 are optimized to engage aircraft and subsonic cruise missiles. Hypersonic glide vehicles present significantly more challenging intercept problems due to their combination of high speed, atmospheric flight trajectory, and maneuverability.

Submarine Advantages: CPS-equipped submarines offer unique operational benefits compared to surface ships. Submarines can operate undetected close to adversary shorelines, further reducing flight time and complicating enemy defensive planning. The stealth inherent in submarine operations makes pre-emptive strikes against CPS launch platforms far more difficult. A submarine can conduct clandestine reconnaissance, identify high-value targets, strike without warning, and withdraw without revealing its position.

However, operational employment faces significant constraints that call into question whether the current approach provides adequate combat capability:

Magazine Depth Crisis: Even when missiles become available and all planned platforms are equipped, the Navy's total inventory of sea-based hypersonic strike capacity will be severely limited. Current plans envision approximately 264 total CPS missiles distributed across:

Three Zumwalt-class destroyers: 36 missiles
Approximately 19 Virginia-class submarines: 228 missiles

This total assumes full procurement through the late 2030s or early 2040s and represents the maximum theoretical capacity, not operational loadout. In practice, not all platforms will carry full CPS loadouts at all times, as tubes will be shared with Tomahawks and other weapons based on mission requirements.

Compare this to what could have been achieved by converting four Ohio SSGNs: 264 missiles on just four platforms, available years earlier. Or consider converting four retiring Ohio SSBNs in the late 2030s: another 264 missiles, doubling the fleet's capacity.

Unlike the hundreds or thousands of Tomahawks the Navy can bring to bear, CPS missiles represent an extremely scarce asset. In any extended conflict, this inventory would be exhausted quickly. The Congressional Budget Office estimates each CPS missile costs approximately $40-50 million based on Army LRHW figures—roughly 20 times the cost of a Tomahawk Block V. At these costs and production rates, rapid replenishment during conflict appears unlikely.

Targeting and Intelligence Requirements: Hypersonic weapons are most effective against fixed or predictable targets where their speed advantage justifies their cost and limited availability. Employing CPS against mobile targets requires extremely current intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data with sufficient accuracy to support engagement planning. The targeting infrastructure must provide near-real-time location data, battle damage assessment, and retargeting capability—a challenging requirement in contested electromagnetic environments where adversaries will attempt to disrupt U.S. ISR networks.

Operational Vulnerability: Concentrating such capable weapons on three unique, high-visibility surface ships creates operational risk. The Zumwalt class's distinctive appearance and high-value weapons loadout make these vessels priority targets for adversary surveillance and potential preemptive strike. While the ships' stealth features reduce radar cross-section significantly, they remain visible to satellite reconnaissance, acoustic sensors, and visual observation.

Submarines offer better survivability, but the delayed timeline and limited numbers undermine this advantage. If Virginia-class CPS integration doesn't achieve operational status until the early 2030s, the Navy will spend a decade with hypersonic capability concentrated entirely on three surface ships—a highly vulnerable posture.

Geographic Concentration: According to November 2025 reporting from Interesting Engineering, the Navy intends to base all three Zumwalt-class destroyers and several CPS-equipped Virginia-class submarines at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam in Hawaii. This forward deployment makes operational sense for Indo-Pacific contingencies, but it also concentrates the entire sea-based hypersonic force at a single base vulnerable to long-range strike. Infrastructure upgrades at Pearl Harbor are scheduled for completion by mid-2028 to accommodate these platforms.

The Zumwalt Program: A Study in Acquisition Failure

The hypersonic conversion must be understood within the context of one of the Navy's most troubled acquisition programs. The Zumwalt class represents a cautionary tale in requirements creep, technological optimism, and program mismanagement, with a unit cost exceeding $4.4 billion per ship—roughly triple the cost of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer.

The class was originally planned for 32 ships to replace the Navy's aging cruiser and destroyer force with a revolutionary multi-mission platform emphasizing land attack, air defense, and anti-surface warfare. Cost growth and changing strategic priorities reduced the planned fleet to seven ships, then ultimately truncated procurement at just three vessels. This truncation created cascading cost problems: development costs that would have been amortized across 32 hulls were instead distributed across three, driving unit costs to unsustainable levels.

The Government Accountability Office has repeatedly criticized the Zumwalt program for cost growth, schedule delays, and technical problems. A 2021 GAO report noted that the lead ship experienced numerous reliability issues with its Integrated Power System, propulsion motors, and combat system integration. These problems have limited the operational availability of all three ships and delayed their full operational capability.

The Advanced Gun System failure represents the program's most visible shortcoming. When LRLAP costs spiraled beyond $800,000 per round, the Navy had no choice but to cancel procurement, leaving the ships with two massive gun mounts occupying prime deck space and internal volume while contributing nothing to combat capability. The AGS mounts weighed approximately 1,000 tons combined and consumed substantial electrical power for their automated ammunition handling systems—all for weapons that would never fire a shot.

The decision to convert these failed gun mounts to hypersonic missile launchers provided the Zumwalt class with a clearly defined mission that leverages the ships' unique attributes—exceptional electrical power generation, substantial internal volume, stealth characteristics, and sophisticated combat systems. But the question facing naval planners is whether three hypersonic-capable ships justify their operational and sustainment costs, particularly when those ships currently cannot fire the weapons they were designed to carry and won't be able to do so for at least another year.

The Navy has based all three Zumwalt-class ships at Naval Base San Diego initially, though plans call for relocating them to Pearl Harbor to support Indo-Pacific operations. This concentration allows development of specialized expertise in operating and maintaining these unique vessels, but also creates geographic concentration of the fleet's surface-based hypersonic strike capability—once that capability actually exists.

High-Risk Procurement Strategy

The combined approach to fielding CPS—completing Zumwalt conversions before missiles exist, allowing purpose-built SSGNs to retire without ever carrying the weapons, and relying on slow-production Virginia-class submarines—represents a high-risk procurement strategy, particularly given the program's troubled history.

Standard acquisition practice typically aligns platform modifications with weapon system maturity to avoid exactly this situation: platforms configured to fire weapons that don't exist. The Navy's approach reverses this sequence, betting that the missile program will successfully complete development and receive procurement funding while ships and submarines sit with empty launch tubes or sail to retirement.

This strategy carries multiple, compounding risks:

Program Cancellation Risk: If CPS development encounters insurmountable technical problems or Congress loses patience with continued cost growth and schedule delays, the Navy could find itself with three destroyers equipped with expensive launch tubes for weapons that never materialize—exactly the AGS/LRLAP problem repeated. The recent successful tests reduce this risk somewhat, but the program remains developmental and procurement remains unfunded.

Opportunity Cost - Platform: The hundreds of millions spent on Zumwalt conversions could have funded modifications to the four existing Ohio SSGNs, providing five times the capacity per platform and operational capability years earlier. Instead, perfect platforms are retiring unused while problematic platforms receive expensive conversions.

Opportunity Cost - Weapons: The billions invested in CPS development and platform integration could have purchased approximately 1,000-1,500 Tomahawk Block V missiles—proven weapons available today with known performance characteristics. While Tomahawks lack CPS's speed and penetration advantages, they are operational, affordable, and available in quantity.

Stranded Assets: Even if CPS successfully completes development, procurement rates of 6-22 missiles per year mean the Zumwalt class and Virginia submarines will operate for years with mostly empty launch tubes. The ships' operational value remains constrained by ammunition availability, not platform capability. A Zumwalt carrying 12 CPS missiles and 80 Mk 57 cells full of defensive weapons and Tomahawks provides capability, but is it $4.4 billion worth of capability?

Timeline Misalignment: The Navy chose to modify platforms across different timelines—Zumwalts now, Virginias through the 2030s—while allowing SSGNs to retire in 2026-2028 without modifications that could have been completed years ago. This creates a capability gap where hypersonic strike capacity builds slowly over more than a decade rather than coming online in a concentrated timeframe.

Industrial Base Constraints: Virginia-class production is constrained by shipyard capacity, workforce limitations, and competing demands from the AUKUS agreement to help Australia build nuclear submarines. Production is running at 1.2 boats per year instead of the planned 2.0 per year. Adding more Virginia submarines to the construction queue doesn't automatically accelerate delivery—it may simply push other critical programs further to the right.

Technology Obsolescence: By the time CPS achieves full operational capability and adequate inventory levels—potentially the late 2020s for Zumwalts, early 2030s for Virginias—the strategic environment and threat landscape may have evolved significantly. Adversary air defense systems continue advancing, potentially reducing CPS's penetration advantage. Chinese hypersonic weapons are proliferating, and defensive systems specifically designed to counter hypersonic threats are under development globally.

The Navy's rationale for this approach appears to rest on several questionable assumptions: that CPS development will succeed despite repeated delays, that Congress will fund procurement at planned rates, that the ships' other capabilities justify their cost even with limited CPS loadouts, that no superior alternative emerges during the extended development timeline, and that retiring the four purpose-built SSGNs without exploiting their hypersonic potential is acceptable. Each of these assumptions carries significant uncertainty.

Comparative Context: The Global Hypersonic Competition

The Zumwalt's CPS integration occurs against intense international competition in hypersonic weapons development, though the competitive picture is complicated by significant uncertainty about adversary capabilities versus claims.

Russia claims to have deployed the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle on UR-100N ICBMs and the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile on MiG-31K aircraft. The Avangard reportedly entered service in 2019, while Kinzhal has been used in combat operations in Ukraine, though with mixed results and questions about whether it truly qualifies as a hypersonic weapon versus a ballistic missile. Russia has also announced the Tsirkon (3M22 Zircon) hypersonic anti-ship cruise missile, which has undergone testing from surface ships and submarines, though independent verification of performance claims remains limited.

China has tested the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle and deployed the DF-17 medium-range ballistic missile system, reportedly conducting hundreds of test flights. In 2021, China tested a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from a fractional orbital bombardment system, demonstrating unexpected capability that surprised U.S. intelligence analysts. China's hypersonic development remains largely opaque, though satellite imagery, intelligence assessments, and occasional demonstrations suggest active programs across multiple platforms.

Neither Russia nor China has publicly demonstrated sea-launched hypersonic weapons directly comparable to CPS in terms of range, payload, and operational concept. However, both nations are clearly developing such capabilities, and the pace of their programs appears faster than U.S. efforts—though this may reflect looser testing standards, acceptance of higher risk, or simply propaganda rather than genuine operational capability.

The U.S. approach differs fundamentally from these competitors in several respects. American hypersonic programs emphasize conventional rather than nuclear payloads, reflecting different strategic priorities and legal constraints. U.S. programs generally pursue boost-glide systems rather than air-breathing scramjet propulsion, favoring mature technology with lower development risk but potentially limiting ultimate performance. American development timelines have been more conservative than the aggressive schedules claimed by competitors, though whether this reflects more rigorous testing standards and operational requirements or bureaucratic inefficiency remains debatable.

The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon achieved initial operational capability by September 30, 2025, making it the first U.S. operational hypersonic weapon system. The first battery of eight missiles is deployed to the Indo-Pacific, providing land-based hypersonic strike capability before the Navy fields its sea-based variant. This demonstrates that shared technology approach works—the Common Hypersonic Glide Body and booster can be operationally fielded when acquisition strategy supports it.

The contrast is instructive: the Army managed to field an operational hypersonic capability despite sharing the same developmental missile as the Navy. The difference lies primarily in procurement strategy—the Army funded production and accepted operational risk, while the Navy continues development work without buying operational rounds and pursues platform integration strategies of questionable efficiency.

Future Prospects and Unanswered Questions

The successful integration of CPS launch systems on USS Zumwalt raises questions about broader Navy hypersonic plans and whether this represents a viable path forward or an expensive detour that will require yet another course correction.

Current program documents indicate that CPS will remain limited to the three Zumwalt-class destroyers and Virginia-class submarines for the foreseeable future, with no plans to integrate the system on other surface combatants. The Virginia Payload Module planned for Block V and later Virginia-class submarines will accommodate both Tomahawk cruise missiles and CPS missiles, though actual CPS deployment on submarines now appears delayed to the early 2030s.

The Navy is exploring several potential pathways for expanding sea-based hypersonic capability beyond the current plan:

Next-Generation Strike Missile: The Navy's Next Generation Strike Missile program aims to develop a follow-on to Tomahawk with significantly enhanced speed and range. While program requirements remain classified, industry analysis suggests NGSM could incorporate hypersonic glide technology in a package compatible with standard Mk 41 VLS cells, enabling deployment across the surface fleet. If successful, NGSM could provide hypersonic capability to dozens of destroyers and cruisers rather than concentrating it on a handful of specialized platforms.

DDG(X) Integration: The Navy's next-generation guided-missile destroyer is in early concept development with plans for first-unit construction in the late 2020s. Hypersonic weapons integration is a stated requirement for this platform, though specific weapons and launcher configurations remain undetermined. DDG(X) could potentially use either CPS in large-diameter tubes or a future Mk 41-compatible hypersonic weapon.

Ohio SSBN Conversion: Though not part of current plans, converting some Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines to CPS-armed SSGNs as Columbia-class replacements become available represents a potential pathway to significantly expand hypersonic inventory. Four converted boats could provide 264 missiles, doubling the current planned capacity. However, this would require the Navy to reverse course on its apparent decision to scrap Ohio SSBNs rather than convert them.

The broader question facing the Navy concerns the appropriate balance between exquisite, high-end capabilities concentrated in small numbers of platforms versus more widely distributed weapons across the fleet. The Zumwalt experience suggests risks in both approaches: the original AGS/LRLAP concept failed due to unsustainable costs, while the CPS solution, though technically progressing, provides extremely limited magazine depth and questionable operational value given inventory constraints.

Whether concentrating initial hypersonic capability on three unique, expensive surface ships while allowing purpose-built cruise missile submarines to retire represents sound strategy or continued misallocation of scarce resources remains an open question. The answer may not emerge until CPS missiles actually exist in operational inventories—if they do—and the Navy can assess whether the capability justifies the extraordinary investment.

The submarine question looms particularly large. If the Navy proceeds with current plans, the United States will lack any large-capacity undersea hypersonic strike platforms for the foreseeable future. The four SSGNs will be gone by 2028. Virginia-class boats with VPM won't achieve CPS operational capability until the early 2030s at best, and even then will carry only 12 missiles per boat—a fraction of SSGN capacity. By the time sufficient VPM-equipped Virginias are operational to provide meaningful capability, the strategic window may have shifted, and adversaries may have deployed effective countermeasures.

Conclusion: Another Expensive Gamble

The USS Zumwalt's transformation from a troubled ship class with inoperable main armament to a hypersonic strike platform without hypersonic weapons represents adaptation born of desperation rather than strategic planning. The Navy successfully salvaged a deeply flawed acquisition program by providing the ships with a new mission, but has done so by betting on a weapon system still years away from operational deployment while simultaneously allowing ideal platforms for that weapon to retire without ever carrying it.

As the Zumwalt completes sea trials and works toward return to service in 2025, it will do so with sophisticated launch tubes for weapons that won't arrive until 2026 at the earliest—and then only in token quantities of six rounds. The ship can go to sea, but it cannot perform its primary mission. Meanwhile, four Ohio-class guided missile submarines—each capable of carrying five times as many hypersonic missiles as a Zumwalt—sail toward retirement in 2026-2028 without ever receiving the weapons they were ideally suited to carry.

This situation echoes the Advanced Gun System debacle that left the class without effective armament for nearly a decade. The critical difference is that CPS is progressing through development and will eventually be procured, whereas LRLAP was canceled entirely. But the underlying problems remain and have multiplied: the Navy has once again invested hundreds of millions in platform modifications before ensuring weapon availability, has allowed perfect platforms to retire unused, and has chosen an integration strategy that spreads limited capability across too many platforms arriving too slowly.

The submarine dimension makes the situation particularly frustrating. If the Navy had equipped the four Ohio SSGNs with CPS before their retirement, the service would have 264 hypersonic missiles operational on highly survivable platforms by 2026-2028. Instead, the Navy will spend the next decade slowly building toward that same capacity on Virginia-class submarines—platforms with one-fifth the individual capacity, serving in a dual role that compromises both attack and strike missions, and delayed by industrial base constraints that may prove insurmountable.

Whether this high-risk approach ultimately proves successful depends on factors still unfolding: CPS developmental testing must succeed, Congress must fund procurement at levels far exceeding current plans, the missiles must achieve acceptable reliability, Virginia-class production must accelerate dramatically, submarine integration must overcome substantial technical challenges, and the Navy must develop effective operational doctrine for employing a small number of extremely expensive weapons distributed across platforms that won't all be ready simultaneously. None of these outcomes is guaranteed, and several appear unlikely based on historical performance.

The Zumwalt program was supposed to revolutionize naval surface warfare. Instead, it has become a case study in acquisition pathologies—technological overreach, requirements instability, cost growth, missed opportunities, and a seemingly endless cycle of modifications to fix previous mistakes. Converting the ships to fire hypersonic missiles addresses their most glaring deficiency, but only if those missiles actually materialize, only if the submarines intended to carry most of the inventory actually get built and integrated on schedule, and only if retiring the purpose-built platforms that could have carried these weapons proves not to have been a strategic blunder.

For now, the Zumwalt sails with empty magazines—again—while four Ohio-class cruise missile submarines steam toward retirement without the weapons they were perfectly designed to carry, and the Navy, Congress, and defense contractors continue working toward a capability that may or may not justify its extraordinary cost. The ship's journey from costly embarrassment to strategic asset remains incomplete, with the most critical chapters yet to be written and increasingly doubtful of a satisfactory ending.

Verified Sources with Formal Citations

Jennewein, Chris. "First of San Diego's futuristic Zumwalt destroyers gets new hypersonic missiles." Times of San Diego, 17 January 2025. https://timesofsandiego.com/military/2025/01/17/first-of-san-diegos-futuristic-zumwalt-destroyers-gets-new-hypersonic-missiles/
U.S. Navy. "USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000)." Naval Sea Systems Command, 2024. https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Home/Warfare-Centers/NSWC-Dahlgren/What-We-Do/Zumwalt/
Congressional Research Service. "Navy Conventional Prompt Strike Missile: Background and Issues for Congress." Report R46567, Updated December 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46567
Congressional Research Service. "The U.S. Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW): Dark Eagle." In Focus IF11991, Updated January 2026. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF11991
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Navy Shipbuilding: Past Performance Provides Valuable Lessons for Future Investments." GAO-21-239, June 2021. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-239
U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Weapon Systems Annual Assessment." GAO Report, June 11, 2025.
U.S. Department of Defense. "Fiscal Year 2025 Budget Request: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Navy." February 2024. https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/25pres/RDTEN_Book.pdf
U.S. Navy. "Navy Conventional Prompt Strike Weapon System Flight Tests Environmental Assessment/Overseas Environmental Assessment." Naval Environmental Analysis Office, 2024. https://www.nepa.navy.mil/
McDougall, Shaun. "Lockheed Martin Awarded $1 Billion U.S. Navy Contract for Hypersonic Missile Work." Defense Security Monitor, 3 June 2025. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/06/03/lockheed-martin-awarded-1-billion-u-s-navy-contract-for-hypersonic-missile-work/
McDougall, Shaun. "An Overview of Current U.S. Hypersonic Missile Developments." Defense Security Monitor, 22 December 2025. https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/12/22/an-overview-of-current-u-s-hypersonic-missile-developments/
Hambling, David. "Inside the U.S. Military's Race to Deploy Hypersonic Missiles." Popular Mechanics, 3 July 2025. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a65010390/us-hypersonic-missile-programs/
Lawrence, Drew F. "GAO warns that Air Force's hypersonic cruise missile program is behind schedule." DefenseScoop, 11 June 2025. https://defensescoop.com/2025/06/11/gao-report-air-force-hacm-hypersonic-cruise-missile-behind-schedule/
"US Deploying 1700 Mile Range Hypersonic Missiles." NextBigFuture, 16 October 2025. https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2025/10/us-deploying-1700-mile-range-hypersonic-missiles.html
"Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon." Wikipedia, Updated January 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Long-Range_Hypersonic_Weapon
"Conventional Prompt Strike." Wikipedia, Updated December 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conventional_Prompt_Strike
"Ohio-class submarine." Wikipedia, Updated December 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohio-class_submarine
"Virginia-class submarine." Wikipedia, Updated January 2026. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia-class_submarine
"Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Programme, USA." Naval Technology, 15 March 2024. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/conventional-prompt-strike-cps-programme-usa/
"Hypersonic projects include Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) and Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW)." Military Aerospace, 2024. https://www.militaryaerospace.com/test/article/55275198/hypersonic-projects-include-conventional-prompt-strike-cps-and-long-range-hypersonic-weapon-lrhw
Eckstein, Megan. "Navy Confirms Global Strike Hypersonic Weapon Will First Deploy on Virginia Attack Subs." USNI News, 18 February 2020. https://news.usni.org/2020/02/18/navy-confirms-global-strike-hypersonic-weapon-will-first-deploy-on-virginia-attack-subs
Eckstein, Megan. "Navy Declares IOC for Zumwalt-Class Destroyer." USNI News, 20 September 2023. https://news.usni.org/2023/09/20/navy-declares-ioc-for-zumwalt-class-destroyer
LaGrone, Sam. "Navy's Zumwalt Destroyer Gets Hypersonic Missile Tubes." USNI News, 11 January 2024. https://news.usni.org/2024/01/11/navys-zumwalt-destroyer-gets-hypersonic-missile-tubes/
Burgess, Richard R. "Zumwalt Class Destroyers Being Reconfigured for Hypersonic Missiles." Seapower Magazine, 15 March 2023. https://seapowermagazine.org/zumwalt-class-destroyers-being-reconfigured-for-hypersonic-missiles/
U.S. Department of Defense. "Director, Operational Test and Evaluation FY2022 Annual Report: Conventional Prompt Strike." 2022. https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/navy/2022cps.pdf
Kaushal, Sidharth and Sam Cranny-Evans. "Hypersonic Weapons: Myths, Realities, and How to Respond." RUSI Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute, November 2022. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/hypersonic-weapons-myths-realities-and-how-respond
Gady, Franz-Stefan and Michael Kofman. "Untangling the Hype Around Hypersonic Weapons." War on the Rocks, 4 December 2019. https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/untangling-the-hype-around-hypersonic-weapons/
Stashwick, Steven. "US Navy to Arm Virginia-Class Attack Subs With New Hypersonic Weapon." The Diplomat, 21 February 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/us-navy-to-arm-virginia-class-attack-subs-with-new-hypersonic-weapon/
"Sea-Based Hypersonics Hit the Fleet: CPS on Zumwalt, Virginia." The Relay, 26 September 2025. https://therelaymag.com/sea-based-hypersonics-cps-zumwalt-virginia-indo-pacific
Hollings, Alex. "Conventional Prompt Strike: The US Navy's Hypersonic Weapons Programme." Euro-SD, 12 April 2023. https://euro-sd.com/2023/04/articles/30723/conventional-prompt-strike-the-us-navys-hypersonic-weapons-programme/
Purssell, Robert. "The U.S. Navy Could Turn Ohio-Class Subs and Nimitz Carriers Into Missile Trucks." 19FortyFive, 19 March 2025. https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-navy-could-turn-ohio-class-subs-and-nimitz-carriers-into-hypersonic-missile-trucks/
"The Navy's Ohio-Class SSGN Submarines: 'Cruise Missile Trucks' Headed for Retirement?" The National Interest, 25 November 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/navys-ohio-class-ssgn-submarines-cruise-missile-trucks-headed-retirement-210476
U.S. Navy. "SSGN - Ohio Class Guided Missile Submarine." Military.com. https://www.military.com/equipment/ssgn-ohio-class-guided-missile-submarine
"Ohio Class SSGN." Submarine Industrial Base Council, 30 March 2017. https://submarinesuppliers.org/programs/ssn-ssgn/ssgn/
"Hypersonic warships, subs at US' Pearl Harbor to counter China threat." Interesting Engineering, 10 November 2025. https://interestingengineering.com/military/us-to-send-its-most-advanced-hypersonic
Keller, John. "Lockheed Martin to move forward on developing hypersonic weapons for Navy submarines and surface warships." Military Aerospace, 2025. https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/55294822/lockheed-martin-hypersonic-missiles-for-submarines-and-surface-ships
General Dynamics Mission Systems. "Ohio-Class SSBN & SSGN Submarines." https://gdmissionsystems.com/submarine-systems/ohio-class

Author's Note: This analysis draws on open-source Department of Defense budget documents, Congressional Research Service reports, Government Accountability Office assessments, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation reports, Navy program documentation, and defense industry sources. Classified performance parameters for CPS missiles and specific operational employment concepts are not included. The author previously worked on Lynx SAR/GMTI radar systems at General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and brings 20+ years of defense systems engineering experience to this analysis, including work on classified strategic programs during the Cold War era.

SIDEBAR: A Navy Without a Strategy—or Why None of This Makes Sense

The USS Zumwalt's hypersonic conversion crystallizes a broader and more troubling problem: the U.S. Navy appears to lack a coherent operational concept for how its surface fleet will actually fight in the Indo-Pacific theater it claims to be preparing for. The service continues spending billions on platforms and weapons while fundamental questions about their employment remain unanswered—or worse, unasked.

The Unanswered Questions

Consider what the Navy hasn't explained about CPS-equipped platforms:

How do three $4.4 billion destroyers with 12 hypersonic missiles each contribute to deterring or fighting China? The obvious answer is "standoff strike against high-value targets," but this raises immediate follow-on questions the Navy hasn't addressed publicly. What targets justify weapons costing $40-50 million each when Tomahawks cost $2 million? How do you find and target mobile threats in time to exploit CPS's 10-minute flight time? What happens after you've expended your 36-missile inventory—do these three ships sail home?

Why concentrate such expensive, high-value platforms in contested waters? The Navy plans to base all three Zumwalts at Pearl Harbor along with CPS-equipped Virginia-class submarines. This forward deployment optimizes response time for Indo-Pacific contingencies, but it also parks $13+ billion worth of unique, irreplaceable ships within range of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The Zumwalts' stealth features reduce radar signature, but they don't make the ships invisible to satellite reconnaissance, acoustic sensors, or simple visual observation in harbor. If conflict appears imminent, these platforms become priority targets for preemptive strike—and unlike SSBNs that can disappear into the ocean, surface ships in port are sitting ducks.

What's the operational concept for ships that can't survive inside the adversary's weapons engagement zone? The entire premise of distributed maritime operations and the Marine Corps' new littoral doctrine assumes that U.S. forces will operate inside the first island chain—within range of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and air power. Yet the Navy is building a surface fleet increasingly optimized for standoff operations from outside this threat envelope. The Zumwalt can fire CPS from 1,700+ nautical miles away, but what then? Does it close with enemy forces to employ its other weapons? Does it retreat to safe distance? The ship's combination of offensive reach and defensive vulnerability suggests an operational concept that hasn't been thought through to completion.

How does any of this integrate with joint operations? The Army has operational hypersonic missiles deployed to the Indo-Pacific right now. The Air Force is developing air-launched hypersonic weapons. Theater commanders will have multiple hypersonic options—so why does the Navy need its own bespoke sea-based variant at enormous cost? What targets can the Navy hit that the Army and Air Force can't? The answer should drive platform and weapon choices, but there's no evidence the Navy has done this analysis—or if it has, it hasn't shared the results.

The Procurement Disconnect

Even more fundamentally, the Navy's procurement decisions don't align with its stated operational priorities:

The Navy says it needs more ships. The service's force structure assessments consistently call for 350-400 ships to meet global commitments and fight a peer competitor. Current fleet size hovers around 290 ships. The shortfall is obvious and growing as older ships retire faster than new ones commission.

Yet the Navy builds fewer, more expensive ships. Instead of maximizing hull numbers within constrained budgets, the Navy pursues exquisite platforms. Three Zumwalts at $13+ billion could have bought 4-5 additional Arleigh Burke-class destroyers—proven designs that work, carry more defensive weapons, and would actually increase fleet capacity. The argument that Zumwalts bring unique capabilities only holds if those capabilities matter more than presence, numbers, and the ability to be multiple places simultaneously.

The Navy prioritizes capabilities it can't afford to use. CPS missiles at $40-50 million each and procurement rates of 6-22 per year create a weapon the Navy will be afraid to employ except in extremis. Compare this to China's approach: proliferate large numbers of less sophisticated weapons and overwhelm defenses through volume. The U.S. counters with small numbers of exquisite weapons that must work perfectly because there aren't enough to afford failures. This is the strategy of a service that hasn't seriously thought about magazine depth in sustained combat.

The Navy retires capacity it desperately needs. The four Ohio SSGNs collectively carry 616 Tomahawks—more than the Tomahawk capacity of 15 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. These boats provide overwhelming strike capability from survivable, stealthy platforms. Yet the Navy is retiring all four by 2028 and replacing their capacity with... eventually... someday... 22 Virginia-class submarines that won't all be ready until the 2040s. This isn't a plan; it's institutional negligence.

The China Problem No One Wants to Discuss

Here's the uncomfortable reality the Navy seems determined to avoid: in a full-scale conflict with China over Taiwan, the U.S. surface fleet faces existential risk.

China has spent 25 years developing an integrated anti-access/area-denial system specifically designed to destroy U.S. Navy surface ships. This includes:

DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles
Hundreds of land-based anti-ship cruise missiles
Submarine-launched anti-ship weapons
Extensive air-launched missile capabilities
A space-based targeting network to find and track U.S. ships across the Western Pacific

The Navy's surface fleet has no answer to this. Aegis can engage multiple threats, but it can't defeat a massed salvo of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from multiple axes. Standard missiles cost $2-4 million each; Chinese anti-ship missiles cost far less. The math doesn't work—China can overwhelm defenses through volume while spending a fraction of what the U.S. spends defending against them.

The logical response would be either:

Accept that surface ships can't operate in the first island chain and build forces optimized for standoff operations
Build enough ships and weapons that losing some is acceptable
Develop revolutionary defensive systems that change the cost-exchange ratio
Rethink the strategy entirely

The Navy is doing none of these. Instead, it's building small numbers of expensive, vulnerable surface ships and pretending the problem doesn't exist.

The Submarine Alternative the Navy Won't Pursue

Submarines offer the obvious solution: they can operate inside the threat envelope, they're difficult to find and kill, and they provide strike capability without the vulnerability of surface ships. The Navy knows this—that's why SSBNs form the bedrock of nuclear deterrence.

Yet the Navy won't fully commit to submarines for conventional strike:

It's retiring the four Ohio SSGNs without replacement, eliminating 616 Tomahawks and potential CPS capacity of 264+ missiles from the most survivable platforms in the fleet.

It's building Virginia-class submarines too slowly to replace even existing attack submarine numbers, much less add capacity to offset SSGN retirements.

It's not converting retiring Ohio SSBNs to conventional strike submarines, despite these boats offering 5-10 times the capacity of any alternative platform.

It's prioritizing surface ships that are far more vulnerable and expensive while providing less capacity per platform.

Why? The surface Navy has bureaucratic and political power that submarine forces don't. Aircraft carriers and destroyers make impressive port visits, show the flag, and photograph well. Submarines disappear—literally and figuratively. Admirals build careers commanding carrier strike groups, not submarine squadrons. Congress members want shipyards in their districts building visible ships, not invisible submarines.

This isn't strategy; it's institutional bias determining procurement.

The Columbia-Class Albatross

The Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program exemplifies the Navy's strategic bankruptcy. These boats are necessary—the sea-based nuclear deterrent can't fail. But the program is consuming shipyard capacity, workforce, and budget that could address conventional capability gaps.

Columbia-class costs are spiraling: $130+ billion for 12 submarines, or roughly $10+ billion per boat. This is crowding out everything else. Virginia-class production has slowed to protect Columbia schedules. Surface ship maintenance is deferred. Other programs get cut to protect Columbia funding.

The rational response would be parallel approaches: protect Columbia as the nuclear deterrent priority while converting retiring Ohio SSBNs to conventional strike submarines to address theater warfare needs. This leverages existing hulls, preserves nuclear capability, and provides massive conventional strike capacity.

But the Navy won't do this because it wants new construction, not conversions. It wants Columbia-class submarines and new surface ships and new everything—and it can't afford any of it, so nothing gets done adequately.

What an Actual Strategy Might Look Like

If the Navy seriously analyzed Indo-Pacific conflict requirements, a coherent strategy might include:

Accept surface ship vulnerability and plan accordingly. Build cheaper, more numerous surface combatants that can absorb losses. Deploy them in distributed operations where losing ships doesn't lose the war. Save the expensive platforms for missions that justify the risk.

Maximize submarine capacity. Convert retiring Ohio SSBNs to CPS-armed SSGNs. Accelerate Virginia production even if it means delaying surface ships. Submarines can operate in contested waters; surface ships increasingly can't.

Solve the magazine depth problem. A Navy that runs out of missiles in the first week of war has failed. Either build many more weapons (expensive) or build weapons optimized for volume production (cheaper, possibly less capable). The current approach—small numbers of very expensive missiles—guarantees rapid exhaustion of inventory.

Integrate with joint forces. Stop pursuing service-specific solutions to theater problems. If Army hypersonics can hit the targets, why does Navy need its own? Share weapons, share targeting, share costs.

Make hard choices about missions. The Navy can't do everything with 290 ships and a stagnant budget. What matters most: power projection, sea control, deterrence, presence? Different answers lead to different fleets.

The Navy is doing none of this. Instead, it's building a small number of exquisite platforms with weapons it can't afford to use, retiring capable platforms prematurely, and hoping nobody notices that the emperor has no strategy.

Billions Into the Deep Six

Here's what the Navy has spent on Zumwalt-related programs:

$22+ billion for three Zumwalt-class destroyers (original cost estimates were $9 billion total)
$3+ billion developing the Advanced Gun System and LRLAP ammunition that never worked
Hundreds of millions converting the ships to carry CPS missiles
Billions more developing CPS that remains developmental after nearly a decade
Unknown additional billions for CPS procurement that hasn't happened yet

Total investment: approaching $30 billion for three ships that still can't perform their intended mission.

For comparison:

The four Ohio SSGN conversions cost $4 billion total and provided 616 Tomahawks immediately
A Virginia-class submarine costs $4.3 billion and provides multi-mission capability
An Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyer costs $2.5 billion and works

The Zumwalt program represents not just acquisition failure but strategic failure—billions spent on platforms without a coherent concept for their employment, weapons they can't fire, and missions they can't perform, all while purpose-built platforms retire unused and real capability gaps go unaddressed.

This isn't planning. It's institutional inertia with a Navy letterhead.

The question isn't whether the Zumwalt will eventually get hypersonic missiles—it probably will, in small numbers, years from now. The question is whether spending $30+ billion to put 36 hypersonic missiles on three vulnerable surface ships represents a reasonable allocation of resources when the Navy faces peer competition in the Indo-Pacific, a shrinking fleet, deferred maintenance, and industrial base constraints that prevent building ships fast enough to replace losses.

The answer appears to be no. But the Navy continues anyway, because stopping would mean admitting the entire enterprise was misconceived from the start. Better to keep shoveling money into the deep six and hope somehow it works out.

It won't.

Note: The Navy has consistently declined to provide detailed operational concepts for Zumwalt-class employment with CPS, citing classification concerns. While some operational details appropriately remain classified, the absence of even unclassified strategic justification for a $30 billion investment suggests the service either hasn't done the analysis or doesn't want to defend the results publicly. Either possibility is troubling.

Aerospace Electronic and Defense Systems

Friday, January 23, 2026

USS Zumwalt Completes Hypersonic Conversion